




























The Dissertation Committee for Curtis Anthony Brewer 
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: 
 
Interpreting the Policy Past: The Relationship Between Education and 







Michelle Young, Supervisor 
Norma V. Cantu 
Pedro Reyes 




Interpreting the Policy Past: The Relationship Between Education and 









Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin  
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of 










To my wife, Kristen, 
whose true-love-ways move and sustain me. 
 
To the boys, Taber and Milo, 
whose smiles give me courage. 
 
To my parents, Ben and Judy, 




 No written work has a single author. The many people I have encountered 
during my life all have produced this work. I have been lucky to have students, 
friends, professors, mentors, and family members who all encouraged me to be 
thoughtful about how we treat each other, especially our children.   
 First, I must acknowledge my committee and thank my adviser, Dr. Michelle 
D. Young, whose focus and knowledge have stretched my intellect and encouraged 
me to take on the questions that I was passionate about. This dissertation would not 
have come to fruition without the both academic and financial support of Dr. Pedro 
Reyes. Also, Dr. Norma Cantu’s real-life experiences and her perspectives on the 
politics of law provided me with important feedback. Since I met her, Dr. Jennifer 
Jellison Holme continually has recommended some of the best and most needed 
readings, many of which made this dissertation possible. Last, but by no means least 
of my committee members, Dr. Mariah Wade’s archival methods class and her 
attention to social theory were important ingredients in my approach to research. 
Thank all of you for your time and advice as I worked through this project.  
 A special thanks goes to Dr. Jay D. Scribner, who took a chance on me and at 
the same time never stopped supporting me. He taught me that a great deal of being a 
professor is about making sure that students know that they belong. He is a person 
whose substantial impact stems from his kindness.  
 During my doctoral studies, numerous friends and colleagues, many of whom 
are teachers, helped educate me: Bradley Carpenter, Jess Geir, and Madeleine 
vi 
Hamilton, just to name a few. I also would like to thank the writing group, Justin 
Olmanson, Steven Greenstein, and Jennifer Jefferson, who suffered through many 
earlier drafts. Finally, I would like to acknowledge John Gasko and Thu Suong 
Nguyen, who both helped me through numerous conversations.  
 Finally and most importantly I would like to thank my family. My parents and 
my sister, through their unconditional love, they always allowed me to be myself. 
Also, Steve and Ticket Slinkard, whose generosity, support, and love made my 
doctoral studies possible. Most importantly, I would like to thank Kristen, whose love 
is the only foundational category I know.  
vii 
Interpreting the Policy Past: The Relationship Between Education and Antipoverty 
Policy During the Carter Administration 
 
Publication No. _________ 
 
Curtis Anthony Brewer, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2008 
 
Supervisor: Michelle Young 
Given the present demand for greater accountability in public education and 
the call to close the achievement gap between the haves and have-nots, scholars have 
renewed advocacy for policy frameworks that combine education and antipoverty 
policies. This study historicizes the possibilities for such connections at the federal 
level by focusing on how people during the Carter Administration explained the 
relationship between the policies. Toward this end, this study examined how the 
coconstructions of context and meaning of the late 1970s made certain explanations 
of the relationship between education and anti-poverty policy more possible than 
others.   
 This study is a critical policy analysis employing historical methods. A 
historical narrative was constructed through the collection of oral history and archival 
data. Through this history, explanations of the relationships between the policies by 
the Carter Administration are situated within the social regularities of the day.  
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 Specifically, in the late 1970s, as people became dismayed by the persistence 
of equality issues, despite equal protection under the law, they looked for other ways 
to work toward equality. The elevation of education as a national priority became a 
visible strategy to the power structure at the time because it did not require a 
necessary redistribution of privilege and would allow a concomitant strategy to invest 
in other identities. At the same time, as people searched for greater personal freedom 
through education. A growing neo-liberal sentiment asserted that education policies 
had to be disconnected from the antipoverty policies that were supported by groups, 
whose demands for conformity were seen as standing in the way of social well-being 
predicated on the pursuit of self-interest.  
 Thus, in the late 1970s education and antipoverty policy were separated at the 
federal level, not only bureaucratically, but also in the rhetoric of national priorities. 
As a result, education policy became more greatly aligned with human capital 
development and further detached from more redistributive policy frameworks. The 
rearticulation in the social regularities regarding race, property, individualism, and 
domestic stability remade the possible in domestic social policy. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.  
       –F. Scott Fitzgerald 
 
The purpose of this study was to research the ways in which people explained 
the relationship between federal education and antipoverty policies from 1975–1981. 
I undertook this task to demonstrate the complexity of the multiple sites of political 
struggle, where policy is made and negotiated, and to point to the ways in which 
education policies are always in circulation with and enacted among other polices. 
This demonstration can provide insight into how the social regularities (see the 
appendix for definitions) during the Carter Administration shaped the possibilities of 
U.S. education and antipoverty policies. Such a study would help me and others 
interpret the present policy options and our desires for social justice as events of a 
specific historical moment with its own possibilities and contradictions. In doing so, 
we can begin to engage in more creative policy making, which may help us in our 
struggle to improve the well-being of our children inside and outside of school.  
My choice of this research problem has been shaped by my own history as 
well as by the time and place in which I am currently working. Because this work 
cannot be seen as separate from my own subjectivities, I use the “I” pronoun. 
Wilinsky (1989) advised, “Researchers must find ways of stepping from behind the 
disembodied voice” (p. 249). However, this does not mean that one should assume 
that this is the work of an autonomous consciousness. Instead, my experience should 
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be read as a snapshot of my subjectivity, which is always “within the context of a 
fluid, changeable social setting, in motion via the interaction of a plurality of 
multiply-sited, diffused agents” (Lather, 1991, p. 42).  
The subject matter of my dissertation was strategically chosen based on my 
desires to improve schooling and the quality of life of many children of poverty 
today. These desires developed out of the contradictions of our time, brought into 
sharp relief during my years as a middle school social studies teacher in a high-
poverty school. In my school, I worked with teachers who heroically employed 
progressive and culturally specific pedagogies to support students’ ability to construct 
and interact with knowledge as their experiences dictated. In my own classroom, I 
hoped to create a community of learners where a sense of the self could be developed 
through a critical engagement with history. Most of the time I failed.  
Although some teachers had moderate levels of success, we felt that most of 
our attempts for this type of education were systematically undermined by the very 
structure of schooling. These structures, which included working with over 150 
students a day, seemed to be validated only by tradition and economy and had little 
relationship to a child’s ability to learn. Systems, which were reflected in the schedule 
of the day, forced students to compartmentalize their learning and created student 
loads for teachers that were too large to develop relationships of trust between 
students and teachers. Many of the children I taught struggled at home as well. 
Whether the struggle emerged from neighborhood gang activity, an extra job after 
school, or being in charge of their siblings while their parents worked in the evenings, 
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most students had much more to worry about than the standards set by their teachers 
or the state. Reflecting on the struggles, I began to feel that if we were serious about 
helping children learn, then as a society we should invest more in their well-being and 
their schools. 
My experiences, while anecdotal, were not isolated. A number of publications, 
such as Kozol’s (1991) Savage Inequalities, resonated with my experience and 
showed me how much worse it could be. My teaching experiences also took place 
within a policy context of standards-based reform, which negatively impacted the 
interpretation of the purpose of public education in many schools. Indeed, the federal 
No Child Left Behind Act (2002) and state-mandated testing, regardless of their 
intent, shifted the focus in most schools from teaching and learning to measuring 
achievement. Rhetorically, the shift was intended to hold teachers and administrators 
accountable for providing all students with a high-quality educational experience. In 
practice, however, the shift drew increased attention to improving test scores and 
away from the authentic learning experiences my colleagues and I were hoping to 
provide.  
The dissonance I experienced activated two desires. First, I developed a strong 
desire to investigate how we can continue to create environments that fail our 
students and their families, despite the best intentions of numerous professionals who 
work in schools. Second, through this understanding, I wanted to find a better way to 
advocate for fulfilling that promise. An avenue to realize these goals was the study of 
policy. Through policy work, that I might find ways to influence the agenda.  
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Purpose of Chapter 1 
In this chapter, I lay a foundation for my dissertation research. I begin by 
reviewing what other researchers and policy leaders have said about the 
contradictions and promises that plague the U.S. education system. Within this 
review, I highlight how others have understood the relationship between poverty and 
schooling and the possibilities of addressing these two issues through policy. I then 
offer historical research on past policy precedents and the politics of realignment that 
have influenced what we consider possible in education policy. Subsequently, I argue 
that in order to effectively address the intertwined issues of poverty and education 
through policy, we must understand how education policy came to be thought of as 
separate from other forms of social policy.  
Structure of the Chapter 
Chapter 1 consists of two major sections. In the first section, I describe the 
policy issue under examination. In this description, I first establish the rationale for 
examining the connection between poverty and education. Then, I describe how the 
two policy streams were, at one time, considered in tandem. I end this section by 
entertaining the question of how the U.S. pursued a policy approach that ended up 
isolating education policy at the federal level as separate from other social programs. 
In the second major section, I present my rationale for undertaking this project and 
for the research approach I plan to employ.  
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Explication of the Policy Issue 
 There always has been a relationship between the goals of public schooling 
and the condition of the poor (Spring, 1996). The purpose of this dissertation was to 
offer an interpretation of how this relationship was reflected in the policy ideas during 
the Carter Administration. I wanted to demonstrate the complexity of the multiple 
sites of political struggle, where policy is made and negotiated, and to point to the 
ways in which education policies are always in circulation with and enacted among 
other polices. Through this demonstration, I could expand our understandings of our 
current policy options as we attempt to work for social justice in our schools. In this 
section, I explain the current policy problem posed by our desires to make sure that 
all students have equal opportunity in our society and the conditions of poverty that 
prevent that possibility. 
The Connection Between Poverty and Education 
 According to Horace Mann (as quoted in Mosteller & Moynihan, 1972, p. 3) 
public schools would be “the balance wheel of the social machinery.” At the time 
Mann was writing, it was assumed that schooling provided the means to elevate 
oneself out of conditions of poverty and to afford one a place in the social order. 
However, recent research has confirmed what educators have long known: Poverty 
matters. The instability and deprivations caused by poverty suffocate the abilities of 
children to learn in schools.  
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 Given the present demand for greater accountability in public education and 
the urgent siren call to close the achievement gaps between the haves and have-nots, 
scholars again have started to ask serious questions about the connections between 
poverty and education. Although it is important to ask the best of our educators in the 
schools, it is also important to remember that our schools are socially imbedded 
institutions. Berliner (2005) stated it this way:  
Although the power of schools and educators to influence individual students 
is never to be underestimated, the out-of-school factors associated with 
poverty play both a powerful and a limiting role in what can actually be 
achieved. … It seems to me that in the rush to improve student achievement 
through accountability systems relying on high-stakes tests, our policy makers 
and citizens forgot, or cannot understand, or deliberately avoid the fact, that 
our children live nested lives. (p. 2)  
When we approach education policy, we must remember that a child’s chance for 
success in school is partly determined by the neighborhood in which the school is 
located. Due to centuries of discriminatory laws and practices, the conditions of these 
neighborhoods are not equal (M. Orfield, 2002). We know that “our neighborhoods 
are highly segregated by social class, and thus, also segregated by race and ethnicity” 
(Berliner, 2005, p. 2). Yet, what does this mean? How does this segregation limit the 
possibilities in schools? 
 Before I address such questions, it is important to make some qualifying 
statements. The concepts of poverty and education are not monolithic. There is a wide 
dispersion of experiences and narrations of the experience of education and poverty. 
There is always dispute among scholars about how we construct the categories of 
poverty (Ravallion 1998; Rector, Johnson, & Youseff, 1999; Short, 2001), how we 
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define a community (M. Orfield, 2002; Wilson, 1999), or how we measure 
achievement in schools (Finn & Hess, 2004; Kim & Sunderman, 2005; Tunstall, 
2001). Yet, in practice we still manage to have common enough understanding of 
these concepts to engage in discussions. Also, I address here neither the complicated 
question of what counts as achievement in school nor the role schooling plays in the 
creation of docile subjects (Fairclough, 1992). However, I explain the policy issue 
based on what I believe to be the “common understanding” (Berliner, 2005, p. 3). 
Moreover, research also should facilitate an understanding of how this understanding 
became solidified as common knowledge. Thus, at this point, I do not tease out what 
is considered tolerable poverty or where we should draw the poverty line. The 
suffering of one child is too much in my opinion, especially if it is the result of greed 
on the part of others.  
Opportunity, Poverty, and the Complexities of Segregation 
 Currently, people in the United States value equal opportunity. In fact, at the 
turn of this century survey results revealed that 90% percent of Americans agreed that 
“our society should do what is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal 
opportunity to succeed” (Hoschschild & Scovronick, 2003, p. 13). In 1954, the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided that it was necessary for U.S. society to desegregate schools 
to make sure that everyone had an equal opportunity to succeed. Despite this court 
order, there has been little headway in the desegregation of U.S. schools. G. Orfield 
and Lee (2005) explained, 
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Socioeconomic segregation is a stubborn, multidimensional and deeply 
important cause of educational inequality. U.S. schools are now 41 percent 
nonwhite and the great majority of the nonwhite students attend schools which 
now show substantial segregation. Levels of segregation for black and Latino 
students have been steadily increasing since the l980s. (p. 5) 
Although most frame desegregation as simply a racial issue, it is important to 
remember that the desegregation cases always have been about inequality of 
resources and opportunity. According to G. Orfield and Lee, racial segregation has 
been intertwined with other “forms of segregation, including segregation by 
socioeconomic status, by residential location, and increasingly by language” (p. 14).  
 Often these modes of segregation isolate and concentrate poverty to one 
geographic spot, which is often the inner city (Wilson, 1996). As wealth leaves the 
area and the concentration of poverty increases, the infrastructure and services in 
these areas often decline. Schools in the area and the students who attend them must 
overcome multiple barriers to provide the same chance at opportunity through 
academic achievement as schools in wealthier areas. Due to the historic White 
privileging practices (especially in housing and hiring practices) it is 
disproportionably non-Whites who live in these areas of concentrated poverty 
(Massey, 2006; Wilson, 1999). The public schools in these areas reflect this racial 
difference in wealth. For example, G. Orfield and Lee, (2005) observed, “More than 
60 percent of black and Latino students attend high poverty schools (>50% poor), 
compared to 30 percent of Asians and 18 percent of whites” (p. 10).  
 The power of the social forces in high poverty schools is reflected in 
achievement. Socioeconomic status and zip codes explain most of the variability 
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between the aggregate scores of schools (Kim & Sunderman, 2005; Mosteller & 
Moynihan, 1972). This means that on the average it is unlikely that a school will 
overcome the effects of socioeconomic segregation. A recent study of school-level 
data (D. Harris, 2007) showed that “schools serving student populations that are both 
low poverty and low minority are 89 times more likely to be consistently high 
performing compared with high-poverty, high-minority schools” (p. 387). In other 
words, the schools at the heart of these high-poverty neighborhoods do not have a 
very good chance of having success with a great majority of their students. 
Statistically, it is not likely that these schools will be able to provide students with an 
equal opportunity for achievement in life. 
 Thus, segregation is more than the separation of people into separate housing 
areas based on race. Segregation is also the process by which we stratify opportunity. 
The concentration of poverty in these neighborhoods also impoverishes the 
institutions such as the schools that are trying to help students achieve.  
Relationship Between Poverty and Educational Achievement 
 If the categories by which we segregate the haves from the have-nots are 
multidimensional, then the effects of this segregation are equally complex. Children 
who live in these areas often lack health and proper nutrition, experience violence in 
the form of crime and gangs, and endure unstable home environments. Each of these 
affects what is possible for students in school. 
 Income. One of the most basic elements of poverty is the lack of income. 
Researchers have attempted to understand how each of the aspects of poverty 
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contributes to the gap in achievement at the school level. One of the characteristics of 
these areas is a lack of quality high-paying jobs (Wilson, 1999). The general lack of 
wealth makes all aspects of life more difficult, including success in school. The 
correlation is obvious. Using data from Move to Opportunity experiments, and 
controlling for neighborhood, health, and parental background effects, Duncan and 
Magnuson (2005) concluded that reducing the racial and ethnic differences in family 
income by several thousand dollars would reduce achievement gaps between minority 
students and White students. In another example, a study conducted by Manpower 
Development Research Corporation, researchers (Morris, Huston, Duncan, Crosby, & 
Bos, 2001) synthesized available research on how welfare and work policies affect 
the children of single mothers. The study found that even a “relatively small amount 
of income supplements to working parents—(amounting to about $4,000 a year) 
improved children’s elementary school achievement by about 10% to 15% of the 
average variation of the control group” (Anyon, 2005a, p. 201).  
 Housing. Another important element of poverty is the lack of quality, stable 
housing. Over the past 25 years, urban rents have risen faster than working-class 
incomes (Iceland, 2003; Picketty & Saez, 2003; Wilson, 1996). As rents go up, those 
whose income has relatively decreased are forced to move to find cheaper housing (J. 
E. Rosenbaum, Reynolds, & DeLuca, 2002). Children of these families must change 
schools. This not only disturbs the children’s education, as they have to learn a whole 
new set of teacher expectations and reconcile their prior learning with the curriculum 
of the new school, but also disrupts the receiving school (Kerbow, 1996). Rothstein 
 
11 
(2004) cited a 1994 government report that one third of the poorest children (defined 
as being in families with a reported annual income of less that $10,000) “had attended 
at least three different schools by the 3rd grade” (p. 46). Rothstein (2004) noted that 
reducing the mobility of “low-income students (those eligible for lunch subsidies) to 
that of other students would eliminate 7% of the test score gap by income” (p. 46)  
 Health care. The quality of the health care in a community is another 
important factor in the well-being of children and hence their achievement at school. 
For example, hearing and vision problems are greater among students from high-
poverty areas. Berliner (2005) cited a news report:  
Two different vision screening tests, one among the urban poor in Boston and 
one among the urban poor in New York, each found that over 50% of the 
children tested had some easily correctable vision deficiency, but most such 
cases were not followed up and corrected. (p. 35)  
Researchers also have pointed out that ear infections are much more prevalent in low-
income families (Egbuonu & Starfield, 1982). Although ear infections are easily 
treatable with access to pediatric care, those without quality health care often incur 
hearing loss. Classroom interactions such as learning to read are highly dependent on 
being able to see and hear correctly.  
 Maternal health also has significant implications for the well-being of a child. 
Women who are unhealthy are more likely to have premature babies. Riechman 
(2005) pointed out, “Women of low socioeconomic status are at increased risk for 
delivering low birth weight babies, whether socioeconomic status is defined by 
income, occupation, or education” (p. 100). Reichman continued, “Children born 
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preterm have greater difficulty completing tasks involving reading, spelling, and math 
than their full-term peers, though math scores are more consistently related to preterm 
birth or very low birth weight than are reading achievement scores” (p. 8).  
 There has also been recognition of the greater occurrence of asthma and lead 
poisoning for the children of the poor (Currie, 2005). The buildings (including the 
homes and schools) in segregated, high-poverty neighborhoods are often older and in 
disrepair. The building materials used in these buildings have been linked to lead 
poisoning that can cause symptoms such as irritability and problems of concentration. 
Students arrive at school with mental health issues related to the neurotoxins that they 
have absorbed from their environments. Currie maintained that health conditions such 
as these, as well as deficits in nutrition, can explain up to a quarter of the school 
readiness gap.  
 Neighborhood effects. In neighborhoods where there is a great amount of 
instability, the search for security and love leads to random associations and delicate 
relationships (DeParle, 2004; LeBlanc, 2003). These relationships can lead to love 
and security but also to unwanted pregnancies, trouble with the law, violence, or drug 
use, according to DeParle. All of these consequences limit the amount of school a 
child can attend. For this reason, Berliner (2005) concluded that the neighborhood as 
a collective can have an effect on achievement in school: “Independent of the other 
factors, neighborhood deprivation showed powerful effects on its own. Tragically, 
good parents too frequently lose their children to the streets: neighborhood effects are 
strong” (p. 40). Parents with the financial and social means move out of dangerous 
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neighborhoods. However, many families are not able to relocate. The bad 
neighborhoods, in and of themselves, affect the children’s achievement separately 
from the effects of home and school.  
  Some may wonder what percentage of our students these conditions affect. It 
is estimated that around 20% of American children live in poverty (Blank, 1997; 
Iceland, 2003). Of the 26 wealthiest countries, the United States has the second 
highest percentage of children in poverty (Berliner, 2005). Since the 1970s, there has 
been an increase in the number of people living in the high-poverty areas described 
above. In 1990 about half those in high-poverty areas were African American, despite 
the fact they represented only 12% of the entire population. Latino/a populations also 
have seen a greater growth of poverty. Between 1990 and 2000, there was a reversal 
of decades of increasingly concentrated poverty. Many of the poor moved to an inner 
ring of suburbs, as city centers went through gentrification and revitalization (M. 
Orfield, 2002). Unfortunately, the recent economic downturn and the weakening state 
of many older suburbs underscore that the trend may reverse as poverty becomes 
concentrated in the inner suburbs (Jargowsky, 2003).  
 In summary, segregation along racial and socioeconomic lines has been a 
hallmark of U.S. life, especially in urban centers. Students living in poverty suffer 
more illness, with less access to health care than wealthier students. The 
neighborhoods they walk through to get to their school (most likely a different school 
than the previous year) are fraught with dangerous opportunities. All of these factors 
impact a student’s chances of being successful in school. The problem is not a small 
 
14 
one. As this section has shown, poverty is an important policy issue in our struggle to 
make sure that there is equal opportunity for all of our children to learn.  
Poverty and the Discourse of Excuses 
 As I relate these arguments that poverty matters, I am conscious of two 
dangers. First, there is the danger that the arguments above will be read as an 
indictment of the people who are struggling to make it in these neighborhoods. It is 
important to state here that I am not blaming the children or the families who arrive 
on the doorsteps of the schools with great gifts and problems. Second, I run the risk 
that people will claim that I am just making excuses for the soft bigotry practiced by 
generations of educators—that I am lowering expectations. In fact, some researchers 
claim that attempting to understand the connection between poverty and education is 
just a platform to make excuses. 
 Some see the problems described above as unrelated to the real job of schools. 
They believe that the citizens of this country have made an important choice to 
emphasize schools as the dominant social policy (Hochschild & Scovronick, 2003). 
In doing so, we have chosen to value hard work and competition rather than other 
redistributive policies. Thernstrom and Thernstrom (2003) noted that some are quick 
to point out that “terrific schools that serve highly disadvantaged minority kids do 
exist. … These schools are not waiting until the day social and economic disparities 
disappear. ‘No Excuses’ is their relentless message” (p. 12).  
 Research has shown that there are a handful of great schools; it is possible to 
“beat the odds.” Researchers often have highlighted the success of the Knowledge Is 
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Power Program (S. Carter, 2000; Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 2003). Knowledge is 
Power Program schools are public charter schools that work to provide a different 
option to motivated parents and children. According to Thernstrom and Thernstrom, 
they require an application process intended to “discourage families unlikely to 
cooperate with the school” (p. 47). The school day is longer for the students and the 
teachers. Thernstrom and Thernstrom described one teacher who  
opens his classroom doors at 6:30 every morning, and most students are 
working by 7:00. He also has a program of after-school activities that keeps 
the students who want to stay until 6:00. He gives guitar lessons at recess and 
lunchtime for those who wish to remain in the room. Saturday mornings he 
works with some of his former students in grades 6–10 on algebra, 
Shakespeare and SAT preparation. (p. 47)  
It is obvious that this teacher’s dedication has a large effect on the children who were 
lucky enough to have cooperative parents. The teachers work hard but also expect the 
children to work hard and conform to expectations that they speak politely to 
authority figures and dress neatly. According to Zoch (2004), it is only in schools like 
these, where the responsibility to meet standards is pushed ultimately down to the 
student, that we can even think about closing the achievement gap. Zoch claimed that 
we must level with the student and tell them the only person that can help you is you.  
 Based on these examples, these authors (S. Carter, 2000; Thernstrom & 
Thernstrom, 2003; Zoch, 2004) have concluded that the only real problem with 
education today is that there are not enough of these schools. They have 
recommended policies that they believe would increase the number of these schools. 
They may believe that the teachers we have in the schools today are not “very smart 
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people” (Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 2003, p. 124) and that the collective action of 
these people is not good for the children. In general, they believe that rigidly 
egalitarian public school bureaucracy fails to provide incentives for the few in the 
profession who do care enough. They advocate for the elimination of neighborhood 
schools in favor of choice-based systems, the elimination of teacher unions, and the 
implementation of pay for performance policies (S. Carter, 2000; Education Trust, 
1999; Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 2003).  
 Although it is important to laud the incredible efforts of the educators, parents, 
and students in these schools, we also must ask, “Are these examples a realistic way 
to approach policy construction?” The economist Rothstein (2004) has not agreed. He 
noted,  
Americans have come to the conclusion that the achievement gap is the fault 
of the failing schools because it makes no commonsense that it could be 
otherwise. This commonsense perspective, however, is misleading and 
dangerous. It ignores how social class characteristics in a stratified society like 
ours may actually influence learning in schools (pp. 9–10)  
Rothstein went on to point out that the examples of the few outstanding schools used 
by the Heritage Foundation team (Carter, 2000) are far from typical when it comes to 
being high-poverty schools. Many of the schools have parents who qualify as 
impoverished yet have other background characteristics that are exceptional. For 
example, one of the schools highlighted by Carter had mostly impoverished students, 
but according to Rothstein (2004), “30% had parents with college degrees and 12% 
had parents with graduate degrees” (p. 73). Rothstein (2004) faulted the Heritage 
report for falsely suggesting that “because schools with such children produce high 
 
17 
scores, schools whose children have more serious problems can do so as well” (p. 
73). A more honest approach would recognize that whereas there are exceptional 
teachers and outstanding schools, public schools are responsible for educating 
everyone, and policy solutions should reflect this responsibility. Rothstein (2004) 
summed up his position as follows: 
There is nothing illogical about a belief that schools, if well operated, can 
raise lower-class achievement without investing in health, social, early 
childhood, after-school, and summer programs. But while the belief is not 
illogical, it is implausible, and the many claims made about instructional 
heroes or methods that close the gap are, upon examination unfounded. (p. 83)  
Rothstein maintained that if we are going to close the achievement gap and truly 
provide equal opportunity, we not only must improve our schools, but also must pay 
attention to other social factors  
 In summary, while some may claim that the school’s job is ultimately 
unrelated to the social conditions that surround it, this position is implausible. The 
surroundings of the school have a large influence on what is possible in the school. It 
appears that a more astute policy approach will have to deal with the connections 
between poverty and education.  
“A New Educational Policy Paradigm” Connecting Poverty and Education 
 Positions such as Rothstein’s (2004) make the point that we cannot rely solely 
on education to make sure everyone has an equal opportunity. Relying only on 
schools would ignore that schools and education policy are situated in a complex 
matrix of stratification and government action. Policies are always related to other 
policies (Ball, 1994). We must recognize that we are asking our schools to provide 
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students with a chance at opportunity while we create policies that seem to work 
against that goal.  
 In her book, Radical Possibilities, Anyon (2005a) contended, “Failing public 
schools in cities are a logical consequence of the U.S. macro economy—and the 
federal and regional policies and practices that support it” (p. 2). Specifically, Anyon 
(2005a) established that federal polices regulating the minimum wage, job creation, 
tax brackets, transportation, and affordable housing create conditions of inequity “that 
no existing educational policy or urban school reform can transcend city-wide” (p. 2). 
This observation is based on research and on three decades of experience in urban 
school reform where she saw little improvement.  
 Anyon (2005a) argued that what is needed, in addition to better schools, is 
social policy that allows children to have a fighting chance at a stable home. Anyon 
(2005a) argued, “If, as I am suggesting, the macro economy deeply affects the quality 
of urban education, then perhaps we should rethink what ‘counts’ as educational 
policy” (p. 3). She suggested a new educational policy paradigm that fosters a 
seamless approach to socioeducational policy making, where economic well-being 
and opportunities for quality education intertwine. For example, Anyon (2005a) asked 
us to imagine the following policy approach: 
Education funding reform would include the companion need for financing 
neighborhood jobs and decent wages. … Vocational offerings in high school 
would link to living-wage campaigns and employers who support them. 
College graduation would be understood as a continuation of government's 
financial responsibility for public education. (p. 200) 
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 Rothstein (2004) agreed, writing that while we most often look to our schools 
to achieve equal educational outcomes for children of all social classes, it may be a 
good idea to remember that “in reality, for lower class families, low wages for 
working parents with children, poor healthcare, inadequate housing, and lack of 
opportunity for high-quality early childhood, after school and summer activities are 
all educational problems” (p. 130). The current policy trajectory of accountability and 
standards is being built on a foundation that cannot produce the desired results and 
may even increase inequitable educational outcomes (Valenzuela, 2005). G. Orfield 
and Lee (2005) argued that if we do move forward with testing regimes, “housing and 
land use policies should be designed on a regional basis to foster access for all 
students to strong schools and educational diversity” (p. 43).  
 Therefore, as I have explained, we are faced with a policy choice. Do we 
continue on our current policy trajectory, or do we make policy that recognizes the 
relationship between poverty and educational achievement? In our struggle to make 
sure that all U.S. residents have an equal opportunity, should we find a way to 
coordinate antipoverty and education policies? Should we consider antipoverty and 
education policy as reciprocal? Rothstein (2004), Anyon (2005a, 2005b), Berliner 
(2005), G. Orfield and Lee (2005), and others have assembled a great deal of research 
that argues strongly that we should. They have maintained that if we are serious about 
affording all of our children an equal opportunity for learning, we must write policy 
that does not rely solely on schools to provide this chance. There should be an 
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investment in family supports with the goal of improving children’s chances at 
school.  
 My own experiences in the schools and the research presented above have led 
me to agree with the approach. Most of the teachers I knew were not making excuses 
or lowering expectations. Our daily experiences in the school were the result of 
complex relationships between our sense of stability and physical well-being. 
Ignoring those factors was not an option. The value of this approach would be that it 
does ignore that context but instead works to help children feel safer, see better, hear 
better, and be healthier. This approach in turn would allow schools to help students 
learn better. According to Anyon (2005a), the end goal is not only an alignment of 
policies at the federal level, but also a fit between “neighborhood, family and student 
needs and the potential of education policies to contribute to their fulfillment” (p. 
200). Anyon (2005a) claimed that we can change the odds for our children.  
 If we do not attempt to change the odds, the disconnect between the promise 
and the daily experience of many students and teachers in U.S. schools will damage 
morale. Children will lose faith in the value of education as an important factor in 
their personal success. Many teachers will leave the profession. If from our policy 
framework we continue to shriek, “No Excuses!” then, according to Rothstein (2004), 
“the nation risks abandoning public education only to those willing to pander to 
political fashion by promising to achieve in schools what they know, in their hearts, is 
not possible” (p. 147).  
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 The research presented above has argued strongly that we should take 
seriously the question of what counts as education policy (Anyon, 2005b). Policy 
researchers have asserted that if we do this, we will have the chance to create 
coordinated policies that may offer a greater equality of opportunity than ever has 
existed in U.S. history. If we do not do this, it could mean the delegitimization of the 
public school project. An issue with such moral force requires that we be thoughtful 
in our attempts to realize these desires. It may be wise to look to historical precedents.  
Is it a New Policy Paradigm? 
While the description  of the education and poverty relationship presented 
above has grown out of recent debates, it is important to remember that “for nearly 
half a century, the association of social and economic disadvantage with a student 
achievement gap has been well known to economists, sociologists and educators” 
(Rothstein, 2004, p. 10). Thus, it is important to learn from any historical precedents 
for such an approach. Below I provide a brief account of a few concerted policy 
efforts simultaneously to improve the quality of life for the poor and to improve 
schools. One was President Johnson’s War on Poverty and Great Society programs. I 
also point to the time when most scholars believed this policy approach disappeared: 
the Reagan presidency. 
 The assertion that education policy is independent from other social policy 
seems to be a phenomenon of recent U.S. history. The establishment of state-run 
schools through the common school movements between 1830 and 1850 was 
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modeled on the charity schools, which were designed to use “education to solve 
social problems and build political community” (Spring, 1996, p. 129). Most of the 
time, though, this connection was framed as the expansion of education to improve 
other social problems. Spring noted that most people of the time believed that 
government policies supporting common schools were “the best means of controlling 
crime, social unrest, and political disruptions” (p. 130). We must look to the 20th 
century to find an approach that recognizes the reciprocal relationship between 
poverty and education.  
The Ford Foundation in the 1950s 
The policy framework articulated by Anyon (2005a, 2005b), Rothstein (2004), 
M. Orfield (2002), and others most closely matches the work that came out of the 
Ford Foundation’s attempt to improve the inner cities in the 1950s. Silver and Silver 
(1991) noted that the Ford Foundation in the early 1950s started various independent 
programs to deal with social problems in growing U.S. cities. Some of these were 
educational projects designed “essentially to modernize the system,” like develop 
teacher education, library resources, and spread medical education (Silver & Silver, p. 
40). One program dealt with city planning and focused on metropolitan area studies. 
Toward the end of the 1950s, the two programs came together under the title Great 
Cities Schools Program, which, according to Silver and Silver, resulted in the 
launching of an “educational anti-poverty program” (p. 53).  
The Great Cities Schools Program reflected a belief in the power of 
community action. As the programs developed, the Ford Foundation sought a bolder 
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and more comprehensive approach to the salient issues of the inner city. Kravitz 
(1965) noted that the “Ford Foundation provided large development funds to 
coordinate programs in such areas as employment, education, and social services, 
under the auspices of a new community agency” (p. 41). In Philadelphia this 
developed into the establishment of school–community coordinating teams. The goal 
of these programs was to provide a range of strategies to bring the schools, the 
parents, and the community “more effectively into action on behalf of the child” 
(Silver & Silver, 1991, p. xx). This work would become the template for federal 
policy.  
The Connection as the Framework for National Policy 
As Trattner (1999) stated, “President Johnson’s declaration of war on poverty 
in 1964 only put the highest official sanction on what had already become a vogue, or 
at least a significant national issue” (p. 310). Harrington’s (1963) book The Other 
America spurred many task forces in the Kennedy Administration. These task forces 
brought together people from the Ford Foundation and senior policy writers within 
the administration, according to Silver and Silver. 
Lyndon B. Johnson (1965) declared, “Our task is to make the national purpose 
serve the human purpose: that every person shall have the opportunity to become all 
that he or she is capable of becoming.” This general understanding of the role of 
government grew out of a 30-year-old tradition initiated by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
response to the savage results of the stock market crash. However, Johnson was not 
responding to an economic crash but to the loud dissonance created by the paradox of 
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extreme poverty within a very wealthy nation that claimed to be the land of 
opportunity. As it still is today in the United States, the extreme poverty of the 1960s 
was mostly divided along racial lines.  
 Johnson felt that the nation’s future was dependent on a full-scale response 
this injustice. His policy programs, the War on Poverty and the Great Society, 
addressed the growing racial tensions that were most visible in the greatly expanding 
urban centers. Berube (1991) wrote, “Essentially, Johnson wove a comprehensive set 
of innovative programs that addressed the problem of poverty and the concerns of the 
civil rights movement. These programs were chiefly in three areas: education, social 
welfare and civil rights” (p. 60). According to Katz (1996), the civil rights movement 
added 
a new element: for the first time, social welfare policy became one strategy for 
attacking the consequences of racism in America. As racial tensions worsened 
in the North as well as the South, the civil rights movement transformed the 
historic links between race, poverty and opportunity into a national disgrace. 
(p. 268)  
According to Katz, this social welfare policy can be sorted into “programs with four 
overlapping purposes: to promote opportunities, stimulate community action, 
introduce new services, and expand transfer payments” (p. 266). 
 One of the key elements in promoting opportunities was the education policy. 
Johnson (as cited in Kaplan, 1984, p. 7) is remembered as telling his staffers, “This is 
going to be an education program. We are going to eliminate poverty with education. 
… People are going to learn their way out of poverty.” Berube (1991) pointed out, 
“Johnson's involvement in the education policy process was twofold. First, he set 
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broad policy. … Second, he personally applied pressure on members of Congress” (p. 
75). In terms of education policy, Johnson pushed through the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965(ESEA), the Higher Education Act of 1965, and the 
Bilingual Education Act of 1968 (as cited in Silver, 1981). Each of these programs 
was targeted at populations with the least amount of opportunity in America. The 
resulting policy represented a revolution in terms of federal intervention into 
education, especially for students with the greatest need for assistance: the 
disadvantaged poor. According to Silver, these policies were “part of a wide-ranging 
attack on the ‘root causes of poverty in the midst of plenty’” (p. 18).  
 As noted above, education was not used in isolation to attack the problems of 
racism and poverty. On January 8, 1964, in his State of the Union address, Johnson 
(1965) stated, “Our aim is not only to relieve the symptom of poverty, but to cure it 
and, above all, to prevent it. No single piece of legislation, however, is going to 
suffice”. Education policies were passed along with the Economic Opportunity Act of 
1964, which established the Office of Economic Opportunity. The Office of 
Economic Opportunity was charged with the development of a variety of community-
based antipoverty programs, such as the Neighborhood Youth Corps, Job Corps, 
Volunteers in Service to America, the Model Cities Program, Upward Bound, Food 
Stamps program, the Community Action Program, and Project Head Start.  
 These programs were meant to work in concert. This was considered to be the 
“high water mark” of the welfare state in the United States (Hodgson, 2000, p. 151) 
Although there has been a great deal of debate about how to measure the success of 
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the programs (Gans, 1995), it is clear that in the mid-1960s antipoverty and educaiton 
policy were linked in the hope of creating more equitable chances of opportunity for 
children. 
Public schooling in America always has been related to social problems that 
are the result of inequality. The work of the Ford Foundation set an important 
precedent because it grew out of pragmatic attempts to deal with poverty in the 
contexts of American cities. By the mid-1960s, a social policy framework had been 
refined to recognize the reciprocal nature of poverty and education. Yet, today a 
similar approach is described as “new” (Anyon, 2005b). When did such an approach 
disappear? 
Reagan’s Realignment 
There is overwhelming recognition that the election of Reagan signaled a 
change in political attitudes of the United States (T. Bell, 1988; Lekachman, 1987; 
Muir, 1992; O’Connor, 1998). The realignment in American politics that began with 
Richard Nixon’s quest for a new majority culminated in the Reagan presidency 
(Mason, 2004). Reagan’s election victories in 1980 and 1984 were both landslides.  
As he came into office 1981, Reagan (as cited in Troy, 2005, p. 1) declared 
that it was “morning in America again.” He hoped to reestablish order by reframing 
the U.S. mission in the world along his interpretation of its Judeo-Christian roots, 
according to Troy. In the same way that Nixon had targeted lower income 
neighborhoods as places of “permissiveness,” the Reagan Administration claimed that 
they would protect the taxpayers from the “cheats” who abused the welfare system 
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(Trattner, 1999, p. 364). Reagan (as cited in Trattner, 1999, p. 8) declared, “My 
friends, some years ago, the federal government declared war on poverty, and poverty 
won.” George Gilder, a mentor of Reagan, stated, “In order to succeed, the poor need 
most of all the spur of poverty” (as cited in Trattner, 1999, p. 364). The Reagan 
Administration held that the world was unfathomably complex, and that social 
engineering such as the War on Poverty was not only doomed to failure, but also 
likely to do harm (Trattner, 1999).  
When Reagan took office, many Americans seemed ready for such 
pronouncements. The years prior had seen oil shortages, inflation, and rising 
unemployment, all during an economic down-turn that resulted from the closure of 
many U.S. manufacturing sites. The first fired were the last hired; in most places 
these were women and other marginalized groups. Between 1970 and 1978 the 
number of “women family heads beneath the official poverty line rose 38.7 percent” 
(Katz, 1996, p. 284). Many people in the United States started to believe that welfare 
programs inflated wages and therefore reduced the wealthy’s ability to accumulate 
capital and invest in innovation. Starting in the mid-1970s, determining that the rising 
number of welfare recipients was the problem, according to Katz (1996): “City-
governments slashed services and state legislature attacked general assistance” (p. 
283). By the 1980s the federal government began to cut social welfare funding and 




Federal education spending was also considered part of the drain on the 
accumulation of capital. In his 1980 campaign Reagan promised to eliminate the 
“huge new bureaucracies [who had] misspent our taxes” (McGuinn, 2006, p. 41). Yet, 
as we will see, this did not come to pass; Carter’s Department of Education became 
the centerpiece of Reagan’s domestic policy.  
Repercussions of the Reagan Realignment 
 Clearly, the Reagan Administration viewed the War on Poverty as a failure. 
The repercussions of this stance are seen in how almost unthinkable the approach it 
claimed a failure is considered today. By unthinkable, I mean that the suggestion of 
such an approach is almost immediately discredited through a few vague tropes such 
as, “Oh that is just making excuses,” or “that seems politically impossible.” Even 
those who are the strongest advocates for a neo-War-on-Poverty approach feel that 
general acceptance would require a major change.  
For example, Rothstein (2004) wrote that we must fight this battle 
incrementally, because there is “little practical hope that Americans will make a 
realistic commitment to close the achievement gap between lower and middle class 
children in the present political environment” (p. 132). Anyon (2005a) devoted the 
last chapter to her book to “Building a New Social Movement.” Anyon (2005a) 
argued that to develop such a new and radical policy paradigm, we first must 
“mobilize the underlying rage, and channel the energy that is released” (p. 154). This, 
she advised, should be done through community organizing, where a revolutionary 
spirit can be unleashed. 
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 What Rothstein (2004) and Anyon (2005b) both have recognized is that for 
many people, the ways in which we approach educational policy making are natural 
or self-evident. It is assumed that the dominant policy levers that we lean on, such as 
standardization, mass testing, and aggregate accountability measures, are rooted in a 
response to human nature and therefore are indispensable. Also, there is a sense that 
the naturalness of the current policy regime is predicated on “proof” that past policy 
levers, such as the ones described above, failed. Such self-evidence claims tend to 
stabilize the dominant approach and make other options almost unthinkable to the 
point that they must be reintroduced slowly or result from a radical groundswell. 
 To what should we attribute this unthinkableness? The most common 
explanation is that the rise of the coalition of the right has created conditions where 
progressive politics is out of favor (McGuinn, 2006; Spring, 1997). These 
explanations show that education issues have been central to partisan politics, so the 
education policy cannot be understood apart “from the broader developments in U.S. 
politics” (McGuinn, 2006, p. 4). These explanations are unsatisfactory because they 
approach the problem from the point of view of a zero-sum game: a battle of interest 
groups in which one group has the electoral trump cards (Mansbridge, 1990). The 
central question in these investigations focuses on who is in charge and how they 
define education policy. Whereas interest groups and coalition building are certainly 
important aspects of any political story, they do not help us understand how so many 
people began to see the connection between education and other social policy as 
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unnecessary to the development of equal opportunity. It does not help us understand 
how people today see this approach as almost impossible.  
 Others have pointed out that in addition to the building of conservative 
coalitions acting as lobbyists, there has been a coordinated effort to push a 
conservative ideology on the public. For example, DeBray (2006) described how No 
Child Left Behind was the result of ideological battles that changed over the 1990s. 
She highlighted how the growth of conservative ideology increased the polarization 
between the two parties. This ideological battle set the ground for a major shift in 
education policy making, in which practitioners were largely left out of the 
discussions.  
Explanations like DeBray’s (2006) are useful for explaining what ideological 
conditions were necessary for a certain policy approach to be accepted. They are 
informative in explaining how conservative coalitions developed its hegemony, but 
do not offer an analysis of how the technical aspects of governing (i.e., bureaucratic 
structures, accountability systems, and state devolution) worked to produce our 
current understanding of the problem. This approach also tends to mark the ideology 
as the prime factor in social change. An analysis of the interplay between multiple 
forces, such as the technical aspects, their relationship to the discourses that framed 
them, and their relationship to modes of authority, would help us see the polymorphic 
nature of social change.  
It is important to remember that these modes of power are productive and not 
simply a negative political responses to the welfare policy or Federalism of previous 
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decades (Berry, Osborne, & Rose, 1996). If we look at it this way, we can understand 
that the current policy approach is not a shrinking of the state but instead a new 
approach to how to use the technologies of the state. As will be discussed in greater 
detail in chapter 2, this new approach rewrites what types of governing are possible.  
 Therefore, what is needed is research that helps us grasp how certain practices 
came to be understood as the common-sense approach and how these approaches fit 
into the particular regimes of authority, or social regulation and economy, of a given 
historical moment. This combination of common-sense practices and power can be 
understood as generating social regularities that were continually enacted and invoked 
in social interactions (Foucault, 1972; Fraser, 1989; Scheurich, 1997). In any moment 
in history, multiple historical processes (such as the development of fiscal policies; 
accountability regimes; and discourses on the individual, race, opportunity, and 
equity, among others) become the emergent rules by which social interactions are 
made regular. If we pay attention to these grids that constitute the social regularities 
of a time, we can begin to understand how some things are thinkable while others are 
not (Foucault, 1991a, 1991b).  
In doing so we can begin to explore how power operates through the policy 
agendas of liberals and conservatives to make some approaches self-evident and 
others almost unthinkable. More specifically, we can explore how through these 
social regularities, people of a given time drew lines around the dispersion of various 
policy approaches and decided that some were education policies and some were not. 
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Maybe then we can see how the views as voiced by Reagan were seen as self-evident, 
as they still are today.  
Rationale for the Study 
 The description above reveals that the idea of coordinating education and 
antipoverty policies is seen as almost unthinkable, despite research, historical 
precedents, and a strong moral argument for such a policy approach. We also have 
seen that most scholars recognize that Reagan’s election signaled a realignment in 
American politics and policy making. This realignment reflected a transition in how 
people framed U.S. policy options. I also have established that if we are going to 
understand this transformation, we not only must know how Reagan came to power, 
but also must understand how different historical processes came together to develop 
social regularities that constituted what was possible through human interaction, 
including policy making.  
For example, during the Reagan presidency, while the rest of the domestic 
policy budgets were being slashed, the education budget was insulated from the 
supply-side fiscal policy. By then, the superdepartment of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) had been separated into the Department of Education and the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Not only were they separate, but 
they also competed against each other for survival. Many attributed the visibility of 
the new Education Department as the reason that Reagan, despite campaign promises 
to abolish it, chose to feature his domestic policy through the Department of 
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Education (T. Bell, 1988; Stockman, 1986). The Reagan domestic policy, as 
explained by the report, A Nation at Risk (National Commission on Excellence in 
Education, 1983), focused on individual achievement and the pursuit of excellence in 
a geo-political context. In this case, the rise of supply-side discourses intersected with 
bureaucratic budgeting practices, discourses about individualism and efficiency, and 
U.S. economic competitiveness in the world. The Department of Education, formed 
just prior to Reagan’s election, was an important factor in the establishment of 
Reagan’s educational policy practices and therefore in the erasure of the War on 
Poverty approach.  
Therefore, if we are going to understand how education policy came to be 
understood as independent from other social policies at the federal level, it is 
important to study how people understood the relationship between the policies in the 
era just prior to Reagan’s ascension. I believe that a historical study of the Carter 
Administration is fruitful for two reasons. First, Reagan’s victory was in large part 
due to his ability to deliver a message that resonated with the majority of U.S. voters. 
Looking at the years just before his victory can help us understand how the discourses 
of equity, opportunity, and efficiency coalesced at that time and how he was able to 
articulate them. A look at the tensions within the Carter Administration over the 
relationship between these policies can help us grasp this transformation. Second, the 
development of the Department of Education by the Carter Administration allowed 
for the bureaucratic separation of the goals, administration, and funding for education 
from health and welfare.  
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Thus, during the Carter Administration, education policy at the federal level 
was created as a “historic individuality” (Foucault, 1972, p. 22). This research was 
designed to grasp the shape of the transitions in discourses and practices that began to 
appear regularly in social interactions. This helps us explore how Reagan’s vision 
was so quickly made natural. Also, investigating the ways in which people 
understood the relationship between the policies and the larger social context in 
which these ideas were articulated during the Carter Administration provides insight 
into our current desires to see the policies as related once again.  
One work, The Politics of Federal Reorganization: Creating the U.S. 
Department of Education (Radin & Hawley, 1988), already addressed these years and 
the creation of the Department of Education in great detail. It is a traditional work of 
institutional political science. Radin and Hawley described their work as a case study 
of federal-level decision making. In this case study Radin and Hawley analyzed 
the positions and roles of the actors involved in the policy process; the 
functions that are built into the institutional setting in which the decisions 
were made; the bases of power and uses of political resources; the attributes 
and demands of the policy environment and the specific goals and objectives 
attached to the issue. (p. 2)  
Their investigation was detailed and complex. One of Radin and Hawley’s goals was 
to show the policy process as both “predictable and chaotic. It is linear yet circular. 
Informal sources of power define most relationships, yet formal authority is essential” 
(p. 219).  
Radin and Hawley’s (1988) investigation revealed a great deal about the 
people involved in the decision making and the actors who were present. However, 
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the subject of study was ultimately the act of reorganization. Radin and Hawley ended 
their book with this statement: “There is much that reorganization cannot do. The 
grander the scheme, the less likelihood there will be of it achieving success” (p. 234) 
Radin and Hawley’s book is an invaluable secondary source that carefully mapped 
out the dynamics of the time, but they did not give significant attention to how the 
relationship between the polices was understood and did not deal with how it was 
constituted by the social regularities of the time.  
Purpose of the Study 
 In this chapter, I have shared the research and conceptual work of scholars 
who specialize in educational and social policy as well as historical research on past 
policy precedents and the politics of realignment. This review raised the question of 
why an approach that connects education and antipoverty policy is almost 
unthinkable today. In order to answer that question, I needed to explore the 
development and transformation of various social regularities (intersections of 
practices and discourses) that allowed the education policy to appear to be self-
evidently independent by the time of Reagan’s election. Therefore, as articulated 
above, the purpose of this dissertation as to identify the ways in which people 
explained the relationship between federal education and antipoverty policies from 
1975–1981.  
 In my work, I wanted to demonstrate the complexity of the multiple sites of 
political struggle where policy is made and negotiated and to point to the ways in 
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which education policies are always in circulation with and enacted among other 
polices. Through this demonstration, I wanted to provide insight into how social 
regularities of the time shaped American education and antipoverty policies in order 
to help interpret the present policy options and our desires for social justice as events 
within a historical moment.  
 Most of the time, these policies are studied as separate independent 
phenomena. In order to observe how people have understood their relationship, I 
strategically have chosen a time period where the relationship was made explicit and 
debated. Although I will situate the years 1975–1981 within longer historical trends, 
the bulk of my examples will come from this time period. 
Research Questions 
 Research Question 1: How did people during the Carter Administration 
explain the relationship between education and antipoverty policy? 
 Research Question 2: What social regularities can be identified during the 
Carter Administration, and how did these regularities impact antipoverty and 
educational policies? 
 Research Question 3: What lessons can be taken from a historical 




This study was framed as a critical policy analysis. The purpose of this study 
was to use the history of the Carter Administration, specifically the separation of the 
Health, Education, and Welfare Department (HEW) into HHS and the Department of 
Education, to help us identify the ways in which political actors in Washington, D.C., 
1976–1981 explained the relationship between federal education and antipoverty 
policy. Through this history, I have explored the multiple ways in which the policies 
were understood and how their relationship to each other was negotiated in order to 
help interpret the impact of the social regularities of the time on policy making. This 
exploration can help us understand how the policy approach advocated for today is, 
despite historical precedent, almost unthinkable to many.  
As discussed in chapter 2, the analytical framework that guided this 
investigation forced me to look for the ways in which the actors constructed their 
contested conceptualizations of the relationship between the policies. It highlighted 
that the ways in which people constructed these understandings were not the result of 
a single moving force but were instead shaped by the nests of the social regularities.  
In order to produce such a study I used both the methods of critical policy 
analysis and historical research. In order to answer Research Questions 1 and 2, I first 
accumulated primary and secondary sources. Next, I ordered these sources by 
chronology and theme. Finally, I cross-examined the sources in order to produce a 
historical interpretation. Then, in order to answer Research Question 3, I have offered 




 As I stated at the beginning of this chapter, my research emerged from the 
dissonance between a promise and experience. This dissonance animated two desires. 
First, I felt a strong urge to investigate how we can continue to create environments 
that fail our students and their families, despite the best intentions of a great deal of 
professionals who work in schools. Second, through this understanding, I wanted to 
find a better way to advocate for fulfilling that promise. Both of these desires are 
undergirded by an assumption of infinite possibilities for human life. There is no 
single story of how our world will unfold. Instead, all we have is our present, in 
which we occupy only partially our own consciousness and many subject positions 
simultaneously (Lather, 1991). Therefore, this work is not an attempt to “seize 
‘history’ and bend it readily to our collective purposes” (Giddens, 1991, p. 153). I 
hope the interpretations offered in this work do not render the social world more 
transparent; instead, I hope for this work to disrupt our social interactions and allow 
us to spin off in other directions.  
Accordingly, my attraction to the question, “What counts as education 
policy?” is not because I have the final answer but because it asks us to consider all of 
the infinite possibilities. In a time when there seems to be a natural answer, the job of 
the social researcher is to shake this false self-evidence and point to the historical 
contingency of our approaches. Therefore, I developed a study to explore how it came 
to be that education policy is thought of as naturally separate from other social policy. 
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This study benefited from recent theoretical and methodological developments in 
education policy analysis. These are further explained in chapters 2 and 3.  
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITRATURE AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
As described in chapter 1, the purpose of this study was to research the ways 
in which people explained the relationship between federal education and antipoverty 
policies from 1975–1981. I undertook this task to demonstrate the complexity of the 
multiple sites of political struggle, where policy is made and negotiated, and to point 
to the ways in which education policies are always in circulation with and enacted 
among other polices. Through this demonstration, I wanted to provide insight into 
how the social regularities during the Carter Administration shaped the possibilities 
of U.S. education and antipoverty policies. Such a study would help me and others 
interpret the present policy options and our desires for social justice as events of a 
specific historical moment with its own possibilities and contradictions. In doing so, 
we can begin to engage in more creative policy making, which may help us in our 
struggle to improve the well-being of children inside and outside of school. 
 Accordingly, this chapter has two purposes. First, through a review of the 
literature, I have shown a gap in current policy studies with regards to the relationship 
between education and antipoverty policies. My second purpose was to build a 
poststructural theoretical framework to help me understand how people during the 
Carter Administration explained the relationship between the policies.  
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Structure of the Chapter 
 This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section provides a 
review of the literature. This section is concluded with a discussion of what can be 
learned from previous explanations of policy change in U.S. federal education and 
antipoverty policies. In the second section, I have developed an explanation of my 
theoretical framework. This section consists of two main parts. In the first part, I have 
explained the general tenets of the poststructural policy theoretical perspective. This 
is followed by a description of the framework that guided me as I answered my 
research questions.  
Current Explanations 
The fact that this goal of coordinating social policies reached such a high 
status in U.S. policy 50 years prior, during the War on Poverty, is intriguing. 
However, even more startling is the fact that the coordination is now so absent, that it 
is being rediscovered as a new policy paradigm. Unfortunately, there is no single 
study that has addressed the history of this transformation. Studies have dealt with the 
general historical shift in U.S. politics and their implications for various policy areas. 
Studies also have situated education within the larger context of U.S. culture during 
the second half of the 20th century. Below, I explain what insights they have provided 
and how their limits helped shaped the proposed study.  
In general, the shift in U.S. politics and its repercussions for education and 
antipoverty policy have been approached from two perspectives. One perspective 
 
42 
traces what happened to antipoverty and other social programs when U.S. politics 
went through realignment (Blank, 1997; Ellwood, 1996; Katz, 1996; Trattner, 1999). 
Essentially, such researchers have described the shift as a retreat from past moral 
obligations that spurred past antipoverty legislation. Although these histories are 
valuable secondary sources, none of them consistently addressed the relationship 
between education and antipoverty policy. They often framed education policy as a 
separate enterprise.  
There are also several quality studies of the development of educational policy 
during this time (Berube, 1991; C. Cross, 2004; DeBray, 2006; Kaplan, 1984; Kosar, 
2005; McGuinn, 2006; Miller, 1981; Wong & Nicotera, 2004). These works have 
described in detail the shifts in education policy over the 20th century. They have 
provided a strong understanding of how education policy has changed over time; 
however, their focus on education as the object of study prevented them from 
addressing in any detail how actors in the policy arena understood the relationship 
between education policy and the other social programs. Below, I provide a 
description of a few of the important works from each approach and summarize how 
they influenced the current study.  
Examples of Historical Treatments of Antipoverty Policy 
 I review two of the most expansive and influential books that address the 
history of antipoverty policy in U.S. history (Katz, 1996; Trattner, 1999). Both of 
these works are instructive in that they have treated the development of policy as a 
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historically and socially situated polymorphous process. However, as we shall see, 
neither history addressed the relationship between education and antipoverty policy. 
They also gave little attention to the Carter Administration. 
Katz (1996) started his book with the statement, “Nobody likes welfare” (p. 
ix). He noted that in the current political context, conservatives worry that it erodes 
the work ethic and rewards the lazy. In contrast, many liberals view the system as 
incomplete, inadequate, and punitive. Katz also pointed out that the poor, who rely on 
welfare to get by, find it “degrading, demoralizing and mean” (p. ix). Yet, welfare 
persists. Katz asserted that welfare policy has been a consistent element in U.S. 
history because its strength is derived from “its symbiosis with [U.S.] social structure 
and political economy” (p. ix). The purpose of Katz’s book was to sketch this social 
history and make sure the reader understood two things:  
First, [U.S.] public welfare has a very old history. Public funds have always 
relieved more people that private ones. … Second, welfare policy results from 
choices among alternative possibilities. We have the resources, competence 
and ideas to transform social welfare in America. (p. xvi) 
 Katz (1996) then offered a thorough historicizing of antipoverty policy. He 
showed how the policy choices in early U.S. history, such as the development of the 
poor house, were just as much a product of their time as the current “workfare” 
options are today. Katz described his book as 
a tale of transformation, of how social policy responded to the great shifts in 
America’s social and economic structure from the nascent capitalism of the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, through the nation’s 
industrialization and the great era of corporate capital in the early twentieth 
century, to the current period of deindustrialization and the emergence of the 
service economy. (p. xii)  
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Such a study is invaluable for helping us understand how people viewed welfare, but 
it ultimately fails to answer our questions because Katz never seriously addressed the 
relationship between education and antipoverty policy. Although he did a great job of 
explaining how education was interwoven into the War on Poverty, his singular focus 
on welfare policy makes education’s separation a nonissue. Also, Katz did not spend 
any time on the Carter Administration. His book jumps from a chapter that describes 
the War on Poverty to a chapter that describes Reagan’s policies.  
Trattner (1999) has offered another comprehensive look at the development of 
antipoverty policy in the United States. Trattner agreed with Katz (1996) that U.S. 
social policy has been the product of a wide variety of overlapping and conflicting 
factors, including paternalism, capitalist self-interest, good intentions, economic 
forces, religious beliefs, cultural values, demographic changes, nationalization of 
politics, and bureaucratic expansion. He claimed that the tension between these 
factors helps create our response to the social problem of poverty.  
 Trattner (1999) differs from Katz (1996) in that he did give some treatment to 
the Carter Administration. In a chapter titled “A Transitional Era,” Trattner explained 
how the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations dealt little with welfare policy, due 
to their attention to rising inflation and foreign politics. However, Trattner did 
describe a welfare proposal that would significantly expand benefits and allow the 
federal government to create more jobs for the unemployed. Carter was also 
committed to phasing in a workable health care insurance program. However, none of 
these programs made it through Congress. Trattner noted that rising inflation rates, 
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the Iranian hostage crisis, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan left many people in 
the United States feeling “angry, frustrated, impotent and disillusioned with the 
government’s ability to resolve important problems”(p. 358). 
 Although Trattner (1999) offered some important details about antipoverty 
policy in the Carter Administration and the multiple factors interacting at the time, he 
has provided no real discussion of how Carter viewed the relationship between 
education and antipoverty policy. This is probably also because his object of study 
was the stable singular concept of welfare policy. We need research that recognizes 
that welfare policy and education policy are both enacted through and in relationship 
to other policies.  
 Neither study addressed the central question of how people explained the 
relationship between education and antipoverty policy during the Carter 
Administration. What they have offered instead are examples of detailed historical 
treatments of the many factors that combine and contradict each other to create 
policy. These insights were important in the design of my study of the historical 
relationship between the policies.  
Examples of Historical Treatments of Educational Policy 
 Education policy literature approaches the problem in a similar way. There is, 
by definition, a singular focus on education policy as an independent phenomenon. 
Interestingly, there is little attention given to the Carter Administration. However, the 
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literature often provides insights into the historical contexts that produced federal 
education policy.  
Unfortunately, as highlighted in chapter 1, there is a great deal of attention to 
the Reagan presidency but little to Carter, who preceded him. This is unfortunate 
because it prevents us from understanding how Reagan’s ideas were so self-evident to 
so many people. For example, Berube (1991) offered a description of presidential 
politics and education in his book, American Presidents and Education. Berube’s 
goal with the book was to 
analyze presidential involvement in education and the reasons for it and 
correlate it with an assessment of national educational outcomes. I shall 
examine presidential efforts in education that have been successful and also 
had considerable impact as well as some that were not so successful but had 
significance either ideologically or as forerunners of future policies. (p. 2)  
The presidents studied included Lyndon B. Johnson, Ronald Reagan, and George 
Bush. Berube failed to address Carter and did not give a reason for doing so. We must 
assume that the creation of the Department of Education in 1991 had little or no 
impact on the educational outcomes Berube chose to evaluate. Berube did offer 
insight into how three other presidents addressed education among their other agenda 
items. He noted that historically presidents have paid little attention to education and 
pointed out that over the past 50 years, they have made stronger links between public 
education and the economy.  
Whereas Berube’s (1991) book was narrow in focus, examining only the 
executive branch, others have attempted to trace the entire evolution of education 
policy. In his book, No Child Left Behind and the Transformation of Federal 
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Education Policy, 1965–2005, McGuinn (2006) has offered a long-term look at the 
development of education policy at the federal level. In this book, he has claimed that 
there have been few studies of federal education policy making. He stated that these 
studies describe the changes but do not point to the theoretical significance of the 
historical and political context in which the changes occurred. He asserted that his 
book would not do the same but instead would rely on policy regime theory to help 
him explain how federal education changed. He defined a policy regime as a concept 
that frames the role of ideas, interests, and institutions in generating major policy 
change in a specific issue area over time. Thus, policy regimes consist of three 
dimensions, according to McGuinn: “a policy paradigm, a power alignment and a 
policy making arrangement” (p. 17). These combine to produce a distinctive pattern 
of policy making.  
 McGuinn’s (2006) work is important in that he did not try to describe the 
transformation in education policy as the result of one sweeping change. Instead, 
McGuinn explained that the history of federal education policy making is 
characterized as a “gradual regime construction, maintenance, enervation, and 
reconstruction that unfold in fits and starts over time” (p. 209). He noted that the first 
regime can be termed the “equity” regime, as established by the War on Poverty 
legislation. The second can be termed the “accountability” regime, as signaled by the 
passage and implementation of No Child Left Behind.  
 Although McGuinn’s (2006) book describes how education policy changed 
due to shifts in ideas, interest groups, and administrative decision-making processes, 
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he failed to give much attention to this process during the Carter Administration. In 
fact, he moved directly from a description of the 1965 policies to a description of the 
1988 Bush plan. Although McGuinn, like others, has done a good job of pointing to 
how policy is historically and socially situated, he has treated ideas as stable 
consistent objects that have force. This approach, which I discuss in greater detail 
later, fails to acknowledge how the historical and social contingency that applies to 
policy production also applies to production of all knowledge. Finally, the book 
remains focused on education policy as a stable individual unity. By this, I mean that 
McGuinn treated the unity of education policy as self-evident; thus, there was little in 
his account to help us understand how people have explained the relationship between 
the policies over time.  
Cross, former assistant secretary of education, released his book Political 
Education: National Policy Comes of Age in 2004. This book presents a history of 
federal education policy since the end of World War II. Cross wanted to show how 
“federal policy has been—for better or worse—a constant influence on what states 
and local districts do, especially with respect to students most at risk” (p. ix). Unlike 
McGuinn (2006), Cross did not seek theoretical analysis of this phenomenon. Instead, 
he seemed content with his assumed “realist” description. Cross studied the 
development of federal policy primarily through “the various iterations of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and, to a lesser extent, the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)” (p. x). More importantly for my 
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purposes, Cross paid attention to the Carter years and the creation of the Department 
of Education.  
 Cross (2004) offered a description of the move to create the Department of 
Education that focuses on the relationship between Califano and Carter. Cross wrote 
that Califano was trying to “pull every string he could to derail the dismantling of his 
agency—antics that would be among the major reasons that would lead Carter to fire 
him in the summer of 1979” (p. 59). Although this type of information is important, it 
is also insufficient. Cross provided no record of Califano’s reasoning and no 
discussions about the implications of creating a separate department for the 
antipoverty programs. Like the others, Cross’s focus on education policy 
development did not explain how people understood the relationship between the 
policies.  
What We Have Learned From These Examples 
 Both the education and the antipoverty perspectives offer important insights 
into the historical study of U.S. policy. First and foremost, all of the authors 
recognized that policy production is a historically and socially situated activity, 
subject to many factors of influence. Second, they all noted that the large shift in U.S. 
politics between 1965 and the present had a large effect on the types of policies that 
were produced. However, none of the works dealt directly with how people 
understood the relationship between the policies. Furthermore, in each of these 
accounts the Carter Administration was either glossed over or ignored. Finally, these 
authors seemed to accept that although the policies are historically situated and 
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inconsistent, there is a lack of disruption of the concepts that inform the production of 
policy.  
Situating Education Policy 
Some studies in education not only have described how education changed, 
but also have situated education policy within the larger U.S. cultural framework. For 
example, Spring’s (1996) monumental work traced how the history of U.S. schools 
are the result of, and productive factors in, cultural domination, the management of 
the distribution of ideas across society, and persistent racism and inequality. His 
interpretative framework is important because it is through these aspects of schooling 
that we see social forces or discourses operating with the power to link or separate 
poverty and education policies. However, the object of study was still the American 
school. He focused on this subject from 1642–2000, a time span that greatly exceeded 
my research questions.  
Another example of a work that situated education policy within the larger 
U.S. cultural framework is The American Dream and the Public Schools by 
Hochschild and Scovronick (2003). The purpose of this book was to bring together 
disparate education policy topics, such as vouchers, afro-centric schooling, inclusion 
classes, school finance, and school desegregation, and to review them through a 
framework that viewed the public school as the institution by which we should 
operationalize the “American dream.” Hochschild and Scovronick defined the 
American dream as a fair chance at mobility: 
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Our understanding of the American dream is the common one, described by 
President Clinton in this way: “The American Dream that we were all raised 
on is a simple but powerful one—if you work hard and play by the rules you 
should be given a chance to go as far as your God-given ability will take you.” 
(p. 9)  
Hochschild and Scovronick claimed that schools should be treated as public sites of 
democracy and used the American dream as their guide in local decision making. 
Here we again see a linking of education to dominant discourses of opportunity and 
equity. Although their study is important in that it relates school policy to the wider 
project of social policy in U.S. society, Hochschild and Scovronick de-emphasized 
the historical contingency and socially imbeddedness of a concept like the American 
dream and the discourses of opportunity and equity. Such an approach ignores the 
ways in which knowledge is continually constructed. Additionally, although they 
provided a great deal of history, they did not focus specifically on how we came to 
understand federal education policy as separate from antipoverty legislation.  
 Both of these studies provide insight into how education is interpenetrated by 
multiple social processes that are part of the experience of U.S. residents. They have 
shown how education is always in relationship with other aspects of our society but 
did not focus on the relationship between education and antipoverty policy during the 
Carter Administration.  
A Focus on the Relationship 
Only Silver and Silver (1991; also Silver, 1981) consistently have addressed 
the relationship between education and antipoverty policy. Their work identified how 
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education policy was linked to antipoverty legislation in both the United States and 
Great Britain from roughly the 1950s to the mid-1970s. In both countries, they looked 
at the important interest groups and research foundations that contributed to the 
joining of education and antipoverty. Silver and Silver’s comparative work gives 
great insight into the different articulations of equity and opportunity in the United 
States and Great Britain. Although this work is invaluable in helping us understand 
the growth of the War on Poverty in the United States, its time frame prevents any 
clear understanding of the uncoupling of the policies. Finally, Silver and Silver did 
not devote any attention to the Carter Administration.  
Summary 
 The insights and the limits revealed through the review of some of the 
literature provide guidance for answering my research questions. The most important 
insight gained from the readings highlighted, as well as from the others that were 
cited, is that policy production is a historically and socially situated activity that is 
subject to many factors of influence. The authors all noted that the large shift in U.S. 
politics between 1965 and the present had a large effect on the types of policies that 
were produced. Reviews of federal social policy and education policy showed a 
change in approach beginning in about 1981; however, none of the works accounted 
for how these changes might have been visible during the Carter Administration. 
Only Silver and Silver (1991; also Silver, 1981) consistently have dealt with how 
people understood the relationship between the policies. Finally, although these 
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authors seemed to accept that the policies are historically situated and inconsistent, 
the implications of this were undeveloped in their approaches.  
 If we are going to understand how the socioeducational policy paradigm 
described above became unthinkable, we must be able to understand how people 
constructed their knowledge at the time when education policy became independent 
from other social policies. As shown in chapter 1, this requires a focus on the Carter 
Administration. We also must bring education and antipoverty policy into the same 
view. The studies above, through the researchers’ choice of either education or 
antipoverty policy, failed to provide us with an understanding of the relationship of 
the time. Education policy cannot be understood as an independent or stable concept. 
A theoretical framework that continually acknowledges the implications of social 
construction of knowledge was needed to guide my investigation.  
The Theoretical Framework 
 In this study I looked at the utterances and interactions of historical figures 
that allowed me to interpret how the various understandings of the relationship 
between education and antipoverty policies were articulated during the Carter 
Administration. I chose this object to help me understand how education policy 
became thought of as independent from antipoverty policy and to help me explain 
how we have reached a point where the rejoining of them is almost unthinkable.  
 If my object of study was the social regularities that make certain words and 
interactions possible, then my theoretical framework must help me understand a 
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person’s capacity to speak as it is related to the moment’s social interactions. It also 
must give guidance to how I could understand these relationships in historical figures. 
It must help me understand how the historical social context made certain 
explanations and practices become intelligible, valorized, or deemed as natural, 
whereas others become discounted, impossible, or unimaginable (Britzman, 2003). 
Finally, given that the ultimate end goal of this work was policy analysis, the 
framework must help us understand what this means for the policy issues that 
surround the  relationship between education and poverty.  
The Theoretical Frames in Critical, Poststructural Policy Analysis 
 Research into policy should not be understood as solely an attempt to find 
answers to some research questions on a policy issue or social problem. Instead, it 
should be considered “interpretational forays into the dynamic complexities of high 
modern society” (Ball, 2005, p. 1). These forays should be guided by a framework or 
“theoretically informed sets of linked concepts” (Ball, 2005, p. 1). However, these 
frameworks should not be treated as a “perceptual straight jacket but a set of 
possibilities for thinking with” (Ball, 2005, p. 1). Frameworks should help us try to 
see coherence in the social situation and allow a writer to be deliberative about how 
we treat our object of study. At the same time, our theories should help us recognize 
that the set of concepts that we lean on are always “polymorphic, supple and 
adaptable” (Ball, 2005, p. 2). The complexity of the world does not lend itself to 
 
55 
grand narratives that can act as an “off-the-shelf interpretational kit” for all social 
situations, including policymaking (Ball, 2005, p. 2).  
 Such an approach to theory reflects the reflexive turn that has characterized 
much of the academic work of the 20th century (Crotty, 2003). This turn is part of the 
paradigmatic shifts in which people began to question their epistemological and 
eventually ontological assumptions in the production of research (Kuhn, 1962). 
Through these shifts, the objectivity of the world was questioned. People began to 
realize that the meaning of the object was conditional on its observation. They also 
began to notice that these observations were not the product of one consciousness but 
instead were always already conditioned by the social environment. In this 
environment there are always power differences. This has implications for not only 
how we attempted to understand the world, but also for our attempts to represent the 
world. If all knowledge is already socially constructed, “representation is always in 
crisis, knowledge is constitutive of power, and agency is the constitutive effect, and 
not the originator, of situated practices and histories” (Britzman, 2003, p. 245).  
 Below, I describe how the theoretical frames used to study politics and policy 
making have reflected this shift. First, I explain and critique the assumptions of the 
objectivist theoretical framework in the study of politics in the 20th century. Second, 
I specifically review some theoretical approaches to the study of policy that attempted 
to address these critiques. These descriptions allow me to situate and describe the 
more recent, critical, poststructural theories. 
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A Critique of Objectivist Theories  
The seismic shift in the social sciences also influenced how policy research 
was performed and represented. Fischer (2003) described how this epistemological 
crisis played out in the study of politics and policy making. Fischer noted that over 
the course of the 20th century, political science and policy development have pursued 
an “empirically based causal theory of political behavior” (p. 21). However, in this 
pursuit, researchers made some common epistemological and ontological 
assumptions. Epistemologically, they assumed that it was possible to know reality 
through empirical studies. Systemized observation in empirical studies would allow 
researchers to provide a more accurate description of objective realities, and this 
knowledge therefore could accumulate. Ontologically, it was assumed that all humans 
were by nature self-interested actors. This approach to human behavior was 
theoretically developed by Homans (1974), Becker (1978), and more recently 
Coleman (1990). 
Today, in political research this approach is termed rational choice theory. 
Researchers from this paradigm attempt to explain all social phenomena, including 
policy making, in terms of the rational calculations made by self-interested 
individuals. Researchers who use this lens see social interaction as social exchange 
modelled on economic action. People are motivated by the rewards and costs of 
actions and by the profits they can exact. The goal of this approach is to explain, 
generalize, and predict human behaviour through mathematical modelling of the 
available resources and the rational choices actors will make in their attempt to 
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maximize their own interests. Through statistical inference practices, a model is 
judged for its value to describe the objective behaviour of individuals. 
Fischer (2003) noted that the logic behind this approach “has been partly 
methodological and partly political” (p. 22). Methodologically, there is an assumption 
that focusing on the objective available resources in the study of policy making can 
control for nonempirical normative factors, such as ideas or faiths. According to this 
approach, the objective reality is needed to explain behaviour rather than a subjective 
discussion of values. Politically, this allows researchers to privilege their ideas as 
reality. Some rational-choice researchers, though, have noted that ideas do operate to 
guide the self-interested actors to their objective goals (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993). 
This approach has a fundamental epistemological problem: The objective 
resources in the world only have meaning based on our perceptions of that resource. 
For example, it is not necessary that we choose to value gold over an equally rare 
item. It is the social meaning given to gold that determines its interest to an actor 
(Norton, 2004). Ideas, then, do not just act as guides, but also frame our possible 
choices. From this perspective, politicians and policy makers are engaged in the 
manipulation of ideas that shape the way we see, understand, and value various 
resources.  
Ideas in Policy-Making Theories  
There have been various attempts to deal with the role of ideas in the policy 
process. Some emphasize how the institutional constraints of an environment shape 
how we view the resources around us. For example, Hall and Taylor (1996) noted that 
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institutions work to combine and change group preferences over time. The goal, then, 
is to compare how the difference in institutional structures can generate different 
configurations of preferences over time. The works of Skopol and Margaret (1980) 
and of Pierson (2000) are important examples of this. 
 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) made another attempt to show how ideas 
matter. They attempted to merge the notions of the rational actor with the importance 
of ideas. This approach, according to Fischer (2003), may set “the field on firmer 
scientific foundations” (p. 94).  
 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) emphasized the “significance of 
relationships within policy sectors for understanding how policy decision-making 
functions” (p. 130). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s theoretical framework, named 
advocacy coalition framework, assumes that the most useful way to think about 
policy change overtime is through a focus on “policy subsystems, i.e. the interaction 
of actors from different institutions interested in a policy area” (p. 131). It also 
assumes that public policies can be treated “in the same manner as belief systems, i.e. 
as sets of value priorities and causal assumptions about how to realize them” 
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The framework thus helps the analyst track how 
different policy subsystems compete and pursue their interests based on their values. 
The advocacy coalition framework has been very influential (Fischer, 2003). Its 
influence can be seen in the policy regime framework that was described in 
McGuinn’s (2006) work.  
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 However, such an approach is not sufficient. As alluded to above, this 
approach treats ideas as one of the many factors that influence politics. Ideas can be 
held by people and are stable entities or objects that have causal force. This approach 
ignores many of the developments in the sociology of knowledge that show that the 
consciousness of the individual is not an empty container in which ideas are held, if it 
exists at all (Berger & Luckman, 1966). Instead, the social construction of knowledge 
points to how our ideas, personality, preferences, and desires are historically and 
socially situated. To put it another way, it is only through social interaction that our 
subjectivity is constituted. This insight shifts our tracking of ideas as stable factors 
that can influence the policy process to one that asks how the social interactions 
within the policy process make some ideas possible and others not. 
Recent Poststructural Theoretical Developments in Policy Studies  
 Policy theorists recently have tried to deal with the important challenges to the 
objectivist stance. Fischer (2003) noted that responding to that challenge requires an 
approach that stresses  
the subjective foundations of social reality [and] seek[s] to overcome the 
objective-subjective dualism imposed by positivist or neopositivist 
epistemological doctrines, principles that spelled out the traditional scientific 
principles long serving to rule out or downplay the subjective foundations of 
social understanding. (p. 12) 
Due to this emphasis, there is a rejection of the possibility of a neutral observational 
vocabulary from which to prove the answer to any policy question. Instead, according 
to Fischer, poststructural policy theory is attuned to the “theoretical constitution of 
 
60 
facticity” (p. 14). This directs our investigation into the ways in which people’s 
(including the researchers) interests are constructed through their social relationships. 
 Policy theory from a poststructural stance also recognizes that policies are not 
stable, fixed, abstract documents but instead are open, awkward, incomplete, and 
unstable texts that may be read an infinite number of ways (Ball, 2005). This breaks 
down the dualism of object (policy) and subject (reader, implementer, analyst). 
Instead, as Lather (1991) noted,  
Context and meaning in everyday life are posited as co-constructions, 
multiple, complex, open and changing, neither pre-given nor explainable by 
large scale causal theories, but made and re-made across a multiplicity of 
minor scattered practices. (p. 42)  
This unrelenting recognition of complexity and difference then destabilizes ideas that 
hold the policy is solely the result of a dominant ideology or the rational choices of 
autonomous actors. Meaning, then, is always in the process of becoming and 
replicating.  
 Poststructural policy theory not only addresses the importance of symbolic 
social aspects of policy making, it also attempts to understand how some symbols are 
more possible than others (Scheurich, 1997). That is, the theoretical position does not 
ask us to explain a policy issue but instead asks us to try to be clear about how the 
social relationships of the time made the naming of a policy problem possible. The 
theory should help us see the complexity of the ways in which our world is socially 
constructed rather than help us model a causal factor.  
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 A poststructural approach also tries to suspend foundational categories. There 
is a resistance to judge the knowledge explained in the policy issue of a given time as 
true or untrue, warranted or unwarranted, or adequate or distorted, for we have no 
point outside of history from which to make that judgment. Instead, the goal is to 
offer a theoretical framework that helps us explain “the knowledge production 
procedures, practices, apparatuses, and institutions” (Fraser, 1989, p. 21). A 
poststructural approach thus asks us to recognize the ways in which our 
understandings of schools or poverty are part of the social patterns of a time and how 
the unity or disunity of the policy approaches are the product of knowledge 
production procedures. 
 However, any attempt to establish how systems of meaning are stabilized and 
replicated obscures the “active side of social processes, the ways in which even the 
most routinized practice of social agents involves the active construction, 
deconstruction, and reconstruction of social meanings” (Fraser, 1989, p. 157). From 
this perspective, the poststructural policy analyst is always looking for the ways in 
which the individual events irrupt to complicate and resist the stabilized practices of 
knowledge production. The analyst is also looking for ways in which more voices can 
be added to the policy process. Since there are no foundational ethics, it is only 
through interaction and disruption that we can attempt to struggle for a better present. 
 To sum up, a poststructural approach to policy theory rejects the objectivist 
stance and tries to recognize that the world and its meaning are coconstructed. This 
recognition then helps us conceptualize policy studies as a project whose goal is the 
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explanation of the practices and procedures by which knowledge is produced in a 
given time. In doing so we can show how some policy problems appeared while 
others did not, or why some solutions were unimaginable while others were seen as 
self-evident. It also encourages the researcher to disrupt the violence of categories, 
deconstruct things that seem unitary, and bring disparate phenomena into relationship 
(Foucault, 1991b). In doing so, we are able to expose the unfinished nature of policy 
and open it up for critique and betterment.  
 In the next section, I translate these general impressions into a more 
developed theoretical approach. I explain my assumptions, the concept of social 
regularities, and a framework for understanding a speaking person, from a 
poststructural point of view. This approach serves as a jumping off point from which 
to begin interpreting historical utterances or interactions in the Carter Administration.  
A Framework for Understanding how it is Possible That “One Particular Statement 
Appeared Rather Than Another” 
 Given the flexibility of theory, I explain a framework that helped me answer 
my research questions. As a bricoleur, I have assembled various elements from other 
theorists and made them understandable according to my metaphors (Scheurich, 
1997). I begin this section with an explanation of some of my most important 
assumptions. 
The purpose of this study was to understand how people explained the 
connections between poverty and education during the Carter Administration. In 
doing so, I could offer an interpretation of how possibilities for U.S. education and 
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social policy were transformed during this time. This means that I am interested in 
how people chose one explanation over another and thus enacted one possibility over 
another.  
First, I explain my three key assumptions: (a) the intersubjective condition of 
humanity, (b) the historical contingency of all knowledge and experience, and (c) 
ideas related to the dominant mode of power relations. Second, I describe and provide 
the idea of social regularities that helps explain some emergent patterns amid this 
contingency. Then, I explain the capacities from which we speak as social historical 
figures.  
Intersubjective Condition of Humanity  
The object–subject dualism is one of the dominant categories of modernity. 
This dualism assumes that the object has meaning innate to it and the subject must 
work to read its innate meaning if the subject is to know the truth. As described 
above, this approach ignores the social nature of knowledge. An approach that 
recognizes the social nature of knowledge must recognize not only that the object’s 
meaning is constituted by the subject, but also that we are never isolated subjects. 
Meaning is always made through social meanings. Thus, our knowing is not based on 
our intersubjectivity; that is, meaning can be made only through social relationships. 
Habermas (1987) has done the most extensive theorizing on intersubjectivity. Below I 
describe his arrival at the human condition as primarily intersubjective; then, I qualify 
the utility of this idea to my approach.  
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Habermas’s intersubjectivity. Habermas (1987) relied on the work of George 
Herbert Mead, because in Mead he saw a move away from the philosophy of 
consciousness that he claimed tripped up the “Marxist reception of Weber’s theory of 
rationalization, from Lukacs to Adorno” (p. 1). According to Habermas, in Mead’s 
incorporation of a “nonreductionist concept of language into behaviorism, we find 
combined in him the two approaches critical of consciousness” (p. 4). Another benefit 
cited by Habermas is that Mead’s theory of communication focuses on action. 
Through a critique of Mead’s description of the transition from subhuman interaction 
mediated by gestures to symbolically mediated interaction, Habermas has developed 
an approach that places communicative action at the threshold of the origin of 
humans.  
  Habermas (1987) paid attention to Mead’s description of the transition from 
subhuman interaction mediated by gestures to symbolically mediated interactions in 
order to critique the assumptions inherent in the philosophy of consciousness’s 
response to Weber’s theory of rationalization. The main assumption Habermas 
wished to thwart is that human action is ultimately initiated by a need for self-
sufficiency. As mentioned above, this assumption implies that all human action is 
rooted in an instrumental approach to action that treats the world as objects that are to 
be manipulated to reach the given end of self-sufficiency. A focus on Mead’s 
communicative nature of human action allows for a primacy of communicative action 
rather than solely instrumental action.  
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 According to Habermas (1987), Mead’s description of the transition from 
subhuman interaction mediated by gestures to symbolically mediated interactions 
begins by way of the example of two dogs squaring off. In this case the animals 
interact through gestures that are part of an innate stimulus-response behavior pattern. 
According to Mead (as cited in Habermas), this type of interaction may lead to the 
emergence of language through the “fact that semantic potential residing in gesture-
mediated interaction becomes symbolically available to participants through an 
internalization of the language of gestures” (p. 8). This internalization of the symbolic 
possibilities in the gestures can be employed only if the organism is able to take the 
attitude of the other. Through taking the attitude of the other, an identical meaning is 
possible. This transition takes place in three stages. In the first stage, the innate 
gestures are transformed into symbols through a replacement of the individual 
meaning with meaning that is the same for both individuals. Next, the previous 
stimulus–response interaction is replaced with an interpersonal relation between a 
speaker and a listener. Finally, Habermas stated, there is a transformation in “the 
structure of interaction, in that the participants learn to distinguish between acts of 
reaching understanding and actions oriented to success” (p. 9). Habermas noted that 
unfortunately Mead did address how the same meaning is reached  
 Habermas (1987) augmented Mead’s description with a reference to 
Wittengenstein’s discussion of rule. Habermas noted that the sameness of meaning of 
gesture for both individuals is secured only through the “intersubjective validity of a 
rule that ‘conventionally’ fixes the meaning of a symbol” (p. 16). This rule agreement 
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is contingent on rule competence, which refers to “the ability to produce symbolic 
expressions with communicative intent and to understand them” (Habermas, 1987, p. 
17).  
 Through Mead and Wittengenstein, Habermas (1987) established the 
philogenetic nature of communicative action. At this point, we have organisms who 
attempt to communicate by using symbols rather than gestures. These organisms are 
able to judge the validity of the symbol based on the intersubjective rule competence. 
This is prior to institutions of society that generate norms. Habermas noted that 
Mead’s failure to include a description of the transition from basic symbolically 
mediated interactions to more advanced uses of grammatical language leaves a gap in 
the role of communicative action in the development of human society. This then 
requires a development of Durkheim’s theory of religion to explain how the shift to 
symbolic interaction reshapes all forms of interaction and thus the development of 
norms.  
  Habermas (1987) noted that the attention to Durkheim is necessary because 
“Mead makes no effort to explain how this normatively integrated ‘social organism’ 
could have developed out of the sociative forms of symbolically mediated 
interaction” (p. 43). In Durkheim’s theory of religion, Habermas found an explanation 
of normatively guided action that is prelinguistic in nature. 
 Habermas (1987) noted that the core of Durkheim’s collective consciousness 
“is a normative consensus established and regenerated in the ritual practices of a 
community of believers” (p. 60). These ritual practices focus on religious symbols to 
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bring about intersubjective unity. This intersubjective unity allows for those 
practicing the ritual then to define themselves as “we.” Habermas maintained this fills 
the gap left by Mead, because in this “we” that develops, the normative validity of 
institutions tied to religious symbols and the personal identity of a subject defined by 
the collective consciousness are expressed by the religious symbols. Thus, between 
coordination based on symbolically mediated interaction and the development 
grammatical language is the development of normative behavior through religious 
symbols. Habermas noted that only through communicative action can the “energies 
of social solidarity attached to religious symbolism branch out and be imparted, in the 
form of moral authority, both to institutions and to persons” (p. 61). This approach 
satisfied Habermas to make his claim that communicative action is key, not only to 
the beginning of the human species, but also to the development of the institutions of 
society.  
Habermas (1987) therefore posited that communicative rationality allows for 
society to exist and so human individuals. So, only through communication for 
understanding can we continue to thrive. Habermas wrote, 
If we assume that the human species maintains itself through the socially 
coordinated activities of its members and that this coordination has to be 
established through communication—and in certain central spheres through 
communication aimed at reaching agreement—then the reproduction of the 
species also requires satisfying the conditions of a rationality that is inherent 
in communicative action. (p. 397) 
Thus, this reaching an understanding, communicative rationality, rather than a formal 
means-to-an-end rationality, takes primacy in the reproduction of society. Humans 
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may need to obtain food to survive but they specifically do this through coordinated 
action that is based on coming to an understanding. 
Learning from Habermas. Habermas’s (1987) notion of intersubjectivity helps 
us understand many major issues of modern thought. First, his conceptualization 
helps us remove our foundational assumptions that the ego or individual 
consciousness is the site of our knowing the world. This allows us to deny the charge 
that human rationality is ultimately an instrumental and therefore destructive 
rationality. Second, his conceptualization allows us to give primacy to the act of 
attempting to understand. In Habermas’s framework, our existence as a species is 
based on coordinated action that developed out of a communicative rationality that 
built and sustains the intelligibility of the world.  
I take these two assumptions to be very important to how we should 
understand humans. It reminds us that all meaning is socially constructed and that 
coordination of activities is a very important part of our world. It also reminds us to 
decenter the subject. The part of Habermas’s (1987) work that I question is the 
phylogenetic aspect of his explanation. I do not believe we can make a claim about 
the intersubjective nature of humanity as Habermas does. However, I think his 
insights can be used in a pragmatic way.  
Historical Contingency 
In addition to my assumption about intersubjectivity, I also assume that our 
world is never totally determined or totally understandable. We continually must look 
 
69 
at how people made meaning out of the world in their time. In the same way that we 
must decenter the subject, we also must pay attention to the historical moment.  
My recognition of the historical moment is also recognition of the 
impossibility of knowing an order that exists outside of human socialization. As 
Rorty (1989) pointed out, from this point of view “there is nothing ‘beneath’ 
socialization or prior to history which is definatory of the humans” (p. xiii). Thus, 
there is no final vocabulary. Instead, all ways of naming the world are historically 
contingent. Contingency used here is meant to capture the ways in which our social 
interactions are devoid of any immanent nature or logic and thus are always open to 
innovation, transformation, and redescription. According to Topper (1995), 
contingency represents “the abundent possiblites inherent in the recognition of 
historicity: because our inherited practices and forms of life are not ontologically 
fixed but are culturally and historically constituted, they can (although never all at 
once) be questioned, transformed, and re-described” (p. 955).  
 A nonfoundational approach imagines a world that cannot be fullfilled. 
Ljunggren (2003) wrote that Dewey also imagined the world as open and unfinished. 
It is a world without foundations: 
a universe in which there is real uncertainty and contingency, a world which is 
not all in, and never will be, a world which in some respect is incomplete and 
in the making, and which in these respects may be made this way or that 
according as men judge, prize, love and labor. (Dewey, as quoted in 
Ljunggren, 2003, p. 355)  
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Modern Power Relationships 
While I believe our world is contingent and has meaning based only 
communicative action, I also believe it is continually marked by power struggles. 
Anything is possible, but the possibilities are shaped by power relationships. One 
cannot hold power. It can exist only in a relationship, and the relationships of one 
time are different from those of another. If all knowledge is based on relationships, 
and all relationships involve an imbalance of power, then the understanding of a time 
is determined by how knowledge is created through those relationships of power 
(Foucault, 1980). As the story I am telling is of the Carter Administration, it is 
important that we have a sketch of the way power is exercised in modern 
relationships. Foucault’s discussion of governmentality provides a scaffold from 
which to understand this approach.  
Governmentality. In a lecture titled “Governmentality,” Foucault (1991a) 
attempted to outline how power has changed. He showed how the idea of sovereignty 
changed from the practice of ruling, as was familiar to princes of medieval Europe, to 
the practice of the art of government that started in the 1700s in the emerging nation 
states of Europe. In the art of government, ruling no longer had the single goal of 
maintenance of the prince’s power; instead, the new goal focused on the management 
of the population. The state is no longer territory but a population. Foucault (1991a) 
defined this practice of population management as governmentality, an 
ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the 
calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit 
complex form of power, which has at its target population, as its principal 
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form of knowledge political economy, and as it essential technical means 
apparatuses of security. (p. 102) 
This ensemble forms a triangle in which political economy, sovereignty (security), 
and discipline work all at once to generate a reality that manages a population. This 
triangle works to develop people into subjects who are framed to act, know, and 
remember in certain ways. Below are the three aspects of the triangle and a brief 
explanation of their technologies and their consequences. 
 Political economy. According to Foucault (1991a), political economy became 
the dominant way of understanding the world through the problems engendered by a 
growing population. The population problems of epidemics and famine as well as the 
generation of greater productive power could be addressed by the ideas of economy 
better than by the military logics that had dominated ideas of government. Foucault 
(1991a) wrote, “The problem of government finally came to be thought, reflected and 
calculated outside of the juridical framework of sovereignty” (p. 104). Instead, ruling 
was a technical problem of population management. Adam Smith (1776/1904) 
defined political economy as a “branch of the science of a statesman or legislator” 
concerned with the twofold objective of “providing a plentiful revenue or subsistence 
for the people … and [supplying] the state or commonwealth with a revenue 
sufficient for the public service” (p. #). From this framework, the population 
represents more of an end of government. Foucault (1991a) wrote, “The population is 
the subject of needs of aspirations, but it is also the object in the hands of the 
government, aware, vis-à-vis the government, of what it wants, but ignorant of what 
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is being done to it” (p. 104). This shift was important because in the regime of truth 
presented by political economy a person’s personhood was folded into the 
development of the population.  
 Discipline. Under the logics of political economy, the government’s goal is 
the growth of a population. However, it is a certain type of population, one that will 
not challenge the sovereignty or the economic order. In order to maintain the 
dominant social order, modern society relies not only on violence or ideology, but 
also on disciplining technologies. Foucault (1991a) wrote,  
Discipline was never more important or more valorized than at the moment 
when it became important to manage a population: the managing of a 
population not only concerns the collective mass of phenomena, the level of 
its aggregate effects, it also implies the management of population in its 
depths and its details. (p. 102)  
Power (2005) addressed this by rephrasing it as follows: 
Liberalism depends on the “unfreedom” of some to ensure that the rest will 
consent to be governed in and through freedom. While some members of 
society are judged to be capable of properly governing themselves through 
freedom, others are not yet. Those who are not, or not yet, ready for freedom 
must be governed through older disciplinary methods, with the goal of 
instilling enough self-discipline and self-responsibility that they will one day 
be able to properly exercise their freedom and be governed accordingly. (p 
644, emphasize in original) 
Schools, prisons (debtor and criminal), and poor houses are all institutions in which 
discipline has been enforced to develop subjects who can one day rule themselves. In 
each of these places, needs of a person are defined and worked on through 
disciplinary mechanisms. The students, deviants, and poor must define their needs as 
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the institutions do; in the politics of this definition of needs, the dominant order can 
be replicated or contested (Fraser, 1989).  
 Sovereignty. One of the keys to the new way of governing was that it hid the 
operation of power in securing the economic order. The rule was no longer at the end 
of the sovereign’s stick but instead operated through law. In doing so, the law “must 
appear to be a necessity of things, and power must act while concealing itself beneath 
the gentle force of nature” (Foucault, 1991a, p. 106). Once the people learned the 
feeling of respect for private property or for wealth, the order would be a natural 
order in which rational decisions would lead to a natural defense of the capitalist 
economic order that continued the violence of inequality. The system was based on 
the assumption that human nature was first and foremost self-interested.  
 To sum up, according to Foucault (1991a), the exercise of power in modern 
society is practiced through governmentality. Governmentality refers to an ensemble 
of practices and institutions that generate ways of knowing in which people subject 
themselves to and are subjects of the dominant social order. Specifically, power 
works through the supposed natural course of government to support disciplining 
mechanisms that will grow a population that will abide by the dominant mode of life. 
Power of this type continually works upon people. A person’s subjectivity is 
continually constructed through the social interactions that constitute society. 
Schools, poverty programs, therapy, global banking institutions, and political debates 
develop within the common-sense framework that is generated through 
governmentality technologies. This is markedly different from past forms of power 
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that were at the end of a club or sword and were occasional, such as whenever the 
majesty’s army was present. 
Learning from Foucault. Foucault’s (1991a) assertion helps us understand that 
power in the modern world operates throughout the social order. Groups of 
technologies shape our subjectivities. We replicate these power differences through 
our narration of events in all of our social actions. Many take this description of the 
operation of power to be too totalizing or inescapable, but in reality it is 
nonfoundational. The disciplining technologies we choose (e.g., schools, prisons, 
therapy) are always in the process of being enacted. Thus, resistance is always 
possible. So as we look at the Carter Administration, we can use Foucault’s 
description of governmentality to guide our understanding and as a frame from which 
to judge resistance. 
A Summary of my Assumptions 
 As I began this project, I assumed first that all meaning is generated 
intersubjectively. Therefore, it is important to decenter the subject. In other words, we 
should not look for the speaking ego to understand how people explained the 
relationship between education and antipoverty policy but instead should look at the 
social interactions to find meaning. Second, I believe that all social interactions are 
historically contingent. Possible meanings are directly related to the time and place in 
which social interactions occurred. Finally, I believe that all social interactions are 
impacted by power differences. These operate differently at different times. The form 
of power described in Foucault’s (1991a) governmentality is a good starting point.  
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 Although these assumptions directed my interpretive eye toward certain 
aspects of the past, they did not offer me a structure from which to understand 
continuities and patterns that might arise out the study of the social interactions. My 
assumptions also did not fully help me conceptualize a historical actor who can speak 
yet at the same time is subject to the power relationships of the time. The next section 
will help with both of these tasks, as I describe the idea of social regularities as well 
as the capacities from which people can speak during a social interaction.  
Social Regularities 
 If all meaning is created intersubjectively through social interaction, we 
require a concept that helps us understand patterns that arise out of social interaction. 
These patterns are sometimes referred to as culture. However, culture as it is usually 
invoked acts as a holding tank of resources for social interaction (Chartier, 1988). We 
tend to place it outside or hovering just above daily life. Recognition of a historically 
contingent world dispels the notion of anything existing outside of our daily 
interactions. Therefore, it is important to see these patterns as only possible inside 
social interactions. A phrase that captures such an understanding is social regularities 
(Scheurich, 1997). 
The social regularities that we enact in our daily practices constitute what is 
possible in a given time (Norton, 2004; Scheurich, 1997; Wuthnow, 2006). Building 
off of Foucault, Scheurich held that social regularities can be understood as a catch-
all phrase for the discourses, practices, procedures, and narratives that we enact in our 
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daily interactions. According to Scheurich, an investigation into the development of 
policy requires that we “investigate the intersection or, better, the constitutive grid of 
conditions, assumptions, forces which make the emergence of a social problem, and 
its strands and traces, possible—to investigate how a social problem becomes visible 
as a social problem” (p. 97). Scheurich continued that this grid of 
social regularities (thoughts, statements, actions that arise continually out of 
interactions between people in a given place and time; a kind of grammar or 
economy) makes possible a production and reproduction of social orders. The 
social regularities then, constitute both categories of thought and ways of 
thinking. (p. 99) 
It is important to remember that, due to our recognition of intersubjectivity, we 
should understand that no one individual or group has conscious control over the 
creation of these social regularities. Because they are always constituted by social 
interaction, replication does not require the actions of a self-conscious subject.  
  For example, in our society, categories of thought, such as White supremacy, 
private property, meritocracy, rule of law, individualism, equality, opportunity, and 
efficiency (along with others), all occur regularly in our daily interactions. In our 
interactions, we engage in practices and procedures that support these categories of 
thought, such as grading students or invoking property rights. Out of the regularity of 
these practices and discourses emerge patterns of relationships that come to represent 
our common sense. Scheurich (1997) noted that it is important to remember that these 
categories and ways of thinking are historically situated. They emerge out of our 
interactions, made possible and limited by our social and historical context.  
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Scheurich (1997) built these ideas mainly from his readings of Foucault 
(1972; 1991b). In both of these works, Foucault was trying to explicate how historical 
explanation is possible, without relying on the centered consciousness or deep 
structural explanations. Typically, when Foucault described social interaction he 
referred the social regularities as discourses. In his description of the historical 
contingency of these regularities, Foucault (1972) warned,  
We must be ready to receive every moment of discourse in its sudden 
irruption; in that punctuality in which it appears, and in the temporal 
dispersion that enables it to be repeated, known, forgotten, transformed, 
utterly erased and hidden, far from all view, in the dust of books. Discourse 
must not be referred to the distant presence of the origin, but treated as and 
when it occurs. (p. 25)  
In other words, we act out and enact these regularities in our daily interactions in this 
particular culture at this particular time. The regularities of another place and time 
might produce different ways of knowing and making sense of the world. 
 Of course, the repetition or erasure of a social regularity is not random or the 
product of natural events. Instead, it is a combination of emergent rules that privilege 
some people over others. Although the grids or intersections of these social 
regularities represent the dominant modes of life, they are also always interruptible, 
because there are always other ways of thinking. These marginalized ways of 
thinking often become regularized in communities that are cut off from social 
interaction with the majority (Scheurich, 1997). 
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How the Concept of Social Regularities is Helpful 
 The purpose of this theoretical framework was to help me make sense of how 
people during the Carter Administration were able to explain the relationship between 
education and antipoverty policy and specifically to clarify why one explanation was 
more possible than the others. Given my assumption that all meaning is 
intersubjective, historically contingent, and constituted by power relationships, I 
needed a concept that addressed how certain statements were possible, given the 
social nature and contingency of knowledge. Social regularities provided that basis. 
Use of this concept directed my attention to the patterns that arise out social 
interactions. The identification of these patterns and their intersections enabled 
understanding how in a given time certain statements were more legitimate than 
others. It also removed the explanations provided from the location of individual 
consciousness. The next section deals with the issue of personhood in a framework 
that denies the importance of the individual consciousness.  
The Concept of Ambiguous Personhood: There are People who are Speaking, Right? 
 The goal of this framework was to help me make sense out of how various 
explanations were made during the Carter Administration. Those statements were 
made by historical figures. However, as we just saw, social interactions were 
important in determining what types of explanations could be made. However, to 
leave it at that would de-emphasize that disruption and difference are possible in any 
social interaction. In this section I explain that it is not the consciousness of the 
individual that makes this disruption possible but the interaction of the different 
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capacities of personhood that are constituted by social interactions. First, I outline 
these capacities as Trouillot (1995) explained them and then recapture them for my 
poststructural framework.  
As Norton (2004) stated, “Politics is a vocation in the fullest sense. Political 
institutions convoke, provoke and evoke collective and individual identities” (p. 55). 
The continuity of this identity is directly related to the continuity of the group. Norton 
stated, 
The construction of identity in and through community has readily recognized 
dimensions of time and space. It is on this collective dimension of identity that 
one most easily sees the link between identity and historicity. … One is bound 
in and to histories held in common. (p. 54)  
Our identity or personhood, then, is always produced in social interactions that are 
framed as collective experiences, such as being part of a family, team, or faculty. It is 
important to remember that social interactions are always produced in a specific 
historical context. “Historical actors are also narrators, and vice versa” (Trouillot, 
1995, p. 23). This is the ambiguity of personhood. We are always at the same time 
narrators and participants.  
 Any social situation (which may be all situations, including the process of 
policy making) involves people in three distinct capacities (Trouillot, 1995): (a) 
“agents, or occupants of structural positions”; (b) “actors in constant interface with a 
context”; and (c) “as subjects, that is, as voices aware of their vocality” (p. 23). 
According to Trouillot, each of these capacities is animated by the social conditions 
of the time. By agents, Trouillot means the strata or sets to which people belong, such 
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as class, role, or status positions. In these positions, they perform the role that is 
circumscribed by political, ideological, economic, and sociocultural structures. Just as 
important, people are actors. That is, they only perform their agenthood in a particular 
place and time. Trouillot defined the actor capacity as “a bundle of capacities that are 
specific in time and space in ways that both their existence and their understanding 
rest fundamentally on historic particulars” (p. 23) An example offers an easy 
distinction between these capacities. An analysis of motherhood as an agent position 
can explore the sociocultural, political, economic, and ideological structures that 
define such positions as mothers and daughters, whereas a comparative study of 
mothers in lower class India and upper east side Manhattan would have to address 
how people act as actors to deal with particular situations. For Trouillot, the site of 
this ambiguity in our personhood is found in the subjective capacity of people. The 
idea that people are voices aware of their vocality allows them to display not only 
intent, but also the ability to narrate their intentions. All at once, a person has the 
capacity to be an agent, actor, and subject. According to Trouillot, the subjective 
capacity ensures confusion because it engages people “simultaneously in the socio-
historical process and in narrative constructions about that process” (p. 24). 
Trouillot (1995) noted that faced with this ambiguity, those trying to 
understand historical figures often make one of two choices. People who approach the 
past in realist terms tend to describe humans as only agents and actors who are part of 
material social processes. Others, termed extreme constructivists by Trouillot, focus 
solely on the subjectivity of people and conflate the historical process and historical 
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narrative until everything is fiction. This approach privileges the consciousness as the 
seat of all knowledge. If we resist the need to deny this ambiguity, according to 
Trouillot, we realize that “peoples are not always subjects constantly confronting 
history … but the capacity upon which they can act to become subjects is always part 
of their condition” (p. 24).  
The Value of Linking the Social Regularity Concept to the Ambiguous Personhood 
Concept 
Although contrary to Trouillot’s (1995) purposes, this heuristic of ambiguous 
personhood is useful for helping us frame historical figures in a more poststructural 
way. If we remove the substance that Trouillot attributed to these capacities, as 
positions within a structural framework, they can be reframed as modes of social 
regularity that operate on different time scales. That is, instead of seeing these 
capacities as inherent to the person, we can see these capacities as measures of 
stability for the various social regularities of a given time. The poststructural point of 
view recognizes that our intersubjectivity is primary and sees these capacities as 
constituted through our social interactions. The social regularities with the longest 
occurrence, such as White supremacy, thus constitute our agenthood capacity. Social 
regularities of shorter occurrences, such as those that occur in an institutional setting, 
constitute our actorhood. The shortest occurrence of regularity can be thought of as 





 As mentioned above, if we understand the agenthood capacity as not residing 
within the person, but as a portion of a personhood that is constituted through social 
interactions, then we can begin to see how the aspects of structural thought can be 
reframed in way that resists objectivist tendencies. For example, classic structuralism 
asserts that class structures are social facts that determine our consciousness and lot in 
life. In this framework the object of the class structure is taken to be a reality that 
determines our subjectivity. However, the social construction of class structures long 
has been recognized. Giddens (1973) noted that while there are an infinite number of 
economic positions within a given society, there are usually only a few classes that 
are self-identified. In other words, while every person may have different amounts in 
their bank accounts, they all can place themselves and others in just a few class 
categories. These class categories are the result of the intersection of practices and 
discourses that are enacted in social relationships. 
 Massey (2006) provided an important example of the constitution of the 
agenthood capacity. In his description of the development of the U.S. stratification 
system over the past 50 years, he showed that stratification operates on what he 
termed a stereotype model. Although he invested his model with psychological 
metaphors, the model is useful to help us make agenthood thinkable. Massey asserted, 
“Stratification begins psychologically with the creation of cognitive boundaries that 
allocate people to social categories” (p. 10). He claimed these social categories yield 
subconscious dispositions toward people and objects and act as guides by which an 
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individual makes judgments. Some people fit into categories that are considered an 
out-group because of their perceived danger our lack of warmth, whereas others are 
considered part of an in-group that is considered likable and helpful. According to 
decisions about the distribution of resources, people fall back on these categories. 
Out-groups are denied access or opportunity, whereas in-groups are secured and 
rewarded.  
 While Massey’s (2006) description is laden with psychological theory that 
privileges a realist interpretation of the human brain as an autonomous object, his 
discussion of categorical rule sorting is helpful. If we reframe it in a poststructural 
way, we begin to see that those categories are not developed first in the mind of an 
individual but instead are constituted by the social interactions. The constitution of 
these categories allows a simple meaning-making rule that can be enacted in more 
social interactions and so becomes a social regularity. The stability of these 
regularities, such as the continual out-group status of African Americans in U.S. 
history, allows people to be constituted as agents of those positions (e.g., White 
oppressor or exploited African American). Unlike Massey’s claim that humans are 
hard-wired to think categorically, in the poststructural reframe these social 
regularities are just that: products of intersubjective meaning making, which always 
produces a text that is open, unfinished, and multidimensional.  
Actorhood 
 The capacity of actorhood is generated through the social regularities that are 
enacted within a certain time and place. For example, an agenthood might be a slave, 
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but the actorhood capacity might grow out of the social interactions of a slave on a 
plantation in the salt peat of the Caribbean. A person’s actorhood comes from the 
institutional scripts that are continually enacted in a certain institutional setting 
(Rowan & Miskel, 1999; Rusch, 2005). Examples of this can be found in educational 
reform literature that has noted the institutional expectations of social interactions 
have a large effect on the fidelity to reform (Hanson, 2001). For example, Rusch 
noted that change in schools requires organizational learning and that organizational 
learning is dependent on “complex professional talk” (p. 85). Schools where social 
interaction engenders actors to speak about local issues in a certain way create the 
mostly likely conditions for reform.  
Subjecthood  
The reflexive nature of subjecthood adds ambiguity to our ability to 
understand historical figures. The social regularities of their time always force them 
to enact agenthood (e.g., class position or race) and their actorhood (e.g., welfare kid 
in this school). At the same time, within the social interaction, they can narrate those 
capacities. Social interactions allow people either to contest their agenthood or to 
support it. It is possible to narrate the unfairness of a position or an institutional 
practice, but this is only done among social regularities that create one as an agent of 
a class and actor in an institution.  
This ambiguity is a site of crisis for those who desire a truthful voice, because 
these capacities to speak are always constituted by the social regularities of the time. 
According to Britzman (2003), social regularities  
 
85 
authorize what can and cannot be said; they produce relations of power and 
communities of consent and dissent, and thus discursive boundaries are 
always being redrawn around what constitutes the desirable and the 
undesirable and around what it is that makes possible particular structures of 
intelligibility and unintelligently. (p. 252) 
Summary of the Framework and its Value 
The theoretical framework I have laid out is based on three assumptions. First, 
I assume that all meaning is intersubjective. In other words, there is no meaning in the 
object except when it is part of a social interaction. The second assumption is that all 
social interactions are historically contingent. By this, I mean that there are no 
foundational aspects of human knowledge or experience. The third assumption is that 
power relationships in modern times operate along a certain mode, termed 
governmentality by Foucault (1991a).  
 These three assumptions helped me theoretically link two concepts. The first 
concept is social regularities, by which I mean the regular patterns that can be 
identified in social interactions. Since all meaning is generated through social 
interactions, these patterns shape our meanings; they determine what is thinkable and 
unthinkable. The second concept is the ambiguous personhood. I conceptualized that 
people, through social interactions, are constituted in three ways: as (a) agents, (b) 
actors, and (c) subjects. I then linked the two concepts to show that as agents, people 
enact and are products of social regularities that are long term and stable, like class 
positions. As actors, people enact and are products of social regularities that last for 
shorter spans of time and are more dependent on local institutional settings. Finally, 
as subjects, people enact regularities that allow them to narrate their other two 
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constituted capacities. Through a review of the purposes of this study, I explain how 
this will guide my research.  
This study revolved around the following puzzle: Why is an approach that 
connects education and antipoverty policy almost unthinkable today? In order to 
answer that question I needed to explore the development and transformation of 
various social regularities (intersections of practices and discourses) that allowed 
education policy to appear be self-evidently independent by the time of Reagan’s 
election. My theoretical framework offered me vistas from which to understand these 
social regularities. By linking a personhood to social regularities, I could see that 
these social regularities can operate on different time scales and emerge out of 
different dimensions of a social interaction. However, my road to the discovery of 
these social regularities must wind through examples of social interactions in which 
historical figures speak. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation was to identify the 
ways in which people explained the relationship between federal education and 
antipoverty policies from 1975–1981. My framework directed me, as I investigated 
these explanations, to make sure I embrace the ambiguity rather than attribute 
statements to deeper conditions. In doing so I did not trace what was said, but instead 
traced why one particular statement appeared rather than another. Therefore, this 
theoretical framework guided me as I answered Research Questions 1 and 2. 
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What This Means for the Researcher 
Research Question 3 asked the following: What lessons can be taken from a 
historical deconstructive analysis of this policy issue for contemporary educational 
policy? The theoretical framework I have laid out helped me create my historical 
deconstruction of the issue. However, in order to answer my final research question I 
must investigate what is possible given such a framework. 
 First, it is important to note that the same three assumptions also apply to 
myself and the production of my interpretation. Whatever representation I create, it 
always will be a partial coconstruction of the context and the intersubjective 
meanings that I enact. So how does a researcher conduct policy studies from such a 
free-floating position?  
 The first step is to let go of the desire to hold “truth and justice in the same 
vision” (Rorty, 1999. p. 12). In other words, just because we are “children of time and 
place, without any significant metaphysical or biological limits on plasticity” does not 
mean that our moral obligation to sympathize with the pain of others is lessened 
(Rorty, 1999, p. 15). Even if it cannot all hang together, there are still important 
relationships in our time. Thus, a poststructural approach does not attempt to show 
the truth of the policy situation. It attempts to identify important contextual 
relationships for the sake of betterment. As we create our interpretations, we produce 
“a weave of knowing and not-knowing which is what knowing is” (Lather, 1991, p. 
49). According to some pragmatists, such as Ljunggren (2003), that recognition of not 
knowing might be the most important element of democracy: 
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My conclusion, stemming from Dewey, is that a radical democracy and a 
radical conception of the Public, as well as the meaning of community, 
requires a non-foundational attitude. That is my message, and by this I mean 
an attitude where the limits between philosophy and politics disappear when 
theorising on body/mind, individual/collective, private/public, and where a 
contingency in thinking/acting is the very condition for being. Then, this is an 
attitude of willingness—a willingness to give up any foundation for the sake 
of better arguments. (p. 352) 
Therefore in my opinion the goal of policy studies from a poststructural position is 
neither the diagnosis of the entire liberal order nor the search for justice. Instead, the 
goal is to engage in a struggle for betterment and work for disruption. Both of these 
concepts, fairness and disruption, hinge upon the recognition that life is contingent on 
our historical moment. The concept of fairness involves assumptions about the 
moment; this is in contrast to justice, which claims some foundational condition. 
Fairness is always related to a process of a negotiation. Disruption is also a relational 
concept. One who disrupts does not desire to set things straight but only to point to 
the possibility of difference. 
 Accordingly, my answer to Research Question 3 was framed along the lines of 
fairness and disruption. The lessons we learn have to do with our abilities to disrupt 
the present and to think of more fair possibilities for the future. Although these are 
meager claims, they may be all we have.  
Conclusion 
In choosing my object, I purposefully avoided the question, “What is 
education policy?” or, “What is the purpose of education policy?” Instead, I am 
interested in how people drew the lines around education policy during the Carter 
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Administration. I was interested in how they made use of the dominant practices and 
discourses around them to regularize these boundaries. I have written a history of how 
this way of “doing” education policy came to be accepted as “altogether natural, self-
evident and indispensable” (Foucault, 1991b, p. 74). In doing so, I attempted to shake 
the false self-evidence of education policy’s independence and demonstrate its 
precariousness, “making visible not its arbitrariness, but its complex interconnection 
with a multiplicity of historical processes” (Foucault, 1991b, p. 76). 
 The theoretical framework I have provided above guided my methodological 
approach to the subject. In the next chapter I describe my methodology and research 
design. Each of these is tied to my purpose.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
 
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the methodology that was employed 
in this dissertation project. In this study, I have provided an interpretation of the 
historical sociopolitical forces that constituted how actors at the federal level from 
1975–1981 explained the relationship between federal education and antipoverty 
policies. I also seek to demonstrate the importance of the process of historicizing in 
policy analysis. In carrying out this project, I have designed a strategy that emerged 
from the theoretical orientations described in chapter 2 and my methodological 
commitments. This chapter delineates that strategy and its theoretical and 
methodological components.  
 I begin the chapter with a discussion of critical policy analysis and its 
methodological underpinnings. Subsequently, I demonstrate the appropriateness of 
using this approach for my particular research study. This is followed by a description 
of the research design of the study, in which I discuss methods of data collection, 
analysis procedures, and the ethical considerations of researcher positionality and 
trustworthiness.  
Critical Policy Analysis  
 The overarching methodology for this study is critical policy analysis. Critical 
policy analysis is a set of strategies for researching the development and the effects of 
policy that highlights how power operates in specific historical and social contexts. 
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Critical policy analysts typically define policy in a broad sense and recognize that 
policy can be analyzed as a text, a discourse, and the effects of power (Ball, 1994). 
This approach to policy analysis arose out of the poststructural and feminist critique 
of traditional, rational policy analysis (Fischer, 2003; Fraser, 1989; Forrester, 1993; 
Yanow, 1996). In educational policy studies specifically, policy analysis developed as 
an attempt to apply insights from political sociology, critical leadership studies, and 
qualitative evaluative studies to the study of education policy (Ball, 1987, 1994, 
2005; Lather, 2006; Lincoln & Guba, 1989; J. Marshall & Peters, 1999; Scheurich, 
1997; Taylor, Rizvi, Lingard, & Miriam, 1997; Young, 1999). I begin this section 
with a brief summary of this critique, which leads into a discussion of the main tenets 
of critical policy analysis. Next, I explain the relevance of these tenets to the purposes 
of this study. Then, I again emphasize and elaborate on the importance of 
historicizing in this type of research. 
 Early policy studies were rooted in Laswell’s (1951) work, The Policy 
Orientation, which asserted that policy inquiry should be an applied social science 
that provides objective solutions to social problems. There was a desire within this 
framework for a policy science that would act as a mediator between academics, 
government decision makers, and ordinary citizens, with the goal of minimizing, if 
not eliminating, the need for unproductive political debate over the pressing policy 
issues on the agenda. At its best, as Fischer (2003) pointed out, “policy analysis, in 
this model, strives to translate political and social issues into technically defined ends 
to be pursued through administrative means” (p. 4). At its worst, Laswell’s 
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technocratic, managerialist understanding of policy studies privileges “truth” over 
democracy (Taylor et al., 1997, p. 28).  
 Traditional policy analysts long have avoided recognition that power is an 
important part of policy analysis (Ball, 1994). Power itself is a slippery concept. 
Traditionally, political scientists have been concerned with the location of the seat of 
power within the state and the political and economic elites who control that seat 
(Fischer, 2003). As Dye (1987) pointed out, the irony of American government is that 
the masses do not control the democracy of America. In liberal democracies of late 
modernity, looking for the seat of power fails to explain how, despite a change in 
political parties and increasing volume of citizens who have access to the political 
system, a hegemonic group remains whose interests are served over others (Giddens, 
1973). A search for the controlling elites or puppeteers is often fruitless. In fact, such 
a search distracts us from understanding that power is a relational phenomenon. It is 
only between people that power exists; one cannot hold power (Foucault, 1980; 
Nyberg, 1981). Power is an intersubjective phenomenon that is dispersed throughout 
the social order. Power is the ability not only to constrain, such as in the limits of 
possible actions in a certain relationship, also to produce systems of knowledge, 
regimes of truth, and economies of desire (Foucault, 1972; Norton, 2004).  
 Some authors have argued that who exercises power is not nearly as important 
as how power is exercised (Foucault, 1980; Nyberg, 1981; Trouillot, 1995). A 
researcher with a critical perspective recognizes that policy is part of how power 
operates. A policy not only may constrain our action and what we view as possible, 
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but also may constitute new ways of speaking and acting that privilege the position of 
some over others. Policy analysis from a critical perspective is to clarify the 
relationship between the ways in which people’s interests are constructed through 
historically situated systems of knowledge or economies of desire and the process of 
policy production.  
 In the critical analysis of policy, analysis of how power is exercised must be 
attempted in all stages of the policy process. Critical policy analysts have tended to 
make use of the traditional policy stages (Dunn, 1994), not to describe a linear 
process of policy production, but as spaces in which a researcher can identify the sites 
of political struggle. Scheurich (1997) argued that we must analyze the ways in which 
problems are constructed, what solutions are perceived as available, and the systems 
of knowledge that are available for our evaluation of the policy implementation in a 
given time. Taylor et al. (1997) argued we must study the contexts in which the 
policy is developed, the places in which the texts are produced and interpreted, and 
the consequences of the policies. Ball (1994) has outlined that critical policy analysis 
must attempt to expose the politics of five different contexts: (a) the context of 
influence, (b) the context of policy text production, (c) the contexts of practice, (d) 
the context of outcomes, and (e) the context of political struggle. According to Ball 
(1994),  
Each context consists of a number of areas of action—some private and some 
public. Each context involves struggles and compromise and ad hocery. They 
are loosely coupled and there is not one simple direction of flow of 
information between them. (p. 26)  
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I would add that each of these contexts can occur simultaneously or separated by 
expanses of time. They can be disjointed and separated culturally and geographically 
and yet still be interpenetrated by common discourses and practices. In each space 
policy is constructed through and constructs relationships of power. 
 Tracking power through these various moments simply helps emphasize the 
fundamentally processual character of policy production and to insist that what policy 
is matters less than how policy works, that power itself works through policies, and 
that the policy makers’ claimed political preferences have little influence on most of 
the actual practices of power (Trouillot, 1995). The different solutions or policy levers 
that are perceived as available in a historical moment are shaped by power relations 
of that time. The practices that are the responses to the available policy levers are the 
result of relationships of power; our understandings and descriptions of the effects of 
the deployment of given policy levers are also a result of power relationships.  
Critical Policy Research Methods 
The traditional model of policy of analysis has encouraged research methods 
that attempt to find the true cause of the social problem as well as the most logical 
and efficient solution. Researchers employing this approach assume that they can 
separate facts from values by relying on rigors of objective empirical analysis (Dunn, 
1994). Social problems are treated as self-evident objects that need to be explained 
and described, preferably in economic terms. Researchers in this vein also have 
assumed that because these facts are value free, they are therefore generalizable. They 
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assume that social problems eventually can be overcome through the accumulation of 
the truth (Fischer, 2003).  
 Those practicing a more critical form of policy analysis recognize that the 
dominant policy science “misses the point of politics” (Stone, 1988, p. 5). Truth, 
rational analysis, and generalizablity do not exist without politics. The study of 
politics and policy requires recognition of the political nature of truth. As observed in 
the past it is usually the dominant group’s interests that are rationally accepted as 
truth. With this understanding, many have asserted that a policy analyst with a critical 
perspective must reveal how interests are socially constructed rather than search for 
the truth. A critical policy analyst heeds Foucault’s (1980) warning: 
It is not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which 
would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of 
truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural, within 
which it operates at the present time. (p. 133)  
Therefore, a prominent strategy within critical policy analysis is to reveal policy 
issues as historically contingent events. In a critical policy analysis, the social 
dynamics that shape the practices of problem definition and policy making are 
exposed through a detailed portrait of the sociohistorical context (Ball, 1994). A 
single policy is not considered an independent event but is instead seen in relation to 
the other practices of policy within a state or state subsystem. However, the state is 
not a single monolithic entity, but rather one node within a complex matrix of social 
regularities (Scheurich, 1997). A critical policy analyst must paint a large enough 
picture to reveal not only what people in a given context identify as a policy issue and 
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policy solution, but also what problems and solutions are unthinkable at a given 
moment (Scheurich, 1997). 
In order to paint such a picture, critical policy analysis must employ 
historicizing methods. The goal of historicizing is to contextualize the policy issues 
with specific attention to how policy development operates though time. Neustadt and 
May (1986) argued that those who produce, administrate, or advocate for policy must 
know how to use history; officials must be “thinking in time” so as to continually 
compare the present to the future to the past and back again (p. 251). Neustadt and 
May wrote, “For the essence of thinking in time-streams is imagining the future as it 
may be when it becomes the past—with some intelligible continuity but richly 
complex and able to surprise” (pp. 253-254, emphasis in original). Policy analysis 
approached in this way asks us to interpret the relationships between our resources 
and our desires, not only in the present, but also as related to our past resources and 
goals. The analyst then must attempt to interpret the past availability of resources and 
desires in their original complexity, not as the pared tropes that reach us today. One 
strategy for developing our understanding of these relationships is the production of 
microhistories.  
 The emphasis on a detailed contextual picture found in critical policy analysis 
requires a certain type of historicizing, one that consciously deals with the problem of 
the macro–micro divide (Taylor et al., 1997). The historical narratives that are 
produced must be able to reveal patterns of long-term social interactions and 
domination while showing how agency is possible in a given situation. The analysis 
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must reveal how the policy issues are part of a richly complex historical moment that 
is situated among social processes that unfold on multiple time scales.  
 Historicizing in this way allows the critical policy analyst to see policy as an 
interpretative event that can happen in multiple contexts. A critical analysis of any 
policy must unpack the complexity of its production and interpretation “via 
exploration of the ambiguity, fragmentation, undecidabilities, fluidities, hyperrealities 
and incoherencies of a world in process” (Lather, 2006, p. 789). One must attempt to 
track how power is exercised in the different complicated contexts of policy 
production and interpretation. 
Whereas critical policy analysis is a set of research strategies, it is also a 
political position that advocates for social justice or—as I have framed it—fairness. 
Critical policy analysts recognize that the veneer of objectivity often hides the bias 
and privileges of the researcher. Instead of claiming objectivity, critical policy 
analysts seek to perform research that is simultaneously sociological, historical, 
political, and philosophical (Flyvbjerg, 2001). As Ball (1994) pointed out, the critical 
policy analyst desires to disrupt the workings of institutions that appear to be neutral 
and independent. At the same time, the critical policy analyst seeks to identify 
political and social activities that help in the struggle to become a more fair society.  
 In summary, I have identified four important tenets of critical policy analysis: 
 1. First, critical policy analysis is a set of strategies that recognizes the 
production of policy as a sociopolitical practice that is historically situated. The 
utilization of this approach requires the researcher to portray a detailed picture of the 
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historical landscape of the context in order to situate the policy issue among the other 
policies operating concurrently, as well as the larger matrix of social regularities that 
are continually experienced by actors in that time and place. This strategy allows us 
to understand how interests are constructed in a given time period.  
 2. Analysts with a critical perspective investigate the different contexts of 
policy in order to expose how power operates in the ways we define problems and 
their solutions. This helps us see how the lines of stratification are replicated or 
disrupted through policy.  
 3. Critical policy analysts also attempt to understand the disjointed 
consequences of policies in the manifolds of social relationships that make up our 
society.  
 4. Finally, I would argue that critical policy analysis is performed to disrupt 
our common practices and help us construct different practices. It is also done to 
strengthen political positions that advocate for practices that are fairer and come 
closer to the dream of becoming an equitable democracy. 
Historical Research Methods 
Given the emphasis on the historical context in critical policy analysis and the 
purposes of my study, it is important clarify the methods of historical research. 
Historians do not discuss method very often (Barrera, 2001). Within the culture of 
that discipline, there is a sense that it is better to write a book about a historical topic 
than to comment on how a book was produced. In this sense historians tend to believe 
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that “true” historians are those who produce great historiographic works, leaving 
reflection on history to marginal areas, such as books on “thoughts about history that 
some historians write as they reach maturity” (Barrera, 2001, p. 190). Recognizing 
the drawbacks of such an attitude some scholars from interdisciplinary schools, 
Campbell (1988) and Lugg (2006a, 2006b), have offered important advice to those 
new to historical methods. 
 In general, the art of historical research involves bringing together and 
identifying many sources of information, interpreting them, and combining these 
interpretations into a narrative. Campbell (1988) explained that archival research is a 
“set of operations that one performs on observational data in written documents to 
achieve definition, description and chronological ordering” of human relationships (p. 
157). The written documents can include primary documents as well as secondary 
sources. As Lugg (2006a) pointed out historians use 
artifacts or primary sources such as diaries; personal and professional 
correspondence; newspaper accounts; government documents, including 
memos, minutes of meetings, arrest reports and criminal complaints, health 
and safety data, public health records, and court decisions; church, synagogue, 
and mosque records; as well as unedited sound and video recordings. (p. 176, 
emphasis in original)  
However, historians also make use of secondary sources produced by other scholars, 
such as, according to Lugg (2006a), “biographies; political, social, and/or legal 
histories; film and audio documentaries; but also autobiographies and memoirs” as 
important sources of understanding (p. 177).  
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 Most important to a historian, however, is how these sources of information 
are related to one another and communicated to the reader. As Lugg (2006a) 
explained, “Doing historical research involves sifting and sorting through these 
literatures using both primary and secondary sources, shifting back and forth between 
the two large sets of materials” (p. 177, emphasis in original). A historian is always 
thinking about the ways that they can weave these disparate sources “together to build 
a coherent story” (Lugg, 2006a, p. 177). 
Historical and Critical Policy Research Methods as Complementary 
I assert that for the critical policy analysis to be effective, the researcher must 
pay close attention to the temporal context. Combining the methods of historical 
research and critical policy analysis helps in our attempts to make research 
meaningful (Flyvbjerg, 2001). There is a possibility for a kinship in the approach to 
these methods that support similar theoretical and strategic aims.  
 First, both methods can be used as a hermeneutical approach to knowledge. In 
critical policy analysis the assertions of the various positions in the policy struggle are 
seen as theory laden. The job of the analyst is to go back and forth between the 
assertions and the social situations that make the assertions possible. The methods of 
historical research can be approached in a hermeneutical way. The secondary and 
primary sources are continually compared to each other. Historical research is an 
interpretative act in which the theory-laden, secondary sources are compared to the 
assertions and interpretations in primary documents.  
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 On a more practical level, the methods offer strategies by which the contexts 
of policy analysis can be explicated. Taylor et al. (1997) noted that for critical policy 
analysis to be  
strategically and politically useful, it is important that such fine grained 
analysis [such as critical discourse analysis] are located within a broader 
context including a historical context. This seems to be a crucial feature of 
critical policy analysis, that is, the notion of thinking relationally—where 
theoretical frameworks are used to place cultural forms within broad patterns 
of social inequality and relations of domination. (p. 32) 
Historical methods offer the tools to go about the strategic work of understanding the 
broad patterns of domination. Ultimately, the combination of these methods allows 
for a detailed understanding of the ways in which power is exercised through the 
production of policy. 
Rationale for Using Critical Policy Analysis 
 Critical policy analysis offers an overarching strategy to help me investigate 
and interpret the policy issues that are at the forefront of today’s education policy. It 
confirms that we must expand our knowledge of the historical context in which our 
understandings of the relationship between federal education and antipoverty policies 
developed.  Through the practice of critical policy analysis we are pushed to bring 
this historical perspective to bear on our current desires for fairness. Below I explain 
how the main tenets identified above framed my investigation.  
 First and foremost, critical policy analysis reminds us that education policies 
are not independent but instead operate within a matrix of other polices and 
governmental inactions. My analysis must situate the policy issue within the larger 
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network of social relationships in order to disrupt the ways in which we accept federal 
education policy as a historic individuality (Foucault, 1972). In this study, it was my 
goal to expose how people during the Carter Administration explained the 
relationships between federal education and antipoverty policies. In doing so, I 
created a detailed portrait of the social and political context. The identification of 
peoples’ explanations did not rely solely on the texts of the policies or the intentions 
of the policy makers. Instead, I used sources that would help us comprehend how 
their explanations were socially and historically situated. For example, I explored the 
ways in which the social regularities of the time constituted their understanding of the 
relationship. Specifically, as a starting point, I investigated the discourses of race, 
meritocracy, and individualism. I also provided a picture of the practices and physical 
resources that were perceived as available at the time.  
 Second, critical policy analysis encourages us to explain how power operates 
through policy. In this study, as I attempted to understand how people at different 
times explained the relationship between the policies, I looked for the ways in which 
these constructions were the product of and helped construct different relationships of 
power. I explored the ways in which actors related these policy streams to the 
dominant systems of knowledge and economies of desire. This required a widened 
focus to capture the exigencies of the social interactions at that time and the ways in 
which the stratification system was developing.  
 Also, given that policy development is not linear but is rather “a messy 
bricolage of unevenly-implemented imperatives and trends” mediated by various 
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historically situated policy texts, actors, and social processes, this study was designed 
not to simplify but to unpack the polymorphous disjointed processes of policy 
development (Davidson-Harden, as cited in Ball, 1987). The Carter Administration’s 
reorganization of the executive branch offers a place from which to observe the 
complex ways in which the federal policies were interpreted and reinterpreted. 
Through reorganization questions, discussions of purpose and goals of policy were 
animated. Some of the people involved in these debates were also major players in 
the production of the original policy texts and influential in the administration of that 
policy. It was important to observe how they rearticulated the relationships between 
the policies at different times and different contexts. I examined how their changing 
understandings of the policies were situated within and against the dominant practices 
and systems of knowledge of the historical moment.  
 Finally, I believed that a demonstration of how the relationship between the 
policies was understood in the past would help us as we interpret the present policy 
options. A destabilization of the unity of the education policy would help brush 
history against the grain to reveal the relationships, the possibilities, and the desires of 
another time (Benjamin, 1969). Studying policy in this way allows us to call into 
question our current desires and perceived possibilities, while allowing me to 
“contribute to society’s practical rationality in clarifying where we are and where we 
want to be” (Lather, 2006, p. 788). 
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Importance of Historicizing 
 Besides my own affinity for the use of history to situate my perspectives, I 
also assert that it is important to emphasize the role historicizing plays in critical 
policy analysis. As noted above, historical research allows us to understand how the 
current policy situation can be situated among broader patterns of domination. In this 
study, I place the current calls for linking antipoverty and education policy in a 
historical context that is attentive to the social regularities through which our society 
was stratified in the 20th century. In order to do so, I agree with Pierson’s (2005) 
claim that it is important to recognize that “understanding the sources of policy often 
requires that we pay attention to processes that play out over considerable periods of 
time” (p. 34). I also recognize, like Pierson, that in general, “the social world is 
marked by processes that unfold over time,” and the exploration of these social 
processes over long periods “can lead us to assess prominent areas of inquiry and 
conventional practices in new and fertile ways” (Pierson, 2005, p. 35). When analysts 
study policy in this way, it allows us to treat the present policy option “as but a 
specific moment within a larger dynamic process” (Pierson, 2005, p. 48). The focus 
of my study is on the second half of the 1970s, but the social processes that 
characterized the majority of the 20th century are brought into relief to help us 
understand the social regularities through which people of that time understood the 
relationship between the policies. 
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Research Design and Method 
 Critical policy analysis requires that rather than simplify, the researcher 
should reveal the complexity of the policy-making process. I advocate for a critical 
policy analysis that uses the techniques of historical production that were crafted for 
the understanding of the Middle Ages and Renaissance Europe—a past far removed. I 
am claiming the adaptation of the same techniques for the investigation of recent 
history with a purpose of providing understanding of policy issues for our own time. 
In their study of the relationship between antipoverty and education policy, Silver and 
Silver (1991) noted, “Perspectives on the recent past change rapidly” (p. 8). Silver 
and Silver further advised that any historical work include an implicit or explicit 
“unrelenting question of what governs historical attention” (p. 9). Given the 
heightened recognition of the instability of the historical narrative of recent events 
and a belief in the necessity of reflexive research, I must make my research plan 
explicit. This dissertation study was guided by three research questions: 
 Research Question 1: How did people during the Carter Administration 
explain the relationship between education and antipoverty policy? 
 Research Question 2: What social regularities can be identified during the 
Carter Administration, and how did these regularities impact antipoverty and 
educational policies? 
 Research Question 3: What lessons can be taken from a historical 
deconstructive analysis of this policy issue for contemporary educational policy? 
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 In this section, I relate how my methods served the purposes outlined above. I 
am clear about my choice of sources and questions I asked of those sources. Also, 
building off the insights of critical policy analysis described above, I explicate the 
modes of analysis and interpretation that I drew on to meet my purposes. 
Critical Policy Analysis That Uses Historical Methods 
In order to develop a critical policy analysis of the policy issue described 
above, I have constructed a history to help us examine how policy elites during the 
Carter Administration understood the relationship between federal education and 
antipoverty policy. This history was constructed by interweaving primary and 
secondary sources. This interweaving was guided by my theoretical framework that 
recognizes that historical figures are constituted by the social regularizes of their 
time. The way the historical narrative has been constructed had important 
implications for my investigation of the policy. Therefore, I explain the methods I 
used to collect, order, and interpret my sources.  
Methods for Collecting Sources 
Following the dictums of historical research, in this dissertation study I sifted 
and sorted secondary and primary sources. I began locating secondary sources 
through the readings of book reviews as well as through discussions with staff at the 
Carter Presidential Library. The primary sources were acquired mostly through 
archival research, although if possible I conducted oral histories.  
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Archival research. Through my ongoing review of secondary sources on the 
decision to divide the HEW into HHS and the Department of Education specifically 
(Radin & Hawley, 1988), the Carter Administration at large (Hargrove, 1988; H. 
Rosenbaum & Ugrinski, 1994), and other histories of the culture within the United 
States of that time, I identified important initial primary sources within the references. 
I gathered primary sources from presidential and congressional archives (I discuss 
this in greater detail in the next section) in order to connect them with and read them 
against previously written secondary sources. Through this process I constructed a 
narrative that reflected my interpretation of the primary and secondary sources. 
Although it is described here as linear, the process of course was more overlapping. 
The secondary sources and the archives always were encountered together and read in 
light of each other, and the writing was ongoing throughout. The ethical aspects of 
this process are discussed in the last section of this chapter.  
Oral history interviews. If possible, I planned to collect oral histories from 
relevant policy actors. This required that before the interview I develop a questioning 
protocol based on the information gathered from secondary sources. The protocol 
must be attentive to the positionality of the interviewee. In his classic work, 
Thompson (2000) described the oral history interview process. He maintained, “To 
interview successfully requires the skill of being a respectful listener” (p. 222). He 
advised that the interviewer carefully to think about how the questions are 
constructed. Thompson cautioned, “Avoid asking questions which make informants 
think in your way rather than theirs” (p. 230). He also explained that interviewers 
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must have a clear understanding of the degree to which they would like to steer the 
interview. A more focused interview may provide useful information but will miss 
stories that have the “potential to connect up different spheres of life” (Thompson, 
2000, p. 231). That is why Thompson advocated for an approach that is 
semistructured and that, whenever possible, allows a person’s life story to be 
recorded.  
Sources of Data 
 The first research question was the following: How did people during the 
Carter Administration explain the relationship between education and antipoverty 
policy? In order to answer Research Question 1, I had to construct a history of the 
separation of the HEW into HHS and the Department of Education that would help us 
identify the ways in which political actors in Washington, DC, at that historical 
moment understood the relationship between federal education and antipoverty 
policy. Therefore, it was important to find sources in which the question of federal 
reorganization was directly debated. For example, my scan of the secondary literature 
initially revealed that President Carter’s relationship with Joseph Califano was an 
important area to research. In his memoir, Califano (1981) explained how as HEW’s 
last Secretary he made a case against the creation of the Department of Education. He 
sent a memo on April 25, 1977, and then attended a meeting on the subject 2 days 
later. Some of the primary sources about these meetings are located in the Carter 
Presidential Library. Interactions such as these were carefully researched among the 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents and other presidential papers 
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available at the library. Archived oral histories, such as exit interviews, also were 
investigated.  
 Majchrzak (1984) pointed out, “Policy is not made; it accumulates” (p. 14). 
Given that the understandings verbalized in the interactions described above are, in 
part, based on the interpretation of the accumulation of policy texts, I also analyzed 
the texts of the policy. In addition to the policy texts, I planned to analyze agency 
white paper documents and policy briefs produced at the time. These read in concert 
with the policy texts themselves would lead to understanding how the actors of the 
time read the policy texts. Such an approach would help me paint a more nuanced 
picture of how the actors understood the relationship between the policies.  
  Research Question 2 considered how these understandings were generated 
through the social regularities of the time. Research Question 2 was the following: 
What social regularities can be identified during the Carter Administration, and how 
did these regularities impact antipoverty and educational policies? The people of the 
time did not just generate their understandings out of thin air. They were living in a 
tangle of political, social, and economic contradictions. They were agents of the play 
of forces that were silently conditioning their existence. Specifically, my second 
purpose was to understand how the articulation and rearticulation of equity, 
opportunity, and efficiency discourses shaped interpretations of American education 
and antipoverty policies at that time (1975–1981). In order to meet this goal, I needed 
to develop a picture of the time that would allow the reader to discern the social 
regularities that were enacted and constituted the different mental constructions of the 
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relationship between the policy streams. One data collection strategy was to use the 
entertainment and news media of the time to get a sense of the multiple discourses 
that were present in American culture at the time (Troy, 2005). This included a 
review of the most popular books, television shows, and magazines of the time. It 
also included investigations of newspapers and magazines that were available to the 
actors in Washington, DC. The Library of Congress is an important archive of this 
type of material. 
Collection of this archival data on popular culture allowed me to develop a 
clearer picture of the symbolic world that surrounded the actors. These were read in 
concert with the secondary sources that provided a picture of the trends in public 
opinion around ideas of race, wealth, and attitudes toward government (e.g., 
Carmines & Stinson, 1989). Also, secondary sources as well as historical statistics 
helped me identify trends in resources and infrastructure. These data allowed me to 
develop a picture of the way the actors of the time interpreted the material resources 
available to them. This also situated the years of 1975–1981 among the longer trends 
of the 20th century.  
 My final research question then asked me to offer my interpretation of the 
present policy issue. Research Question 3 was the following: What lessons can be 
taken from a historical deconstructive analysis of this policy issue for contemporary 
educational policy? In order to represent this policy issue, I collected data from 
current policy texts, scholarly writings on these texts, the white papers produced by 
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various policy centers, and government-issued statements and speeches. These were 
contextualized with secondary sources to help situate desires and goals. 
The Ordering of Data and Interpretation 
 As noted above, a strategy within critical policy analysis is the portrayal of a 
detailed picture of the historical context to situate a policy issue among the other 
policies operating concurrently as well as the larger matrix of social regularities that 
are continually experienced and enacted by actors in that time and place. This strategy 
must rely on the construction of a historical narrative that explicitly relates this 
interpretation of the context. My job as the author of such a narrative was to produce 
an interpretive interweaving of secondary and primary sources. Historical research is 
ultimately an interpretive act (Lugg, 2006a).  
 Wolcott (1994) noted that qualitative data in general can be related to the 
reader as a description, an analysis, or an interpretation. Most, though, are a 
combination of all three, with an emphasis in a certain area. According to Wolcott, 
works that claim an emphasis of description attempt to “stay close to the data as 
originally recorded [and let] … the data speak for themselves” (p. 10). When the 
emphasis is on the analysis, the works tend to report the results of a method that 
“proceeds in some careful, systematic way to identify key factors and relationships 
among them” (Wolcott, 1994, p. 10). However, like historical research, research 
pieces can emphasize interpretation. Wolcott pointed out that interpretation 
does not claim to be as convincingly or compulsively “scientific” as the 
[analysis], being neither as loyal to nor as restricted by observational data 
only. The goal is to make sense of what goes on, to reach out for 
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understanding or explanation beyond the limits of what can be explained with 
the degree of certainty usually associated with analysis. (p. 10)  
 Interpretive work thus privileges the subjectivity of its author. As discussed 
below, my own subjectivity and the theoretical framework that I brought to the 
project shaped my interpretations. Like a specialized lens, subjectivity and the 
framework would bring some aspects of the situation into sharp focus while blurring 
others. Yet, unlike analysis, interpretation of the situation was not bound to tenets of 
the theory but instead was informed by and acted as a launching pad for my own 
creative construction of a narrative. Although this approach might not bring us closer 
to a stable truth, I hoped to learn about the categories of the present by engaging in 
this effort (Tierney, 2000).  
 As Campbell (1988) succinctly stated, historical research “involves difficult 
feats of information retrieval, study of refractory and often incomplete data, and 
eventually involves cross-examination of the ordered data to arrive at interpretive and 
explanatory statements about the human interactions” (p. 157). In what follows I 
describe the methods I used to order the data collected from primary and secondary 
sources. I then explain how I cross-examined these data to arrive at an interpretation.  
  According to Ryan and Bernard (2000), “Coding is the heart and soul” of text 
analysis for the purposes of understanding experiences (p. 780). Ryan and Bernard 
noted that creating the categories that will bring order to the large amounts of data 
collected forces the “researcher to make judgments about the meanings of contiguous 
blocks of text” (p. 780). The categories bring order to the dispersion of utterances and 
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allow the researcher to begin to describe various relationships between the utterances. 
In line with historical methods, in my study I first ordered my data along 
chronological categories (Campbell, 1988). Then, I developed categories that fit each 
of my purposes.  
Ordering of data chronologically. One of the purposes of this study was to use 
the construction of a microhistory to help interpret the ways in which policy actors in 
the late 1970s understood the relationship between antipoverty and federal education 
policy. In doing so, I highlighted the temporal dimension of the context. Therefore, 
the data were organized first along a chronological order. First, utterances, speeches 
or conversations that speak directly to the policy relationship were placed on a 
timeline bounded by the Carter presidency. Second, I placed the cultural resources 
from which the actors constructed their understandings on a timeline that expanded 
further into the past. In doing so, the understandings as well as their constituent 
elements could be understood through an interpretation of their temporal 
relationships.  
Ordering of data by purpose. I also ordered my data according to my 
purposes. First, I grouped all data together that provided insight into how the political 
actors understood this relationship. Codes were developed that reflected the emergent 
categories that classified the various ways in which people spoke about the 
relationship. Second, I grouped all of the information on each discourse that helped 
constitute these opinions. For example, I planned to group together data related to the 
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efficiency discourse and to highlight the ways in which this group of statements 
related to others within the group as well as outside of the group. 
The Cross-Examination of Sources for Interpretive Purposes 
The sifting and sorting of the data allow the researcher to cross-examine the 
data and to ask questions across and within data categories. These questions were 
framed by my theoretical and methodological framework, which asked the researcher 
to understand policy as interpretations of a text that is historically contingent. The 
goal, then, was to understand how certain utterances about the relationship between 
education and antipoverty were possible at that time.  
For example, as I tried to interpret how people understood the relationship, I 
would compare the statements of one actor (say, Carter) to other actors (such as 
Califano). I might examine of each of these statements for how they compared to the 
texts of the policies as well as for how they compared to the dominant discourses that 
were found in the culture at large. I must ask questions such as, “How did this actor, 
as he or she tried to relate their views to others, isolate words and phrases, within 
policies and sometimes distort them or juxtapose them against different policies 
compared to the other actors?” or, “In what ways were metaphors used in their 
explanations?” The understandings of policy then become not translations of an 
agenda but the encounter between the printed page and the social regularities of the 
time and the intersubjective interactions between actors that form an explosive 
mixture (C. Ginzburg, 1980). It is a mixture that not only changes reality, but also 
replicates past social formations. Comparisons such as these ask us to explore people 
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not only as policy actors who deal directly with the finite details and political 
exigencies of the time, but also as subjects who narrate and reconcile their activities 
and as agents of social formations.  
 It was also important to do the same kind of cross-examination across the 
arbitrary chronological timeframes that I developed. For example, Carter’s 
understanding of the relationship in 1971 might have more elements of equity than 
later Carter statements. These types of comparisons helped me see the “messy 
bricolage of unevenly-implemented imperatives and trends” that is the policy process 
(Davidson-Harden, as cited in Ball, 1987). Such comparisons emphasized the 
ambiguous relationship between the agency of the subject and the stability of the 
actor-agent.  
 Finally, it was important that I cross-examine the primary sources with stories 
from secondary sources and, conversely, cross-examine the secondary sources with 
information gleaned from the primary sources. I must examine the primary sources 
for logical support theses of previous authors. At the same time, I must disrupt the 
narratives of past authors with the statements found in the primary documents. 
 Of course, the final product is not only a reporting of these comparisons. 
Instead, these comparisons were brought together to help me construct a narrative. 
My story, then, is an interpretive act that is more than a list of utterances. It must be a 
story of experience and not just of thoughts. It must clarify the practices that 
produced and contained those thoughts, to become a story that connects the micro 




 Researchers practicing critical policy analysis by definition strive for more 
just social interactions. The practice of research itself is a social activity that is 
fraught with struggles and acts of domination (Lather, 1991). The injunction of the 
critical policy analysts to paint the messy, complex picture not only pertains to the 
subjects of study, but also includes the practices of the researcher and their 
relationship to the subjects of study.  
 In this spirit what I present in this section is not only my own subjective 
positionality, but also recognition of the ethical considerations of my research 
practices. I first describe the ethics of doing historical work from a poststructural 
stance. Then, I describe my own positionality and conclude with issues of 
trustworthiness.  
Ethical Considerations of Doing Historical Research 
 A great historiography seems to transport the reader in to another temporal 
location, but this gold standard of the practice is itself fools’ gold. For it is important 
to remember that we, like the characters in our histories, do not have complete 
autonomy over our consciousness. We cannot just transport our consciousness back, 
to given time, by will, careful research, or great storytelling. The categories of today 
are always present in our interpretations of the past.  
 Marx (as cited in C. Ginzberg, 1980, p. xxv) noted, “It is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that 
determines their consciousness.” This reminder is helpful in two ways. First, it helps 
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us remember that if we are to tell a story of how someone lived, we must be able to 
elucidate as much of their social milieu as possible. Second, it reminds us to be 
reflexive in our choices of sources and methods, because our own social existence is 
informing those choices. The stories of the relationship between federal education and 
antipoverty policies are stories of recent history. However, these stories are also 
dispersed fragments of a time and place that are shadowed by present categories and 
commitments. We must remember “how we choose to name other people and 
groups—how we categorize them—often tells more about us, than it does about any 
truth of who they are. It tells more about that which is true to the namer” (Rinehart, as 
cited in Tierney, 2000, p. 544). Yet, this warning should not paralyze our attempts to 
understand. All we will ever have is the present, and from it we must attempt to 
reconstruct past categories and commitments by an arbitrary act of research (C. 
Ginzburg, 1980).  
 I present the historical narrative that I have constructed as an interpretive 
work. I do not claim any reconnoiter or reflection of a past reality. The only thing I 
can claim is a better understandings of the present categories from which we 
construct our past and our present.  
  The majority of the primary sources used in this project were gathered from 
the Carter Presidential Archive and the Congressional Archives. These sources were 
read against and with secondary sources as interpretations of these primary 
documents. Yet, it is important to remember that archives, in and of themselves, are 
acts of interpretation (Bieseker, 2006). When the researcher arrives, the sources that 
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are present and available for viewing are the result of interpretation. Working 
backward, the layers of interpretation become clear. The box that the researcher opens 
is a collection of artifacts, mostly textual, that have been grouped by an archivist. 
This grouping is systematic but is interpretative. For example, in a box in the Lyndon 
B. Johnson Presidential Library a number of artifacts relating to a speech given at the 
Howard University commencement on June 4, 1965. There are teleprompter roles, 
drafts of the speech, and invitations from the university. There is also a letter from 
Patrick Moynihan. This letter seems a bit out of place because it asks for the president 
to side with him on the backlash the release of his report was receiving. This letter is 
some months removed from the speech and does not mention the speech. This act 
alone, this grouping of this letter with the artifacts of this speech, is an interpretation 
of the relationship between that speech and Moynihan’s stance.  
 Moving back another level, there are the categories in which the boxes of 
artifacts are placed. This is especially pertinent to my research, because often there 
are separate categories for education policy and social policy. These categories are 
interpretations that are based on the categories of the archivists.  
 Another step back reveals another interpretive decision made in what to 
donate to the archive and, in the case of national archives, what can be declassified. 
This is especially obvious of state-run archives that have federal guidelines that 
determine the level of access a researcher may have. For example, in the Jimmy 
Carter Library, a great deal is available for viewing on his domestic policy, but his 
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foreign policy, especially with regards to the Middle East, is still not available for 
researchers.  
 The allure of the archive is that the researcher feels as if there is some hidden 
truth that can be liberated from the dusty, rarely opened boxes and volumes. 
Researchers must be continuously aware that this allure can blind us to the 
interpretive acts that have shaped the artifacts that are available. This is especially 
true for archives that are connected to the state. These archives serve the purposes of 
the state, and the interpretations generated from these archives are subject to these 
purposes.  
 Biesecker (2006) pointed out,  
Whatever else the archive may be—say, an historical space, a political space, 
or a sacred space; a site of preservation, interpretation, or commemoration—it 
always already is the provisionally settled scene of our collective invention, of 
our collective invention of us and of it. (p. 124)  
In this settled scene, the ethical work of historians is to situate their work and their 
desires within and against this collective invention. The story that is ultimately told is 
the result of the many layers of interpretation, of which the historian is just one. This 
is especially true for my project, which was research on recent political history. Most 
of my work used the archives of the state, which bear its stamp. 
Positionality 
 As I have commented many times before, this work is my interpretation of 
primary and secondary sources. It privileges my own subjectivity, and therefore it is 
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important to describe myself not as a way of creating legitimacy, but as a way of 
making explicit my relationship to the categories I employed.  
 I am a White male who grew up in a middle-class, suburban home in Texas. 
Some of my most formative years were spent as a teacher in a high-poverty, 
predominantly Latino/a school. In my early adulthood I was politically agnostic. 
Now, I go through political mood swings between a progressive left that still believes 
in the United States’ ability to emphasize hope and compassion (Rorty, 1999) and a 
more despondent, further left position that wonders about the sustainability and 
ethical resources available in our patriarchal, homophobic, inequitable, capitalist 
society that consistently supports White privilege or the ultrarich. Most of the time, 
especially now that I have kids, I leave the nihilist worries at the library and try to 
practice a mode of life that embodies hope, or so I tell myself.  
Credibility  
In critical policy analysis the goal of the research is to retain an acceptable 
amount of credibility rather than validity. The concept of creditability recognizes that 
the act of policy analysis is an imbedded social activity, and it is only through social 
interaction can the work be deemed acceptable. Fisher (2003) pointed out that the 
chief requirement is that other people involved in the policy struggle should be able to 
“follow (not necessarily agree with) the decision procedures of the individual 
providing the assessment” of the policy situation. (p. 154). The decisions that were 
made in this study are related to historical research methods. 
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In historical research the citation is the key to creditability. Given that every 
historical work is act of interpretation, the only real check is whether or not an author 
has overrun his or her sources. By this I mean that we must ask a question of every 
historical work: Can others go to all the same sources and attempt their own 
interpretation? This approach to creditability is similar to the ideas expressed by 
Richardson (1994), who chose to forego the idea of triangulation for the metaphor of 
crystallization. Janesick (2000) summarized the concept as follows: 
The image of the crystal replaces that of the land surveyor and the triangle. … 
The crystal combines symmetry and substance with an infinite variety of 
shapes, substances, transmutations, multidimensionalities, and angles of 
approach. Crystals grow, change, and alter, but are not amorphous. (p. 392)  
Yet, it is also important to point out that the writing of history is not an act of a single 
consciousness. The impact or the value of its refraction can be judged only by how 
the readers invoke the interpretations. In my project I had a group of peer readers who 
provided continual feedback and evaluation of my drafts as I progressed. They also 
were privy to my audit trail, whereby I documented my process of inquiry through a 
journal that explained documents I encountered, the interviews I performed, and the 
readings I undertook (Erlandson, Harris, Skipper, & Allen, 1993). These peer readers’ 
insights, interpretations, and questions about presentation and method were utilized to 




 In conclusion, I first summarize the goals of my study and the approach I 
brought to this study. Then, I point to the steps I took to meet those goals. Finally, I 
situate the project in its historical moment.  
 I have proposed a critical policy analysis that helps us understand how people 
in the past have made meaning out of the relationship between education and 
antipoverty policy at the federal level. Specifically, I chose a critical juncture in the 
history of U.S. politics, the Carter years, which I believed would be fruitful in helping 
interpret how education policy came to be thought of as independent from other 
social policy. In doing so I was interested in how people drew the lines around 
education policy during the Carter Administration. I planned to shake the false self-
evidence of education policy’s independence and demonstrate its precariousness, 
“making visible not its arbitrariness, but its complex interconnection with a 
multiplicity of historical processes” (Foucault, 1991b, p. 76).  
Critical policy analysis helped me frame this study as a demonstration of the 
complexity of the multiple sites of political struggle, where policy is made and 
negotiated, and point to the ways in which education policies are always in circulation 
with and enacted among other polices. Through this demonstration, I provide insight 
into how situated social regularities, race, property, individualism, and stability were 
performed in the production of education and antipoverty policies. Such a study 
would help me and others interpret the present policy options and our desires for 
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social justice as events of a specific historical moment with its own possibilities and 
contradictions. 
In order to produce such a study I used both the methods of critical policy 
analysis and historical research. My research design description noted that first I 
accumulated primary and secondary sources. Next, I ordered these sources by 
chronology and theme. Then, I cross-examined the sources in order to produce a 
historical interpretation. Finally, I offered an interpretation of the present policy 
situation based on my historical interpretation.  
The research project described above is a hybrid of many things. It is a hybrid 
of my desires to understand my teaching experiences and my desire to hope for a 
better life experience of future children. It is also a hybrid of my love of the historical 
narrative and my commitment to produce research that is useful in the policy world. 
Finally, it is a hybrid of my desires for large research projects and the restraints in my 
life. I hoped these hybrids would produce a novel piece of research that is useful, 
focused, and creditable.  
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CHAPTER 4: CONSTRUCTING NEW WAYS OF LIFE: EIGHT-TRACKS, 
THE SUNBELT, DROPPING OUT, AND DOING THE BEST WE CAN 
 
 The purpose of this study was to investigate the ways in which people 
explained the relationship between antipoverty and education policy during the Carter 
Administration. In doing so, I offer an interpretation of how the possibilities for U.S. 
education and social policy were transformed during the late 1970s. By possibilities, I 
mean that, given the infinite number of actions a group could take, how is it that some 
were designated as more possible than others? I am interested in how people chose 
one explanation over another and thus enacted one possibility over another.  
 Specifically, I am interested in the ways in which the policy configurations 
that linked education and antipoverty policies, which grew out of the national 
priorities articulated during the Great Society, were devalued during the 1970s. 
Therefore, in this study I have looked at how the Carter Administration developed 
their vision of our national priorities during the late 1970s. This investigation allows 
me to historicize our current policy debates around the connections between 
education and antipoverty policy. A prominent strategy within critical policy analysis 
is to represent policy issues as historically contingent events. In critical policy 
analysis, the social dynamics that shape the practices of problem definition and 




Purpose of Chapter 
 In order to understand how people during the Carter Administration explained 
the relationship between education and antipoverty policy, I first must try to capture a 
vision of the social and historical context in which they were speaking. In this 
chapter, I situate the Carter Administration and priorities articulated during the 
inauguration among the multiple changes that the nation experienced during the 
1970s. In this chapter I broadly describe a particular time—the mid-1960s to the late 
1970s. It does not deal with education or antipoverty directly; instead, the chapter 
offers a picture of the complexity of social development during that time. 
 I begin this task by highlighting the difference in tone and content of the 
speeches delivered by Johnson and Carter at the outset of their terms. Then, I trace 
the complex, uneven social changes that occurred across many areas of U.S. life. In 
doing so, I hope to situate Carter’s grasping for a new approach within the multiple 
changes in many areas of U.S. life. My representation of Carter’s attempts to establish 
new national priorities is not meant to infer that the new goals were attempts to give 
meaning to outside structural changes. I am assuming that context and meaning in 
everyday life are “co-constructions, multiple, complex, open and changing” (Lather, 
1991, p. 42). Thus, the context and meaning making occurring at a given time should 
not be thought of as separate spheres, in which one is the function of the large-scale 
patterns within another. Instead, the coconstruction of meaning and context are “made 
and re-made across a multiplicity of minor scattered practices” (Lather, 1991, p. 42). 
The possibilities in the development of national goals therefore should be understood 
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as part of the general dispersion of dominant practices and discourses (Foucault, 
1972).  
 In this chapter, I explain some of those coconstructions, such as changes in the 
economy, in technology, and in gender roles and politics. These changes were uneven 
and interrelated. In other words, we are not simply obtaining “a plurality of histories 
juxtaposed and independent of one another” (Foucault, 1972, p. 10). My purpose was 
not just to have the history of the economy beside that of technology, gender roles, 
demographics, and electoral politics, but instead to consider the ways in which the 
multiple and uneven changes during this time reference a historically contingent, 
complex dispersion of the possible. The development of new national goals offers one 
example of the ways in which possibilities were being constructed during the 1970s.  
An Inauguration of a New Vocabulary 
 Many in the Democratic Party saw the election of James E. Carter to the 
presidency as a chance to get the American core domestic agenda back on track (E. 
Emerson, personal communication, October 31, 2007). Following the tragedies of 
Vietnam and the divisive politics of the Nixon Administration, Democrats hailed 
Carter’s victory as an opportunity to fulfill the agenda that was initiated by the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations. It was an opportunity to continue the domestic 
work of fighting poverty and fulfilling of the promise of equality that invigorated the 
civil rights movement.  
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 As Barbara Jordan pointed out in the keynote address of the Democratic 
Convention in 1976, the Democratic Party believed it was the Democrats’ “obligation 
to actively—underscore actively—seek to remove those obstacles which would block 
individual achievement—obstacles emanating from race, sex, economic condition” 
(B. Jordan, 1976). Along with this commitment to the core values, Jordan also 
mentioned that the Democratic Party had to change and do a better job of listening to 
the people. She recognized that the plurality, claimed as a value of the Democratic 
Party, still had yet to be dealt with as the party created a national agenda. It had been 
8 years since the Democrats had held the Presidency, and the Democratic platform 
would be placed in front of a different America, one that was shifting, socially, 
politically, geographically, and economically (Frum, 2000; Killen, 2006; Schulman, 
2001). Carter’s election would reflect that he connected with the people and 
articulated goals and possibilities that reverberated throughout the manifolds of 
grievances, struggles, dissatisfactions, pride, and achievements.  
The Moralist Technocrat 
 The Carter campaign team continually pointed to Carter’s interactions with 
the people as his inspiration for his attempt at the Presidency (Carter, 1978a). He 
asserted that he had spent time listening to the people. What Carter believed he heard 
from the people was that amid the changing factors of U.S. life they wanted a leader 
who could bring a common focus to the growing number of perspectives, identities, 
and problems. Carter had announced his candidacy on December 12, 1974, and spent 
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the next 2 years on the campaign trail full time. He was an outsider to the power 
circle of the Democratic Party and virtually unknown to most people in the United 
States. In order to win the various primary contests, he had to spend a great deal of 
time with the people of each state.  
 In those years the team worked to craft his image as a Washington outsider 
who promised to listen and represent the people’s concerns. He also continually 
mentioned the number of different personas he inhabited. He appealed to a growing 
sense of the liquefaction of identity, when he pointed out that he was a “farmer, an 
engineer, a businessman, a planner, a scientist, a governor and a Christian” (Carter, 
1978a, p. 3). Claiming to pay attention to this pluralism between and within people, 
he offered a path toward good government.  
 Carter believed more than anything people wanted a government in which 
multiple perspectives could come together rationally to solve problems. In his 1976 
autobiography, looking back over the past 10 years, Carter (1976) commented, “Our 
nation has no understandable national purpose, no clearly defined goals. … We move 
from one crisis to the next as if they were fads, even though the previous one has not 
been solved” (p. 173). He maintained that the people wanted a leader who could 
stabilize the erratic and reactionary path the government had pursued in the past. 
They wanted a leader who was a moralist and a technocrat, a president who would 
create an ethical and efficient path to a better future. A president composed of these 
identities could limit an excess of uncoordinated responses and keep the government 
honest and competent.  
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 Running on this position, Carter narrowly defeated the unelected incumbent 
Gerald Ford. On the day of his inauguration Carter attempted to embody two 
personas: a man of the people and a capable, engineer-minded trustee. On the 
freezing morning of January 20, 1977, so as to not overrun the public address system, 
Carter (1977) slowly said, 
We have learned that “more” is not necessarily “better,” that even our great 
Nation has its recognized limits, and that we can neither answer all questions 
nor solve all problems. We cannot afford to do everything, nor can we afford 
to lack boldness as we meet the future. So, together, in a spirit of individual 
sacrifice for the common good, we must simply do our best.  
Carter explained that what was needed was boldness in the development of the 
comprehensive plans for each area of federal government work. However, rather than 
being expansive, these comprehensive plans would provide boundaries, limit 
reactions, and bring focus. Focused policies would lead to more manageable service-
delivery mechanisms that could be adjusted pragmatically to meet the needs of the 
time. Carter (1976) claimed this was his rational and moral mandate.  
 As a symbol of his commitment to the peoples’ desires, following his 
inauguration speech, Carter chose to forgo the limousine motorcade and walk with his 
family the bright, cold, 1.2 miles to the White House. Carter had kept the idea quiet; 
none of parade coordinators, military or civilian, had known, not even the 
Washington, DC, police, only the Secret Service. He was the only president in the 
history of inaugurations to walk the entire route. When asked about it, Carter replied 
in a low-key manner, “We enjoyed the walk. It’s something I’ve thought about for a 
long time. ... This was a good parade” (as cited in Gorney, 1977, p. A16).  
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 The symbolism was not lost on the crowds. A young man with an uncut beard 
and hippy attire, which in past years had symbolized disdain for the establishment, lit 
up when he saw the Carter family walking and yelled, “Jimmy! Jimmy!” The 
President looked over smiling, caught the man’s eye, and waved. Then the young man 
exclaimed, “Alright!” (Naughton, 1977, p. A1). Another woman in the crowd holding 
an empty champagne glass implied a reference to the multiple attempts on President 
Ford’s life and noted, “Isn’t Rosalyn [Carter] brave? She hasn’t even got a hat on” 
(Gorney, 1977, p. A16). Jasper Lewis, an African American resident of Washington, 
DC, also noted that the walk reflected a stark contrast between Carter and the 
previous administrations. He commented, “Man, he got out and walked among the 
people; like a man. Not like Nixon. He has got no reason to be scared” (Gorney, 
1977, p. A16). People were jubilant as in any inauguration; however, part of their joy 
this time was mustered out of a respect for a dressed-down shunning of extravagance 
and pomp. Carter had crafted that symbol to signal a break with the past. 
 Symbols of pragmatic limits would be invoked throughout Carter’s presidency 
(Leuchtenburg, 1998). It was in direct contrast to the buoyant descriptions of national 
goals as laid out by the last Democratic president, Lyndon B. Johnson, just 13 years 
earlier. The Johnson Administration desired to put forth a different symbol of 




 On January 8, 1964, Johnson stepped onto the House of Representatives dais 
to deliver his State of the Union address and donned his surest man-in-charge 
expression (Steinberg, 1968, p. 654). When people tuned their televisions to the 
speech that Wednesday afternoon or in the rebroadcasts that night after work, the 
black-and-white image was focused on Johnson’s left side, which was thought to be 
both stern and kindly. In order to appear as though he was speaking from the heart, 
Johnson used a teleprompter, which included stage directions such as “Look left,” 
“Pause,” and “Look right” (Steinberg, 1968). Theatrics were crafted to insure that 
Congress and the American people would be convinced of the omnipotence of his 
leadership. In this speech Johnson laid out a very large legislative agenda that 
included a tax cut and a plan for an all out effort to eradicate poverty from U.S. life. 
In the address, Johnson (1964) urged, 
Let this session of Congress be known as the session which did more for civil 
rights than the last hundred sessions combined; as the session which enacted 
the most far-reaching tax cut of our time; as the session which declared all-out 
war on human poverty and unemployment in these United States; as the 
session which finally recognized the health needs of all our older citizens; as 
the session which reformed our tangled transportation and transit policies; as 
the session which achieved the most effective, efficient foreign aid program 
ever; and as the session which helped to build more homes, more schools, 
more libraries, and more hospitals than any single session of Congress in the 
history of our Republic. 
In 1964, more was definitely better. This rhetoric reflected the sense that it was the 
wealthiest and most powerful nation’s responsibility as a superpower to create an 
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entire “world of peace and justice, and freedom and abundance, for our time and for 
all time to come” (Johnson, 1964). 
 The speech worked. Congress and the press were impressed. Following the 
speech, Johnson continued to impress Congress. As an enthusiastic senator was 
congratulating him, Johnson replied, “Yeah, I know. I was interrupted eighty times by 
applause” (as cited in Steinberg, 1968, p. 654). Somebody later went back to the 
recording and counted the bursts of applause and found that the President, amid his 
speech and stage direction, had kept count exactly.  
 The New York Times ran a story the next day that located Johnson’s approach 
in a progressive lineage including the Fair Deal and New Deal, the Progressives and 
Populists (Reston, 1964). The reporter, Reston, went so for to quote the ancient 
speech by Pericles, “Wealth to us is not mere material for vain glory but an 
opportunity for achievement” (p. 17). Johnson was seen as the latest bearer of a torch 
that had been lit long ago.  
 The wide difference in the choice of symbols from the two Democratic 
presidents suggests the multiple ways in which society was discursively relocating. 
Johnson’s speech had described a limitless future of leadership and progress, and 
Carter (1977) had asked that we consider limits and that “we simply do our best.” The 
Carter Administration, while claiming to hold to the core of Democratic ideals, was 
grappling, as many were, with how to practice and articulate a new way living in the 
United States.  
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Shifting Modes of Life Across the 1970s 
 During 1964–1977, the nation’s sense of economic superiority and security 
faltered as the postwar boom ended and an energy crisis plagued the nation. People’s 
geographic ties were severed as they moved out of the northeast and into the southern 
suburbs. Technology was changing at rapid pace. In concert with these shifts were 
changes in political coalitions and regional perspectives. Each of these changes 
interacted with and fed off each other.  
Changes in Economic Growth 
 American wealth has no precedent. The growth of this wealth developed 
largely throughout the 20th century. The real gross domestic product per capita 
increased from $1,932.55 in 1950 to $5,000.27 in 1970; by 1990 it was at $23,004.95 
(Heston, Summers, & Aten, 2002). Gordon (2004) pointed out that by the turn of the 
21st century, while “the United States [was] only 6 percent of the land and the people, 
it [had] close to 30 percent of the world’s gross domestic product, more than three 
times that of any other country” (p. xiv). Because wealth accumulation during the 
middle and late 1970s slowed relatively, many people felt as though their 
expectations of a better life were not going to be met, that this growth was not going 
to continue.  
 When Johnson gave his address to Congress in 1964, Americans were still 
experiencing the largest postwar economic boom in history. Individuals all over the 
country increased their personal wealth. This increased wealth and favorable tax laws 
 
134 
had enabled the percentage of people who owned a home to jump from the steady 43–
46% that had characterized the first half of the 20th century to over 60% by 1960 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2004).  
 In addition to changes in personal wealth, the public coffers were flush. 
During that same period of time, the United States spent money both at home to build 
up armaments and abroad to rebuild its allies and former enemies in Europe and Asia. 
The United States also spent a great deal of money subsidizing the development of 
the middle class through housing, education, and transportation policy. In addition, 
Social Security legislation was passed that would reduce poverty for the elderly 
(Schulman, 2001, p. 7). As a result, the proportion of elderly poor dropped from 
35.2% in 1959 to 15.7% in 1980 (Katz, 1996, p. 278).  
However, by 1970, the dollar began to lose its prestige. Foreign investors 
started to dump the dollar, which forced the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates. 
Throughout the 1970s, in a country whose citizens expected growth, the economy 
was stagnant. Termed stagflation, the nation experienced a combination of high rates 
of inflation and high unemployment. In 1973, hourly earnings fell for the first time 
since 1951, and “in a whipsaw action, the middle-class tax burden rose with inflation 
just as the economy and real-income slowed” (Edsall & Edsall, 1992, p. 105). At the 
same time the tax system was becoming more regressive. During the mid-1970s, 
Carter started down the campaign trail, and “for the first time since the Great 
Depression, talks of limits and diminishing expectations filled presidential addresses 
and dinner table conversations” (Schulman, 2001, p. 8). 
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On top of stagflation, there was a recurring fuel crisis. Television news teams 
filmed lines of cars that looked like kinked steel chains emanating from gas stations. 
Drivers were seen standing and waiting with their elbows on the car roofs, heads in 
hands. This depressingly common sight was the result of a turbulent market and 
American foreign policy. For example, in 1973, several oil-producing nations in the 
Middle East used an oil embargo to punish the United States for supporting Israel in 
the October Yom Kippur War. Oil prices in the United States jumped 350% (Killen, 
2006) .  
American military and industrial might was built on gas-powered 
mechanization, and ordinary citizens had been able symbolically to own a piece of 
this power in their General Motors, Ford, or Chrysler V8s. By 1973, the politics of 
the oil market were now crippling this power abroad and in hometown America. The 
oil shocks of the 1970s also reached U.S. families at the hearth. As Bailey and Farber 
(2004) pointed out, “A nation of people who expected indoor winter temperatures 
approximating a day at the beach in June had to lower their thermostats and put on 
sweaters” (p. 3).  
While it is apparent today that the trouble in the U.S. economy during the 
1970s was a time of transition rather than the beginning of continuous downward 
spiral, at the time these changes caused fear and frustration. With the growth in global 
competition in manufacturing, stock market investors and manufacturing industry 
leaders watched as their investments failed to materialize into sustainable profits. 
Factory workers, family farmers, and other people in the bottom 20% of the income 
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distribution acutely felt the growing pains of this deindustrialization. Bailey (2004) 
pointed out that in the transition from a manufacturing to service economy, “the 
majority of the new jobs created in the service sector paid less than the jobs they 
replaced, and by 1976, according to one estimate, only 40 percent of the nation’s jobs 
paid enough to support a family” (p. 109). As factories closed, banks foreclosed on 
farms and unemployment rose.  
Changes in Living Patterns 
 At the same time that the economy started to slow, the place where people 
chose to live was also changing. The place people called their hometown changed 
greatly between the end of World War II and the mid-1970s. Mostly, people moved 
out of the Northeast into the South and West. People were moving out of the 
manufacturing North in search of new opportunities that were growing up around 
suburbs in the South and West that stretched from Virginia to Southern California; 
the area was termed the Sunbelt. For example, between 1950 and 1975, the 
population of states such as California, Arizona, Texas, and Florida grew by 98%, 
197%, 59%, and 202%, respectively. This is compared to an average growth for states 
outside the Sunbelt of only 32%. Traditional centers of population such as New York 
and Pennsylvania only grew by 22% and 13%, respectively (Nordheimer, 1976).  
 People were making these moves for multiple reasons. As Lassiter (2006) 
wrote,  
The growth policies of New Deal liberalism and the emergence of the Cold 
War military-industrial complex shaped the special patterns of development in 
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the postwar suburbs and transformed the South and the West into the Sunbelt, 
the booming region stretching from Virginia to California. (p. 10)  
These patterns reconfigured patterns of housing segregation along racial and class 
lines. Policies such as the Interstate Highway Act of 1956 “facilitated automobile-
based commuting and corporate relocation to the metropolitan fringe” (Lassiter, 2006, 
p. 10). This combined with the Federal Housing Administration and the GI Bill that 
subsidized middle-class home ownership for millions of people who left the city 
centers and the countryside to live in these Sunbelt suburbs, according to Lassiter.  
However, these opportunities were mostly reserved for Whites. For the first 
several decades of the postwar boom, racial minorities were excluded from suburban 
neighborhoods. At the same time, many cities used the federal highway and urban 
renewal spending to “concentrate the poorest racial minorities within inner-city 
ghettos” (Lassiter, 2006, p. 10). Upper middle-class workers followed the jobs to 
suburban neighborhoods that clustered around defense industries or regional branch 
offices of companies like EDS, IBM, Arthur Anderson, and “other service-oriented 
sectors of corporate capitalism” (Lassiter, 2006, p. 10).  
Changes in Technology 
 As people began to change their expectations for the U.S. economy and 
moved into new towns, their modes of living were also being reconstructed through 
changes in technology. As alluded to above, over the course of the 20th century, 
personal mobility changed through widespread use of the car. At the same time, the 
“mechanized entertainment of film, radio, and television made modern life more 
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homogeneous but also more private” (G. Cross & Szostak, 2004, p. 235). Rapid 
changes in technology over the course of the 1970s accelerated all of these dynamics. 
Auto-nation 
 The postwar boom had created a sellers’ market in automobiles. In 1940 there 
were around 27 million registered passenger cars in the United States; by 1950, that 
figure doubled. By 1970, “there were more cars than there were households in the 
United States, and in Los Angeles in that year there were more cars than there were 
people” (Schwartz-Cowan, 1997, p. 236).  
 This almost universal ownership prodded the reconfiguration of life along 
lines of suburbanization. As the demands for affordable housing increased, 
developers sought to plant new residential neighborhoods that gave primacy to yards 
and wide streets in areas that used to be pastures, cornfields, or orchards. The 
developers worked with local municipalities to develop zoning plans that separated 
industrial and commercial properties from residential neighborhoods. Supermarkets, 
office complexes, and schools were built bigger and spread out across the landscape. 
People no longer could walk to places outside the home. Shopping, school, and work 
were accessible only through a ride in the car (Lassiter, 2006). By 1970, more people 
lived in suburbs than in any other demographic; this trend continued through the 
decade (Schwartz-Cowan, 1997). The car ride was a necessary part of social life. It 
was often done alone.  
 This way of living worked well for many Americans; however, there were 
cracks in this automobile configuration of space and living. In the 1970s, just when 
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most people were becoming completely dependent on the automobile, people began 
to discover “somewhat to their surprise and often to their horror, that they had three 
serious problems with their cars: safety, environmental degradation, and as noted 
above, the climbing price of fuel” (Schwartz-Cowan, 1997, p. 240). By the mid-
1970s, due to congressional hearings and reports released in the late 1960s, most 
Americans were well aware of the dangers to bodily and respiratory health that cars 
represented. Images of smog and traffic fatalities became common. At the same time, 
as noted above, drivers in 1973 became familiar with the crippling effect of being 
dependent on oil in a country of gas-guzzling cars. In the summer of 1977 a film 
titled “The Car” hit movie theaters. It told the story of sleek, large, black car that was 
possessed by the devil and terrorized a small, southwestern town. The tag line seemed 
to reflect the worries that many Americans held about being tied to their automobiles: 
“There's nowhere to run, nowhere to hide, no way to stop... THE CAR.” Six years 
later, in 1983, Stephen King released a novel and a horror movie about a car named 
Christine. 
A Private Mass Media 
 Often the only sound outside the rev of the V8 engine was music emanating 
from the increasingly popular eight-track tapes. William Lear, the owner of Lear Jets 
and also developer of the first commercially viable automobile radio, had developed 
the eight-track recording format specifically for its portability (Moy, 2004). He 
quickly contracted with Ford and later General Motors, and the eight-track became a 
popular option in the 1970s.  
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 The eight-track was part of the mechanization of entertainment in the 20th 
century. The development of film, radio, television, and recorded music allowed 
people to experience varied and frequent stimulation. It also allowed for the 
centralization of cultural consumption through the creation of mass audience. 
Ironically, most people experienced these shared experiences in the seclusion of their 
own home or alone in their car (G. Cross & Szostak, 2004).  
 This mass yet privatized culture was further specialized with the introduction 
of such portable formats as the eight-track in the 1970s. This allowed consumers to 
stick to a preferred genre rather than rely on “broadcasting” for their stimulation. In 
the fall of 1976, if you shook your head when the number one song (“Shake Your 
Booty" by K.C. and the Sunshine Band) came on your radio, you could pop in your 
C. W. McCall eight-track and listen to “Convoy.” In the same way if you groaned 
when songs like “Old Dogs, Children, and Watermelon Wine” by Tom T. Hall came 
on, by 1977 you could take out your Clash cartridge, “London Calling,” and rock all 
the way to work. The introduction of cable television and the VCR at the end of the 
1970s did much of the same for the television medium. Increasingly, mass media 
were consumed along narrower and narrower demographic lines and were consumed 
alone in the privacy of the car or home. 
Changes in Gender Relations 
 Another significant transformation in U.S. life was around gender roles. This 
transition was set in motion by the struggles of the 1960s, but it was in the 1970s in 
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which the liberal wing of the women’s movement began to see victories. Throughout 
the 1970s there was a push in every state to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment. As 
Bailey (2004) pointed out, 
In 1973, Roe v. Wade guaranteed women’s right to choose abortion, and as of 
1972, the unmarried could no longer be denied access to birth control. In 
1975, new legislation ended practices that made it impossible for a married 
woman to obtain a credit card or a loan without her husband’s written 
permission. Title IX of the 1972 Education Act amendments prohibited 
discrimination by sex in any program receiving federal aid, thus guaranteeing 
funding for women’s athletics in high schools and colleges. Girls’ 
participation in high school athletics increased fivefold by the end of the 
decade. And during the 1970s, women flooded the work place. ... The 
percentage of female law students had risen from 4 percent in 1960 to 19 
percent in 1974, gains similar to those made in medicine. (p. 108)  
Although these changes were significant, it is also important to remember that the 
increase in the number of women working outside the home was related to the 
economic situation of the time. By 1970, 30% of women with children under the age 
of 6 had paid jobs, and by 1976 that number was up to 43%. Part of this increase is 
explained by changes in the economy, and part is explained by the empowerment of 
women. Another influence was the doubling of the divorce rate between 1966 and 
1976, which resulted in many single mothers entering the work force.  
 People reacted in different ways to these approaches to gender. Some people 
responded with anger and violence; others, such as the mainstream media, responded 
with derision and or by being dismissive. In 1973 ABC Sports put together a “Battle 
of the Sexes” tennis match between the top-ranked women’s player, Billy Jean King, 
and former Wimbledon champion Bobby Riggs. The misogynistic Riggs teased and 
taunted King and hoped that the match would settle the argument not just on the 
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court, but also in places from the boardroom to the bedroom. Riggs described the 
match as a “battle of the sexes. Man against woman; sex against sex. Husbands argue 
with wives, bosses with secretaries. Everybody wants to bet” (as quoted in Schulman, 
2001, p. 160). Riggs lost in straight sets.  
 The tennis match was an overhyped example; however, it did signal that 
gender issues had broadened to the wider society. Although in the wider landscape of 
U.S. life, the lines in the struggle were not as clearly drawn as on the tennis court. 
Many women were outraged at the slow pace of change they observed and felt 
slighted by organizations such as National Organization of Women. Other women, 
such as Phyllis Schlafly, actively fought against women’s liberation and claimed that 
women could only lose their security by embracing women’s liberation. During the 
1970s, Schlafly successfully staged a campaign to block the ratification of the Equal 
Rights Amendment (Critchlow, 2005). Schlafly claimed to represent people such as a 
30-something farm wife who, when asked about her views on women’s liberation, 
responded, 
Women’s Liberation? I just laugh when I hear them talk about it. Today’s 
women have all the freedom they please to come and go. Husbands have been 
brainwashed into letting women do anything. I suppose it’s the economic 
thing—women having to go to work to help make ends meet. But it’s not 
good for the family. I think the trouble with these women who complain about 
their lives is that they’re disorganized. With a washer and a dryer, I don’t see 
how any woman can get behind. (as quoted in Bailey, 2004, p. 114)  
 Just as there were debates about womanhood, there were also arguments about 
maleness. John Wayne had been the dominant American mass media icon of 
manhood in the 1950s. However, as multiple changes across society occurred through 
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the 1970s, there was a partial embrace of other male figures such as Alan Alda. Alan 
Alda was an outspoken supporter of the National Organization for Women and the 
Equal Rights Amendment. He also argued for a new construction of manhood. A 
writer on the subject in 1975, Robert Bly, noted that men of the mid-1970s 
recognized that “the images of the right man, the tough man, the true man which he 
received in High School do not work in life” (as quoted in Schulman, 2001, p. 184). 
Slowly through the 1970s men began to claim that it was important to share the 
domestic responsibilities, even if this was not followed through in action (Schulman, 
2001).  
 However, much like feminism, this new masculinity was hotly contested, and 
men in different places defined these shifts differently. All along the spectrum in the 
1970s people tried on different identities and new affiliations. The strict gender roles 
that characterized much of U.S. history began to fracture.  
Changes in Collectives and Coalitions 
 The complex and uneven changes in the economy, spatial location, 
technology, and social mores during 1964–1977 were also traced by a shift in the 
political world. The political coalitions of the mid-20th century had coalesced around 
two national crises: the Great Depression and World War II. First, the great 
depression developed a common political point of view and a broad national voting 
coalition. The sudden market crash that occurred on a street in New York City in 
1929 had made very clear the interdependent nature of the nation’s economy. As 
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Miles (1974) noted, “The New Deal made it respectable and eventually indispensable 
to use all the fiscal and budgetary powers of the federal government … to fight 
depressions, recessions, and even ‘rolling readjustments’” (p. 1). An array of voters 
from factory workers in northern cities to rural Southerners appreciated an active, 
stabilizing federal government.  
 World War II also established a pattern of expanding allegiance outside of 
local places. The war increased American mobility as never before. The regionalism 
that was common before the war was less acute, as the war brought people together 
against a common enemy. Following the war, the mobilization continued as people 
moved to opening job markets in the South and West. The common enemy in the war 
also encouraged a sense of “we are all in this together,” which slowly began to chip 
away at American segregationist traditions. Legislation such as the GI Bill made it 
possible for previously marginalized groups to fight for entrance into higher 
education (Wuthnow, 2006).  
 By the 1970s, though, this unity began to fracture; the New Deal consensus 
began to crack. As Edsall and Edsall (1992) noted, the overlapping issues of race and 
taxes allowed the conservative movement to focus white voter attention onto the costs 
of Great Society programs. Edsall and Edsall wrote that those costs were first sensed 
by Whites in terms of loss of privilege: “the loss of control over school selection, 
union apprenticeship, hiring, promotions and neighborhoods” (p. 11). The outrage 
about loss of the White privilege in these areas was exacerbated by the rising tax 
burden that was needed to pay for such services as busing and subsidized public 
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housing as well as the new “lawyers of civil rights enforcement at every level of 
government” (Edsall & Edsall, 1992, p. 11). Such a focus on the costs rather than the 
moral imperatives of these programs cracked the new deal coalition by 
pitting private sector against public sector, by pitting those in the labor force 
against the jobless, and by pitting those who bear many of the costs of federal 
intervention against those whose struggle for equality has been advanced by 
interventionist government policies. (Edsall & Edsall, 1992, p. 3)  
The liberal coalition also began to crack in other places. Young liberal 
radicals became enraged at the moral contradictions made evident by U.S. 
imperialism abroad and the slow pace of social reform at home. In the 1960s they 
sought to disrupt authority and order, mostly at colleges and universities in which 
many of them enrolled to avoid what they believed was an unjust war. They hoped 
the disruptions would create new public venues and dramatize important issues. At 
Columbia University, one student radical, Tom Hayden, noted that he felt there was a 
nihilistic discontent that was welling up, which was going to result in the power to 
“stop the machine if it cannot be made to serve humane ends” (as quoted in 
Schulman, 2001, p. 10). However, by 1973 many of the radicals left the public 
sphere, and their discontent became a private affair mostly. Radicals such as Hayden 
had turned their energy away from coalition building and moved to communes like 
the Red Family in Berkley California, which was famous for changing the lyrics of 
Broadway show tunes to create songs to praise North Korean leader Kim Il Sung 
(Killen, 2006).  
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All along the spectrum, people were disengaging from what they felt were 
messy difficult politics. At the same time, many of the mainstream Whites who 
dropped out were becoming uncomfortable with what they saw as costs of the 
activists’ policies. The minority groups began to drop out, disappointed and angered 
by what felt like a bag of false promises. The way people “dropped out” varied. Some 
dropped out to focus on music, nakedness, nature, and drugs; others dropped out to 
focus on kids, careers, and lawns (although those were not mutually exclusive). 
People across the nation were beginning to seek a personal identity that could act as a 
buffer to the complexities and instabilities of the time. The public life that was 
required to establish voting coalitions was fractured. 
A Review of the Shifting Modes of Life  
 This research was animated by a desire to make sense of how the possibilities 
for U.S. education and social policy were transformed during the late 1970s. I am 
interested in how people in the late 1970s chose one explanation over another and 
thus enacted one policy possibility over another. I have offered a representation of the 
multidimensional crackle and flow1 of the changes occurring during this time to 
situate Carter’s attempt to articulate national goals.  
 Over the course of a little over a decade, there were changes in what people 
expected from the economy; they could no longer expect the rising tide that would lift 
all boats. At the same time, gender roles were being reorganized as women entered 
                                                 
1 My thanks to Justin Olmanson for this nice little phrase. It helps me think about the 
swiftness and the resistance that seems to be present in change.  
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the job market and fought for rights in the political realm; the competition for the 
construction of manhood and womanhood was explicit during this era. Often, this 
competition took place through mass media that were becoming more prominent in 
the lives of people; however, due to technological changes, most people were 
beginning to experience this media privately and along slimmer demographic lines. 
The increased use of the automobile and the suburbanization that it facilitated allowed 
people to experience less diversity and to separate their interests from those in the city 
center. Political coalitions that had been developed throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and 
1960s began to dissolve; people in general began to withdraw from the public. These 
changes in these practices of daily life interacted with and constructed each other. The 
new intersections that resulted from these reconstructions of daily life made new 
possibilities visible and others more impossible. An articulation of national goals by 
Carter would require an enactment of a different set of possibilities than had been 
articulated in the past, one that acknowledged centrifugal tendencies in U.S. culture at 
the end of the 1970s. 
Listening for a Charge From the People 
It was in this time that Carter began to listen for a mandate. It was in this 
cacophony that Carter began to assert that his centrism fit with what he heard from 
voters. In his presidential memoir, Carter (1976) remembered, 
Throughout the 1976 campaign, the most persistent question of the news 
reporters was, “Are you a liberal or a conservative?” When forced to answer, I 
would say that I was a fiscal conservative but quite liberal on such issues as 
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civil rights, environmental quality, and helping people overcome handicaps to 
lead fruitful lives. My reply did not satisfy them, and sometimes they accused 
me of being evasive, but it was the most accurate answer I could give in a few 
words. (p. 74)  
Carter, much like others of the time, was dissatisfied with the past categories of 
public life. Living out the multiple changes described above and listening to other 
people’s descriptions of their lives, Carter began to sense that there was a different 
mood in the country. As the social critic Michael Harrington pointed out, “It was a 
weird period for liberals. ... The problem is the conventional wisdom of the past 
doesn’t work anymore” (as quoted in Leuchtenburg, 1998, p. 20).  
 Hamilton Jordan (2001), Carter’s campaign manager and eventual chief of 
staff, noted that he stuck with the uphill battle of the 1976 campaign because he 
believed that Carter represented a way to shake up the political establishment that he 
felt was “so out of touch with the mood and needs of the American people” (p. 64). 
Out on the campaign trail with Carter, he, too, sensed a need for a new vocabulary. In 
this sense Carter did not “invent a centrist mood; he inherited it” (Leuchtenburg, 
1998, p. 18).  
 Other Democrats were aware of these changes. In 1976, Gary Hart stated, 
“The New Deal has run its course. The party is over. The pie cannot continue to 
expand forever” (as quoted in Leuchtenburg, 1998, p. 18). Carter and the other 
Democrats recognized that the past unity could not be taken for granted, and change 
was required if they were going to stay in power. However, at the time it was not 
clear what type of approach could meet the needs of this changing America. What 
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was certain was that to be successful the approach had to resonate with this new 
national mood. During his acceptance speech at the national convention, Carter 
(1976) also acknowledged the shifting mood: “There is a new mood in America. We 
have been shaken by a tragic war abroad and by scandals and broken promises at 
home. Our people are searching for new voices and new ideas and new leaders” (p. 
347). 
It is important here to stop and think critically about what the vague term 
national mood means. Mood itself is often given a causal status in policy production 
literature, even though the concept of a national mood remains ambiguous (Kingdon, 
2003). I assert that in this case the mood was a combination of not only the practices 
and discourses that people socially constructed (such as gender roles or economic 
expectations), but also their satisfaction with these constructions. In their attempts to 
put together new ways of living, people struggled to use past social regularities in 
different ways. They had to rearticulate the most dominant categories in U.S. life. An 
easy example of this attempt to reconstruct the dominant categories is Carter’s 
frustration with the conservative and liberal categories. He sought to reterritorialize 
the liberal category and to pursue fiscal conservatism and the core values of an active 
federal government.  
The mood was also a stew of people’s visions of the future. While describing 
their world, people employed normative statements. That is, they included in their 
discussions about current conditions an implied discussion of what should be. As 
Carter culled his charge from the people, he not only was listening to a nation of 
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people explaining change in their lives, he also was hearing stories of what should be 
and how people felt about the discrepancy.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I described the social and historical context in which the Carter 
administration attempted to rearticulate new national priorities. Carter’s choice of 
symbols was strikingly different from those employed by the Johnson Administration. 
However, placed amongst the multiple and complex changes that were unfolding over 
the course of the 1970s, it is clear that Carter’s speech was trying to resonate with 
these changing modes of life. He was trying to speak to people many of who felt 
betrayed by the economic slump, were living in and driving to and from new suburbs, 
were negotiating new gender roles and, at the same time were living an increasingly 
private life. Carter chose as his priorities the development of an honest government 
that acted rationally. Johnson’s 1964 performance of omnipotent leadership was not 
as palatable by 1976. The fracturing of liberal consensus, the disappointing economic 
opportunities, and the growing privatization of life made an investment in the public 
that hinged on a growing amount of national wealth seem senseless.  
In addition to looking at why the Great Society priorities seemed unappealing, 
in this study I also investigated the ways in which new priorities were constructed. 
Scholars have pointed to a shifting national mood as not only the reason for Carter’s 
victory in 1976, but also the reason for his loss in 1980; his administration was caught 
in the middle of liberal commitments and growing conservatism (Leuchtenburg, 
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1998; Mazlish & Diamond, 1979). We have seen in this chapter that across society 
the way people were living changed in some important ways between 1964 and 1976. 
The mood, as understood as the meanings and the expectations that the new ways of 
living engendered, allowed people to recast to their priorities. Important to this study 
are the ways in which this mood allowed people in the Carter Administration to 
explain the relationship between education and antipoverty policy. As Carter and his 
administration took steps to elevate education to the cabinet level and attempted to 
create a coherent urban policy, they enacted the shifting dominant social regularities 
to narrate and constitute their priorities.  
A closer investigation of how the mood was socially constructed can help us 
capture the systems of knowledge that were used in this process. Paying attention to 
these narrations and the intersections of the social regularities they are built from 
helps us grasp how people at this time came to draw lines around what is education 
policy and what is not. In the next chapter, I highlight some of the social regularities, 
such as race, property, individualism, and social stability, that discursively 
constructed the mood of the late 1970s. I also show how the intersection of these 
discourses privileged some policy priorities over others. 
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CHAPTER 5: DECONSTRUCTING THE NATIONAL MOOD: COMMON 
SENSE, EXPECTATIONS, AND SATISFACTIONS 
 
 Historians point to the 1970s as the decade in which U.S. culture suffered a 
seismic, discursive break (Frum, 2000; Killen, 2006; Schulman, 2001). As Killen 
noted, it was a decade in which many people began to realize that the egalitarian 
dreams of the 1960s would not come to fruition; at the same time, they sensed that the 
self-satisfied stories of accomplishment in the 1950s were irretrievable. In the 1970s 
many Americans began to see their daily lives and the stories that narrated them as 
unhinged from any master narrative, and “amid the wreckage, Americans discovered 
that instead of the chosen people they had become a nation of survivors” (Killen, 
2006, p. 8). In this unhinged world of survivors the mood was at times described as a 
general malaise. 
 The pervasive uneasiness was acknowledged in the keynote addresses 
delivered at both the Republican and the Democratic conventions in 1976. In Kansas 
City, Missouri, speaking to the Republicans, Baker offered a remedy to this free 
floating: 
If we are to meet the challenges of the future, if we are to avert the perils and 
fully realize our promise, we must continue to harken [sic] to the common 
sense of this nation, to those shared perceptions, those basic ideas, that reflect 
the popular wisdom and embody the national will. (as quoted in Milton, 1976)  
A month earlier, at the Democratic convention, Barbara Jordan underscored the 
growing desire to search for a meaningful vocabulary. As she spoke to the crowd at 
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Madison Square Garden, Jordan (1976) assessed, “We are a people in a quandary 
about the present. We are a people in search of our future.”  
 The people of the time, aware that the past stories and ideologies failed to give 
meaning to their changing ways of living, began to tell themselves different stories 
and do different things. Bailey and Farber (2004) described it as a time in which 
“sexual liberationists and Gospel Hour devotees, Mohawk-haired punks and disco 
dancers, furious displaced steel workers and new women professionals, residents of 
the Sun Belt and of the Rust Belt, and white ethnics and people of color” all struggled 
to construct a life (p. 8). Many people in the United States found the dominant 
categories in life unsatisfactory and strived to construct new ways to make meaning. 
The meanings and the expectations that these struggles fomented generated a national 
mood of cultural discomfort.  
 A purpose of this study was to investigate the ways in which people explained 
the relationship between antipoverty and education policy during the Carter 
Administration. In this investigation I offer an interpretation of how certain 
explanations and practices around education and antipoverty policy became 
intelligible, valorized, or deemed as natural, whereas others became discounted, 
impossible, or unimaginable (Britzman, 2003). My approach assumed that the context 
and the meaning in everyday life are coconstructions and open (Lather, 1991). I also 
assumed that the intersection of multiple scattered practices and discourses constitutes 
the historical moment’s becoming of the possible and the impossible. I believe an 
investigation into some of these regular social constructions can help us bring into 
 
154 
sharper focus the mood of the country in the 1970s that so many historians link to 
Carter’s presidency (Fink & Graham, 1998; Leuchtenburg, 1998; Schulman, 2001).  
Purpose of the Chapter 
 In this chapter I look at the social construction of the mood that many point to 
as an important factor in the election of the Carter Administration. In doing so, I 
explain a few of the many scattered practices and discourses, or social regularities, 
that allowed the performance of knowledge or common sense of the late 1970s. A 
review of these practices can help us grasp the ways in which people of the 1970s 
constructed their world and the power relationships that made these constructions 
possible. In doing so, I offer a picture of how education and antipoverty policies were 
part of the social patterns of the time and how the unity and disunity of the policy 
approaches were the products of knowledge-production procedures. Specifically, I 
argue that ways in which the social regularities of the time organized social 
interactions revealed new racializations, naturalized the idea of individual as the 
economic man, and discounted the public realm as an arena for developing social 
change and peace.  
 In the chapter that follows, I explain two bundles or intersections of social 
regularities that people enacted to constitute their ways of life in the 1970s. I have 
chosen the word bundle because I believe it offers a visual representation of the ways 
in which the multiple discourses and practices bumped into each other and were often 
enacted as a single point of logic. I also, at times, use the word intersection because it 
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connotes interpenetrations of ideas that were on different vectors and so directs our 
attention to the ways in which the connections between ideas are historically 
contingent. I believe the use of both of these terms helps us grasp not only the manner 
of distribution of social regularities, but also the degree to which that distribution is 
not geometrical (Foucault, 1972).  
 Thus, I first discuss Bundle 1, which consists of an intersection of Whiteness 
and property. Second, I investigate the intersection of the social regularities of around 
individualism and domestic stability. For each bundle, I first briefly situate the 
multiple articulations of these social regularities historically. Then, I provide a fuller 
description of the dominant rearticulation of these bundles or intersections during the 
late 1970s. I also provide a few examples of the ways in which these dominant social 
regularities constituted and made visible the national priorities during the Carter 
Administration. Finally, given my assumption of the openness and incompleteness of 
our social interactions, I offer some examples of resistance to these dominant ways of 
meaning making that were present at the time. 
 This is not a representation of the gestalt or spirit of an era. The networks and 
manifolds of social regularities across years and locations are too complex for a 
single representation. The social regularities pointed to here are only a few of the 
multiple, dynamic complexes that constitute high modern society. My isolation of 
these social regularities serves a rhetorical purpose; however, it is not meant to reflect 
an assumption of unity or mutual exclusiveness from other social regularities. Also, 
other important, social regularities could have been chosen just as easily. For 
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example, Fraser’s (1989) work has offered important insights into how the bundles 
around femininity and masculinity and their intersections with welfare and work were 
important to the development of social policy at the time.  
Bundle 1: Race as a Resource 
 In 1977, in a phone call to Secretary of the Department of HEW Califano, Hy 
Bookbinder, a civil rights activist and representative of the American Jewish 
Committee, explained, “We’ve come to opposite conclusions on Bakke. But just as 
you shouldn’t be automatically branded a quota lover or opponent of merit, we 
shouldn’t be branded opponents of civil rights generally” (as cited in Califano, 1981, 
p. 235). The phone call was meant to ease the tensions between Califano and the 
Jewish and Catholic communities who were deeply worried about the use of quotas in 
affirmative action policies, such as the one disputed in the Supreme Court case 
Regents of University of California v. Bakke. From their perspective, the required 
numbers in the newest affirmative action policies were reminiscent of the spaces that 
were allocated to Jews and Catholics at the nation’s universities in the 1920s and 
1930s. The quotas for Jewish and Catholic students acted as ceilings that limited the 
number of religious minorities and secured White Protestant dominance.  
 In 1973, a White, male, NASA engineer from California, Alan Bakke, was 
asserting that he was not admitted to the medical school at University of California at 
Davis because of the “reverse discrimination” of the new quotas (as cited in Dreyfuss 
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& Lawrence, 1979). By 1977, Bakke’s case had reached the Supreme Court. It would 
become one of the most important decisions of the era. 
 Califano had supported the use of affirmative action in the nation’s 
universities. In his memoir, Califano (1981) cited one of President Johnson’s last 
speeches in which he stated “to be black in a white society is not to stand on level and 
equal ground. ... [Whites] stand on history’s mountain and blacks stand in history’s 
hollow” (p. 231). According to Califano, this difference needed to be changed. In a 
commencement speech at City College in New York in 1977 Califano (1981) had 
noted, “If American colleges have been able to exert such efforts—special tutoring 
and financial aid—for star quarter backs, surely they can do for other Americans” (p. 
234). Califano went on to emphasize, “If we are serious about achieving minority 
participation in American education then we must have a measure of progress” (p. 
234) However, Califano agreed with Hy Bookbinder and noted that the Bakke case 
highlighted a “real clash of the conflicting interests between constitutional concepts 
of equality and the need to remedy past discrimination, and tested the deep American 
traditions of giving everyone a fair chance” (p. 235).  
 In this phone call we can see a negotiation around the intersection of the social 
regularities that constituted the categories of race and entitlement in the late 1970s. 
These negotiations were taking place in multiple places across multiple interactions 
across the nation. In the 1970s people sought new ways to racialize people and invest 
in the entitlements that were connected to these racializations (D. Bell, 2004; C. I. 
Harris, 1993; Porter, 2004; Schulman, 2001). According to Porter, “In the United 
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States, Americans transformed the way their society was structured along racial line 
during the 1970s; they embraced, rejected or otherwise negotiated racial identities and 
mobilized themselves around them in important new ways” (p. 52). Schulman (2001) 
asserted that in the United States during the 1970s, people were struggling with 
questions such as “could Americans acknowledge difference and still share the same 
city, the same university, the same polity?” (p. 67). 
 In this section I show the ways in which the mood of the late 1970s was 
partially constructed out of the ways in which people enacted the social regularity 
bundle of race and property to make meaning and set expectations. In order to do so I 
first lay out the argument put forward by many critical race scholars that the ideas of 
Whiteness and property have been bundled through discourses and practices across 
U.S. society, including the law (D. Bell, 2000; C. I. Harris, 1993). In doing so I 
briefly trace how this bundle was rearticulated in different ways throughout U.S. 
history. Then, I provide examples of how this bundle was enacted in specific ways in 
the 1970s. Finally, I explain how these bundles helped constitute some of the policy 
priorities in the Carter era. 
Whiteness as Property 
 C. I. Harris (1993) asserted that in U.S. history “rights in property are 
contingent on intertwined with and conflated with race” (p. 1714). Through this 
bundling, “through this entangled relationship between race and property, historical 
forms of domination have evolved to reproduce subordination in the present” (C. I. 
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Harris, 1993, p. 1714). D. Bell (2000) argued that the racialization of people allowed 
the White society to remain stable, because 
even those whites who lack wealth and power are sustained in their sense for 
racial superiority, and thus rendered more willing to accept their lesser share, 
by an unspoken but no less certain property right in their “whiteness.” This 
right is recognized and upheld by courts and the society like all property rights 
under a government created and sustained primarily for that purpose. (p. 72) 
However, the ways in which this right has been legislated and upheld in court have 
changed over time.  
Convergence of Race and Property 
 Chinn (2000) noted that the U.S. talent for “transforming bodies into things 
(information, statistics, evidence, databases) is part of the legacy of slavery” (p. 171). 
The development of these racialization practices can be found at the beginnings of the 
Colonial era. According to C. I. Harris (1993), “The racialization of identity and the 
racial subordination of Blacks and Native Americans provided the ideological basis 
for slavery and conquest” (p. 1715). Connected directly to the racialization was the 
concept of property. While Blacks were transformed directly into physical property, 
Native Americans were divested of their land through an assertion that only White 
culture offered a clear definition of possession and thus had the purchase on the rights 
to use. In the development of chattel slavery we see the multiple ways in which this 
race and property bundle formed the dominant form of social relations. For example, 
early on in the United States, these social relations were codified in the three-fifths 
compromise, in family laws of the time that turned Black women’s wombs into 
commodities and facilitated the reproduction of a slave workforce, and in the legal 
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precedent that allowed slaves to stand in for currency in the repayment of debt (C. I. 
Harris, 1993).  
 When non-Whites were subjugated and their bodies turned into commodities 
of which they themselves had no control, the control over one’s body became a 
valuable asset. Thus, the property rights that developed during slavery facilitated the 
merger of Whiteness and property. In other words, as C. I. Harris (1993) put it, “It 
became crucial to be ‘white,’ to be identified as white, to have the property of being 
white. Whiteness was the characteristic, the attribute, the property of free human 
beings” (p. 1721).  
 However, the end of slavery did not undo the connection between property 
and Whiteness; instead, the bundle was recreated through the social interactions of 
the time. White supremacy was propagated by the states’ willingness to attach value 
to White expectations of superiority. Specifically, at the individual level,  
recognizing oneself as “white” necessarily assumes premises based on white 
supremacy: It assumes that Black ancestry in any degree, extending to 
generations far removed, automatically disqualifies claims to white identity, 
thereby privileging “white” as unadulterated, exclusive, and rare. Inherent in 
the concept of “being white” was the right to own or hold whiteness to the 
exclusion and subordination of Blacks. (C. I. Harris, 1993, p. 1737) 
 For example, the state worked to classify people. Race discourses combined 
with accounting practices played an important role in the constitution of racial 
categories and identities. Chinn (2000) noted the U.S. Census has been more than just 
a counting tool; it is also meant to generate meaning. Chinn wrote, “It is the job of a 
census to reduce the population into correlations of numbers and figures that then 
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take on independent meaning, whether or not they are accurate” (p. 3). In 1890, the 
census included “Negro” and “Mulatto” as racial categories. By 1920, with the advent 
of Jim Crow laws, the “Mulatto” category was dropped. Changes in the styles of the 
U.S. Census were not a product of convenience. They were done to make a point, 
according to Chinn, “about order, difference, inequality of faculties, and the need of 
the subordination of the dominated” (p. 5). The categories and their relationship to 
property value of Whiteness determined whether “one could vote, travel freely, attend 
schools, obtain work, and indeed, defined the structure of social relations along the 
entire spectrum of interaction between individual and society” (C. I. Harris, 1993, p. 
1745).  
 Most famously, the value of Whiteness as a property was upheld in Plessy v. 
Ferguson (as cited in C. I. Harris, 1993). The plaintiff’s argument hinged on the fact 
that the railroad employee, through his barring of Plessy from the White car, had 
without due process deprived Plessy of his reputation of being regarded as White. 
Plessy, who phenotypically appeared to be White, then would be denied future public 
access to public and private privileges. However, the court defended the railroad 
employees’ right to judge Plessy as Black. In the decision the court argued that if 
Plessy had been White, the railroad would be responsible for damages. However, the 
justices posited, “If he be a colored man and be so assigned, he has been deprived of 
no property, since he is not lawfully entitled to the reputation of being a white man” 
(Plessy. v. Ferguson, as cited in C. I. Harris, 1993, p. 1749). Although the decision 
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recognized the value of being White, it did not assume that the conditions of the 
separation were unnatural and thus naturalized Whiteness as a property.  
 Of course, Brown v. Board of Education (as cited in C. I. Harris, 1993) undid 
the separate but equal laws that were established by Plessy. However, the bundling of 
Whiteness and property was not eliminated; instead, it was rejoined through the 
available cultural resources of 1954. Although the decision dismantled the past 
property rights found in legal segregation, it did not offer any reparations for the 
gross inequality that this system had perpetrated. Thus, it naturalized as a starting 
point the inequality of 1954. C. I. Harris (1993) stated it this way:  
In accepting substantial inequality as a neutral baseline, a new form of 
whiteness as property was condoned. Material inequities between Black and 
Whites—the product of systematic past and current, formal and informal, 
mechanisms of racial subordination—became the norm. Brown disregarded 
immediate associational preferences of whites, but sheltered and protected 
their expectations of continued race-based privilege. (p. 1753)  
The expectation that White privilege would be protected extended into the 1960s. 
Non-Whites continued to be segregated and provided with substandard public 
services. The civil rights movement attempted to remedy differences through 
advocacy of integration.  
The 1960s: Investment in Whiteness and a Promise of Redistribution  
 In 1960 it did not appear that the Brown v. Board of Education decision would 
change the expectation that Whiteness could be counted on to signal preferential 
treatment. As G. Orfield (1988) noted, “Only a fraction of 1 percent of black students 
in the South went to white schools, and no white students in the South had ever 
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enrolled in Black Schools” (p. 315). However, the impressive numbers in the Black 
protest movements in the South dramatized the disparities between groups. The civil 
rights movement became a driving force in arousing and focusing public concern and 
thus generating a coalition for major change in national policy; “it galvanized white 
liberalism” (G. Orfield, 1988, p. 316). Developing these coalitions, the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations transformed the executive branch attitude from one of 
disinterest to one of national leadership in civil rights issues. Besides the legislative 
victories of 1964 and 1965, there was also a move in the executive branch to enforce 
the laws. For example, “the Justice Department was authorized to sue on behalf of 
minority plaintiffs in civil rights matters” (G. Orfield, 1988, p. 316). In addition, the 
federal government began to withhold funds to the institutions that practiced 
discrimination.  
 The coalition that helped highlight these priorities consisted of urban and 
southern Blacks, minorities, northeastern intelligentsia, and a large swath of middle-
class Whites. Lyndon B. Johnson expanded the effort to eliminate privilege 
distributed on the basis of race when he proposed a larger effort to eliminate poverty. 
This leadership impressed Roy Wilkins, the leader of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored Persons (NAACP). Johnson had called him in the summer 
of 1965 and explained that he was ready to deal with the race problems. Wilkins 
described the phone call: 
That June President Johnson called me before his Howard commencement 
speech to tell me that he was ready for all all-fronts assault on the problems of 
race. I was astonished by he fervor and by his daring. ... No President before 
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had ever been so enlightened or bold in facing up to these truths. (as cited in 
G. Orfield, 1988, p. 326)  
However, this jubilation faded quickly. The group politics that had brought the 
coalition along started to break up when faced with the urban politics and the riots 
that irrupted later that summer.  
The Move From Group Politics to Identity Politics 
 The group politics of the 1950s and 1960s would give way to identity politics 
in the 1970s. The riots of the late 1960s prompted a national committee to study civil 
disorders. The committee’s findings, known as the Kerner report (Carroll, 1990), 
pointed to the structural differences between White and non-White groups in 
America. According to Carroll, the report stated that the country was “moving toward 
two societies, one black, one white—separate and un equal” (p. 40). However, that 
statement lacked the effect that many similar statements, such as those found in the 
Brown v. Board decision or Harrington’s The Other America, had enjoyed just a few 
years prior (Carroll, 1990). In the 1968 election Nixon, in an effort to attract 
conservative southern votes to the Republican Party, scorned the report’s “refusal to 
condemn the perpetuators of urban riots” (Carroll, 1990, p. 40). Nixon claimed that 
the report tended to divide people. Instead, he claimed what the nation needed was 
“more talk about reconciliation, more about how we’re going to work together, rather 
than the fact that we have this terrible division between us” (as cited in Carroll, 1990, 
p. 40). Known as the southern strategy, the approach proved effective at the polls and 
the Republican candidate carried many southern states.  
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 Nixon’s strategy carefully reframed racial issues in U.S. society by claming a 
desire for color blindness. The ideals of color blindness voiced by “minority activists 
were “rearticulated” during the 1970s in ways that served the group interests of 
Whites (Porter, 2004, p. 67). The call for color blindness was not one that would 
eliminate difference between White and non-White groups. Instead, in this iteration, it 
was intended to hide or ignore the major differences between the groups and protect 
the property value of Whiteness. Despite the claim of a desire for reconciliation, the 
approach increased alienation of Blacks. Many saw through this approach as a 
protection of White power and did not vote for Nixon. Thus, as Carroll (1990) 
pointed out, “The new President felt no obligation to reward a black constituency. He 
appointed no blacks to the cabinet, picking his campaign manager, John Mitchell, 
architect of the ‘southern strategy,’ to head the radically sensitive Department of 
Justice” (p. 40). 
 The nation also shifted in priorities. Nixon had run as a law and order 
candidate. Instead of working to eliminate poverty and racism, the southern strategy 
focused on the need for civil peace. Nixon declared, “Until we have order, there can 
be no progress” (as cited in Carroll, 1990, p. 42). This argument was used to slow 
change and deconstruct the civil rights groups that were working to organize group 
action. In desegregation cases Nixon worked to slow required integration. Nixon 
claimed, “There are those who want instant integration and those who want 
segregation forever, I believe that we need to have a middle course” (as cited in 
Carroll, 1990, p. 42). 
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 At the same time activist groups became the target of the Justice Department. 
In planning a racial policy, “the White House assumed that the ultimate weapon for 
achieving racial peace was military force” (Carroll, 1990, p. 49). The Black Panthers, 
philosophy professors, and other dissidents became the target of John Mitchell’s 
surveillance and illegal spying activities. Mitchell summed up his position in his 
discussion of the purpose of the Justice Department: “I think this is an institution for 
law enforcement, not social improvement” (as cited in Carroll, 1990, p. 49).  
 Nixon’s strategy worked to reframe group activities as threats to civil rights. It 
allowed people to assume that a focus on the differences between groups would lead 
to violence in the streets. This resulted in a resignation by many past civil rights 
activists. Carroll (1990) pointed out, “As blacks learned to expect less from 
government and as examples of police repression appeared more frequently, blacks 
retreated from the barricades of urban revolt” (p. 54). The alienation led often to a 
conclusion that in White society there would be little hope for full participation. 
Instead, people started to conclude that was an approach that focused on the 
development of Black power. A middle-aged Black man captured this growing desire 
for a more multicultural approach when he dissented: 
I get tired of that one-nation-under-God boogie-joogie, we are ourselves. We 
are our own nation or country or whatever you want to call it. We are not one-
tenth of some white something! That man has got his country and we are our 
country. (as quoted in Carroll, 1990, p. 55) 
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Cultural Movement as an Investment in Non-Whiteness 
 Disappointed by the lack of substantial change that the civil rights movement 
had achieved, many started to question the value of working through the legal system 
or the legislative system. Faced with their inability to upend the system that had 
invested in Whiteness, many came to the conclusion that if they could not divest 
White privilege, they should invest in Blackness or Chicano culture. Schulman (2001) 
noted, “By the mid-1970s, cultural nationalism had become the dominant force in 
minority activism” (p. 67). 
 The cultural movement rejected a complete integration approach and instead 
claimed the United States was actually composed of multiple cultures that were 
woven together rather than a melting pot that generated a single White, Anglo-Saxon, 
Protestant (WASP) culture. The Chicano movement was one of the first to assert this 
approach. In the late 1960s, frustrated with the lack of improvement in race relations, 
Corky Gonzales developed a plan to affect change in the Southwest (Schulman, 
2001).  
 In 1966, Gonzales began working in Denver and formed the Crusade for 
Justice. The purpose of the organization was to develop a grassroots movement that 
would lead fights to reform of the “police and courts, better housing, more economic 
opportunity, and significantly, ‘relevant education’ for Chicanos” (Schulman, 2001, 
p. 65). Part of the organizing elements was the use of a nationalistic rhetoric in the 
rallies. Later, when Chicano/a activists and artists “began to invoke Aztlán, a concept 
first publicly defined in 1969, they further rejected the idea that their identities were 
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rooted in the political and cultural systems of the United States” (Porter, 2004, p. 55). 
Aztlán was a symbolic nation that encompassed southwestern areas the United States 
had seized when invading Mexico in 1848. The idea had become so powerful that at 
one point “Gonzales considered appealing to the United Nations for a plebiscite in the 
Southwest to determine whether the people—la raza—might desire independence 
from the United States” (Schulman, 2001, p. 65).  
 The move to from integrationist ideas to a focus on Black power and 
eventually Black culture also developed in the 1970s. The movement was evident not 
only in the grassroots organizations, but also in popular culture. Schulman (2001) 
wrote that the success of “Sly and the Family Stone marked the apex of 
integrationism in American popular culture” (p. 59). The Family, which included 
Blacks, Whites, women, and men, “produced a startling fusion of white San Francisco 
rock, soul, British pop, jazz, and dance tunes—a music they called ‘a whole new 
thing’” (Schulman, 2001, p. 59). The messages of songs like “Everyday People” 
declared that it did not make difference what group people were in because “we got to 
live together” (as cited in Schulman, 2001, p. 59). However, by the 1970s, Sly and the 
Family Stone had started to abandon the integrational aspect of their music. In 1971 
they released an album titled “There’s a Riot Goin’ On.” The lyrics in these songs 
focused “on betrayal, failure, oppression, on being trapped” (Schulman, 2001, p. 61). 
The album was not well received by its White listeners. White listeners did not want 
to hear about the Black suspicion of the unified American culture. Many U.S. Blacks 
began to ask, “Who is being integrated into what?” (Schulman, 2001, p. 60).  
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 Instead of looking for integration into White culture, many Blacks sought to 
develop their own culture. Much like the Chicano movement, they sought to become 
focused on the power that lay “inherent in maintain and expressing a distinctive 
culture through clothing, music, hairstyle, literature, cuisine, and the arts” (Schulman, 
2001, p. 63). If the property value of Whiteness could not be undone by legal means, 
there must be investment in the property value of Blackness, Latin-ness, and other 
ethnic identities. 
 The state once again affirmed this protection of the property right of 
Whiteness by encouraging this multicultural flavor. Porter (2004) pointed out, “Multi-
cultural education programs were often undertaken with governmental funding proves 
that the 1970s marked a shift in the implementation of race as a resource because of 
the particular ways political, cultural, and personal affirmations of identity were 
facilitated by or supported by the state” (p. 56). It was in this environment that Carter 
took office and claimed that the priorities of the government would be focused, 
ethical, and rational service delivery.  
The Partial Construction of the Mood 
 The uneasy mood of the era, then, was partially constructed by a recognition 
and protection of the property entitlement that was invested in Whiteness. Citing the 
civil rights victories that established equal treatment under the law, many people 
began to claim that redistribution was not necessary. Some claimed that Whites 
should be allowed to expect that their position could be exploited for personal gain. 
Many who desired a more equal society felt betrayed by this co-opting of the civil 
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rights agenda to defend White privilege. They also began to feel that White privilege 
was so immovable that their options for leveraging change were limited to investing 
in their own culture and identities. Thus, there was a mixed feeling: While the 
struggle for equality was important, there was also an expectation that it could not be 
pursued through explicit redistribution. The common sense of the time dictated that 
only approaches that maintained White expectation of privilege would succeed. The 
national mood was partially constructed out of the dismay of the realization that the 
equal protection under the law did not translate into an equitable society, ambivalence 
towards the necessity or possibility of redistribution, and surety that the only recourse 
was investment in identity. 
How Was This Bundle Enacted Through Carter’s Actions? 
 To what degree can we see the protection of property right in Whiteness and 
the investment other identities in Carter’s administration? In his acceptance speech, 
Carter (1976) called for investment in the value of multiple cultural identities:  
We can have an America that encourages and takes pride in our ethnic 
diversity, our religious diversity, our cultural diversity—knowing that out of 
this pluralistic heritage has come the strength and the vitality and the 
creativity that has made us great and will keep us great. (p. 352)  
 Carter won 94% of the Black vote in 1976. However, it has been noted that 
Carter did not make civil rights issues a defining element of his presidency. Carter 
has been represented as centrist who struggled against the liberal constituents of his 
party. However, I agree with Graham (1998) that Carter’s course reflected the 
uneasiness of the time in that it created a zigzag pattern. The attention to issues of 
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inequality was pressing; however, the common sense of the era required a move 
against redistribution. Carter desired to balance the budget, to push for progress in the 
fight against racial inequality, and to uphold ideas of color blindness. Each of these 
discourses mobilized different constituencies with different assessments of the 
property and Whiteness bundle.  
 In an interview after his presidency, Carter explained his approaches to deal 
with racial inequality in the United States:  
I looked on them as kind of a continuum of what had been initiated und 
Lyndon Johnson and talked about under President Kennedy. ... And so I didn’t 
look upon these achievements as notable in nature. I just felt as if they were 
my duty. (as cited in Graham, 1998, p. 204)  
Specifically, Carter felt it was his duty to remain committed to affirmative action 
activities and policing discrimination in organizations that received federal monies. In 
his administration Carter appointed many more “minorities and women to top 
administrative posts and federal judgeships in numbers fare exceeding the tokenism 
of his predecessors” (Graham, 1998, p. 216). The administration supported the use of 
affirmative action programs in higher education.  
 Another form of affirmative action that the Carter Administration supported 
was the creation of Minority Business Enterprises. In the last month of the Ford 
presidency, the House Committee on Small Business asserted, “Currently, we more 
often encounter a business system which is racially neutral on its face, but because of 
past overt social and economic discrimination presently operating, in effect, to 
perpetuate these past inequities” (as cited in Graham, 1998, p. 207). The Carter 
 
172 
Administration, despite considerable backlash from White voters, pushed for 10% of 
grant funds to be set aside for minority businesses.  
 However, in another important racial issue of the time, school busing, Carter 
was on record as a critic. He felt that although school busing was an important 
symbolic move, ultimately it was a bad policy move. In a position paper released in 
1976 by the Democratic Committee Headquarters, Carter (1978a) explained his 
understanding of busing: 
At first it is very important to the black citizens to have the busing order, and 
this is a phase that you have to go through, and I think maybe it’s a mandatory 
phase. I don’t argue with it. But eventually the poor parents, mostly blacks, 
say “We don’t want our kids bused any more to a distant school,” because 
these are the very parents who don’t have a second car, and if their children 
get sick in the middle of the day or if they want to go to athletic events they 
can’t go. (p. 611) 
Based on this assessment Carter and local Black leaders then reconstructed a less 
radical busing plan. In their plan they developed four principles: (a) Any kid who 
wanted to be bused could be at the public’s expense; (b) if the student was being 
bused, it had to contribute to integration; (c) any busing operation had to include the 
input of Black leaders; and (d) “this is important in my opinion, no child is bused 
against the wishes of the child” (Carter, 1978a, p. 611).  
 Carter’s decision here seems to capitulate to the argument that White 
expectation of privilege could not be disturbed. As shown in the next chapter, 
Carter’s approach to education called for the improvement of all schools, a move 
away from integration ideals and categorical aid and toward the general aid toward a 
plurality of schools. This is reflected also in his strong push for the full 
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implementation of the Bilingual Act. The administration attempted to strike a balance 
by funding an investment in different identities through affirmative action and 
education programs. However, the Carter Administration tended to shy away from 
more redistributive approaches that would divest Whiteness  
 The uneasy mood of the era was partially constructed out of the social 
regularities that bundled property rights to racial identity. Carter’s attempt to resonate 
with this bundle of practices and discourses that constructed the common sense of the 
day led to path that zigzagged through the various interests of the day. However, 
these constituencies and their interested were constituted through more than just this 
Whiteness and property bundle.  
Bundle 2: Individualism and Domestic Stability 
On December 4, 1974, just prior to his formal announcement of his intention 
to run for the candidacy for the Democratic nomination for President, Jimmy Carter 
wrote a letter to his friends explaining his decision and asking for their support. In the 
letter, he argued that in his travels across the United States and during his time as 
governor he had heard that people were disappointed in the lack of stability that the 
past leadership was providing. Carter (1978a) wrote, 
They feel alienated from the decision making process. They are troubled by 
the dishonesty of public officials. They deplore the absence of effective 
business management in government. They are bewildered by shortages and 
runaway inflation. With good reason, they have lost faith in federal programs 
that waste their taxes while the needs of the people go unmet. (p. 1)  
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Carter (1978a) went on to say that the people were “looking for a new face, a new 
leader whose ideas work” to bring stability back to the country (p. 2).  
Whereas the listing of grievances to predicate a call for change might be a 
common rhetorical strategy in politics, in Carter’s historical moment the argument 
gained traction. At the time in the United States, the growing list of problems 
instigated a strong sense of instability. As described above, the expectations of people 
were continually challenged in areas of life from jobs, to gender roles, to living 
patterns and political alignments. The confusion led many to describe the country as 
heading into a downward spiral. There was a strong desire for a stabilizing force.  
Wuthnow (2006) suggested that social change is most apparent “when it 
influences our ideas about the rights and responsibilities of individuals” (p. 40). 
Inversely, a stable construction of the individual in a given time helps define group 
stability. Thus, the emergent rules of a time that generate the concept of the individual 
intersect with practices we engage to maintain domestic stability. By stability, I mean 
the practices and discourses that define the threshold upon which collective action is 
thought possible for the majority, without the use of a constant threat of violence. For 
example, people assert the United States has avoided class warfare through the 
discourses and practices that allowed people to claim that the nation operated as a 
meritocracy in the economic realm. In the political realm, the democratic ideals and 




In different times in the United States, the common sense around the 
possibilities for nonviolent collective action (economic or political) was bundled with 
the common-sense definitions of the individual. However, these social regularities, 
domestic stability or the individual, cannot be reduced to fundamental elements. They 
are always being reconstructed and brought into relationship in different ways. At 
different times in U.S. society, the relationship between the individual to the group 
has been defined differently.  
Therefore, if we are going to understand the mood of the 1970s, I assert that 
we must investigate the ways that, through the power relationships of the time, people 
constructed and enacted the social regularities around the individual and domestic 
stability. An investigation of this bundle of social regularities gives us some insight 
into the ways in which the renegotiation of past categories was part of the uneasiness 
that characterized the late 1970s. This helps us capture the ways in which the 
common-sense knowledge of the time made some policy approaches more visible, 
more reliable, or more logical than others. 
In this section I show the ways in which the mood of the late 1970s was 
partially constructed out of the ways in which people enacted the social regularity 
bundle of individualism and domestic stability. First, I briefly trace how this bundle 
was rearticulated in different ways in different moments in U.S. history. Then, I 
provide examples of how the social regularities that constructed individualism and 
requirements for domestic stability were enacted in specific ways in the 1970s. 
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Finally, I explain how these bundles helped constitute some of the policy priorities in 
the Carter era. 
Historical Bundles of the Individual and Domestic Stability  
 The construction of individuality and the construction of the definition of 
domestic stability have always been part of U.S. governance conversations. The 
tension between federalist concerns and democratic ideals was part of the attempt to 
agree on the configuration of this bundle. In the late 18th century, the ability of the 
people to govern themselves was tied to the ways in which the person was socially 
constructed. The wrong construction of the individual, it was feared, would lead to 
anarchy and bloodletting or the consolidation of oligarchic rule through force. 
Individuals had to be constructed as worthy of the capacity of ruling. However, the 
needs of the individual also had to be connected to the desire for domestic stability. 
As we will see, at different times in U.S. history people have used multiple discourses 
and practices to establish what stability is and at the same time to define the 
individual.  
The 1840s: Political Stability and the Individual 
 Many of the elites across the world considered the option of “handing over 
self-government to the masses of diverse, largely uneducated farmers and laborers” 
extremely dangerous (Wuthnow, 2006, p. 29). Achieving stability would require that 
people construct their individuality as tied to the peace of the local community. In 
many places in the United States by the mid-1800s, this had been achieved through 
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practices and discourses that were advocated for by scattered organizations, such as 
Bible societies, revival meetings, and temperance unions. The dominant Protestant 
society worked to consolidate its power by forging the fundamental political 
assumptions around individual conscience and local democracy (Wuthnow, 2006). 
 In this time period of revival camps, traveling preachers such as Charles 
Finney began to mobilize people in the North and growing Midwest (Wuthnow, 
2006). Their knack for mobilization of many different communities around similar 
issues of temperance, parental responsibility, and slavery hinged on the idea “that 
every person was governed individually by an inner sense of morality” (Wuthnow, 
2006, p. 30). Preachers combined the value of the inner self with a sense of 
responsibility to the group through an appeal for people to get involved as citizens. 
According to Wuthnow, this definition assumed “invariably that persons of modest 
means and no schooling could function responsibly as citizens, just as persons of 
higher rank could” (p. 30). The practice of this individual morality was a practice in 
common-sense morality; the individual should take part of his or her opportunities in 
a democratic society in order to establish that the common person was capable of self-
rule.  
 In this way, Wuthnow (2006) stated, “it redefined the moral capabilities of 
individuals in a way that rendered democracy possible on an enlarged scale” (p. 30). 
By linking democratic practices to the construction of the individual with a mortal 
soul whose guide was the Holy Spirit to the people of the time had made the practice 
of local democracy an act of faith and testimony. The stability of society was tied to 
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the practice of Protestant schemas. According to Wuthnow, “This cultural mechanism 
was both public and private, challenging whole communities to think about such 
issues as drinking and slavery, but doing so in a way that encouraged self-
transformative experiences on the part of individuals” (p. 31).  
 These configurations worked to ensure the stability of democracy of future 
generations; however, it is important to remember that this type of democracy was 
naturally local. Also, by foregrounding the common sense of the dominant local 
group, this idea of democracy imposed limits on valid participation, “especially 
through its implicit assumptions about religion, race, gender, and cultural 
homogeneity” (Wuthnow, 2006, p. 31). When the U.S. population became more 
mobile and more integrated, the bundle needed to be reconfigured.  
Keynesian Stability and the Organization Man, 1940s–1960s 
 World War II mobilized the U.S. population “on a larger scale and with 
greater unity of purpose than did anything else in the history of the United States” 
(Wuthnow, 2006, p. 33). The recognition of an interdependent society learned 
through the painful lesson of the Great Depression and the regional integration of the 
WWII mobilization engendered a social ethic that placed importance on the 
individual’s ability to work with the whole. These events asked Americans to 
redevelop their understandings of the individual and what was necessary for domestic 
and international stability.  
 The high stakes of the Great Depression and the war had encouraged a 
construction of the individual that prioritized conformity. In this context, “conformity 
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meant that work was done and social order was maintained. The trains ran on time 
and factories filled their orders” (Wuthnow, 2006, p. 43). Conformity also meant that 
people desired to be joiners. According to Putnam (2000),  
[The] two decades following 1945 witnessed one of the most vital periods of 
community involvement in American history. ... The breadth of this civic 
explosion encompassed virtually every organization on the list, from old 
fashioned ones like the Grange and the Elks (roughly a century old in the 
1960s) to the newer service clubs like the Lions and the League of Women 
Voters (roughly four decades old in the 1960s). (p. 55) 
This generation of people also joined labor unions and professional associations at a 
record rate. Community projects were more frequently attended. In general, in these 
years people took a more active role in the social and political life of their 
communities by joining in together at “churches and union halls, in bowling alleys 
and clubrooms, around committee tables and card tables and dinner tables” (Putnam, 
2000, p. 184). 
 In these environments the individual’s responsibility was to go along with the 
crowd. Common sense at the time held that group action led to more productivity in 
industry and more consensus in politics. The service to the organization gave 
individual life purpose.  
 The formation of the individual in this configuration was tied to a drive for 
domestic and international stability. The drive for stability was characterized by a 
desire to prevent a return to the depression that had threatened the capitalist order. At 
the same time, many wanted to prevent the reemergence of nationalist rivalries that 
had plagued Europe for the first half of the 20th century.  
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 On the international level, “free trade of goods was encouraged under a 
system of fixed exchange rates anchored by the U.S. dollar’s convertibility into gold 
at a fixed price” (Harvey, 2007, p. 10). This approach provided a stabilization 
element in the international economy as the dollar functioned as the reserve currency. 
However, it prevented capital accumulation, because the U.S. dollar under this system 
had to flow freely to other parts of the world that were secured through U.S. military 
might. The individualist pursuit of accumulation of capital that was valued in 
previous forms of U.S. capitalism had to be subsumed to the needs of the nation as 
the government and military worked to maintain overall hegemony worldwide. The 
individual as a joiner and conformer helped to ensure that the nation’s interest was 
put in front of that of the individuals.  
 On a domestic level, stabilization was maintained through supports that would 
dampen the business cycles. This approach was represented by a group of practices 
based on Keynesian economic theory. Under the Keynesian approach, the state’s job 
was to focus on “full employment, economic growth and the welfare of its citizens, 
and that state power should be freely deployed alongside of or, if necessary, 
intervening in or even substituting for market processes to achieve these ends” 
(Harvey, 2007, p. 10). Harvey noted that the development of union participation 
meant “to ensure domestic peace and tranquility, some sort of class compromise 
between capital and labor had to be constructed” (p. 10). Countries such as the United 
States, Sweden, the United Kingdom (UK), and Japan practiced these systems. The 
common sense of the time dictated that as the percentage of the population employed 
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went up, the rate of inflation would go down. This system created a stability that 
allowed for the continued growth of the leading economies and a growth of the 
middle class. The social ethic that constructed the individual with the ultimate need to 
belong allowed for the development of unions and other groups that worked to create 
a balance and maintain social stability.  
 At the time, though, there were critiques of this configuration (Mills, 1958; 
Whyte, 1956). People began to feel alienated when, in their quest for belonging, they 
were continually becoming members of larger more impersonal organizations. Critics 
claimed that this led to a fatalistic view of life. In addition, people were complaining 
that in the name of stability the redefined individuality cut away creativity. The focus 
on the joining of groups disrupted older ideas of meritocracy that legitimated the 
distribution of resources. The new distribution of resources was based on one’s ability 
to make good in the company. Wuthnow (2006) pointed out, “Even good citizenship 
was suspect because it was more likely to be motivated by social climbing than a 
genuine desire to serve” (p. 46)  
The 1970s: Loss of Stability and the Neo-Liberal Reconstruction  
 During the 1970s the sense of stability that had been experienced through the 
1950s and the first half of the 1960s soon gave way to confusion in the domestic and 
international realms. As a result, the social regularities that constituted the individual 
were again transmuted to engender a new formation of stability. The use of neo-
liberal logics and the development of the economic individual became the newest 
ballast for the American system. 
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 Growing instability. Starting in the 1960s U.S. society reinvented again its 
definition of an individual. The individual was again highlighted as the source of 
creativity and innovation. A concept of the inner self was identified as a place to find 
value, no matter how the group judged one’s outside (Wuthnow, 2006, p. 46). This 
individualism renewed an interest in the civil rights of each U.S. resident; it also 
encouraged a challenging of authority and unique artistic expression. This urge was 
cultivated at universities and through youth culture. Students wanted to take 
advantage of the opportunities of a free society and expand this opportunity to others. 
In the late 1960s those seeking individual freedoms and social justice could attack a 
common enemy. Harvey (2007) wrote, 
Powerful corporations in alliance with an interventionist state were seen to be 
running the world in individually oppressive and socially unjust ways. The 
Vietnam War was the most obvious catalyst for discontent, but the destructive 
activities of corporations and the state in relation to the environment, the push 
towards mindless consumerism, the failure to address social issues and 
respond adequately to diversity, as well as intense restrictions on individual 
possibilities and personal behaviors by state-mandated and “traditional” 
controls were also widely resented. (p. 42) 
The pursuit of individual freedom and social justice threatened the power structure 
and the configurations of domestic and international stability. Domestically, urban 
riots irrupted throughout the United States. Internationally, these calls for reform 
created suspicions of communist infiltration of American youth culture from the 
Soviet Union. 
 These domestic instabilities were also quickly followed by major recessions 
that began in 1973. During this time, the Keynesian approach that promised to 
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moderate wide swings in the business cycle through the power of the state failed to 
achieve the goal of economic stability. As investors set their sights on overseas 
manufacturing and capital continued to leave the country, the development of the 
welfare state suffered. Harvey (2007) observed, “Unemployment and inflation were 
both surging everywhere, ushering in a global phase of ‘stagflation’ that lasted 
throughout much of the 1970s. Fiscal crises of various states resulted as tax revenues 
plunged and social expenditures soared” (p. 12). 
 Coinciding with the turmoil in the domestic realm, the international money 
system that had been built on the American dollar—whose value was protected by the 
military—might began to crumble. Oil shocks and the growing distribution of capital 
through international trade put stress on the system of fixed exchange rates. By 1971 
U.S. dollars had flooded the world and escaped U.S. controls by being deposited in 
European banks; the fixed exchange rates were abandoned (Harvey, 2007). Harvey 
noted that the previous system that had delivered high rates of growth since 1945 was 
“clearly exhausted and was no longer working. Some alternative was called for if the 
crisis was to be overcome” (p. 12).  
 The individual’s search for stability. As described in chapter 4, faced with 
growing instability and the slow pace of change, many of those who in the 1950s and 
1960s had sought both personal freedom and social justice became weary of the 
turmoil that resulted from engaging the public and instead decided to focus on 
personal fulfillment. As many of the youth movement of the 1960s moved into 
companies and the government, they began to sense that the common-enemy, 
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defense-industrial complex was no longer as monolithic. By the definition of the time, 
the pursuit of “social justice presupposes social solidarities and willingness to 
submerge individual wants, needs, and desires in the cause of some general struggle 
for, say, social equality or environmental justice” (Harvey, 2007, p. 41). This 
discrepancy created tension between organized labor or the political parties espousing 
social solidarities and the student movement for exploration of the self, identity, and 
sexuality.  
 By the 1970s many began to withdraw from the solidarity movements; 
however, the pursuit of individual fulfillment spread. There was a growing interest in 
religion, especially religions that could ground people through an individual’s 
personal relationship with a larger transcendent force. There was experimentation in 
all areas of religious life, from “New Right Christians to New Age seekers, students 
of the Book of Revelation and the Torah, the Bhagavad-Gita and the I Ching” 
(Schulman, 2001, p. 92).  
 This search for a new inner self was partly based on a fear of an international 
instability that would lead to nuclear war. According to Schulman (2001), “The single 
best-selling nonfiction book of the 1970s was not The Joy of Sex or even The Joy of 
Cooking, but Hal Lindsey’s apocalyptic pronouncement, The Late Great Planet 
Earth” (p. 93). Lindsey’s book recast the book of revelations in terms of the global 
politics on the nuclear age.  
 People also sought other ways to transcend the dominant construction of the 
individual that had been enacted following World War II. The new age or personal 
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awareness movement represented the development of multiple strategies to find 
stability by looking inward. A single example of this new age movement was known 
as the Erhard Seminars Training (EST). The training session was meant to eliminate 
the social construction of the individual and reconstruct one’s personhood along lines 
of personal enlightenment. In other words, EST would force you to “throw away your 
belief system, tear yourself down, and put yourself back together again” (Schulman, 
2001, p. 97).  
 The entrepreneurial aspect of both the new age movement and the evangelical 
revivals, while off-putting to some, were integrated into gospels they preached. The 
message worked especially for a majority of Americans who began to flood the ever-
growing churches, such as the one led by Jerry Falwell. These churches filled their 
halls “with middle-class professionals and educated suburbanites, attracted to the 
recipe for wholesome living, biblical devotion, and worldly success” (Schulman, 
2001, p. 96).  
 However, this search for inner peace did not translate into economic security 
for all. The growing inflation and unemployment and the inability of past Keynesian 
strategies to deal with these problems spurred an outcry for new approaches to the 
development of stability. The proper solution at the time was not clear. Harvey (2007) 
mentioned, “I think it is fair to say, no one really knew or understood with any 
certainty what kind of answers would work and how” (p. 13). The obscure approach 
of neo-liberalism would become the answer.  
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 The neo-liberal reconfiguration. Just prior to being elevated to the Supreme 
Court by Nixon, Lewis Powell (1971) sent a memo entitled “Attack on the American 
Free Enterprise System” to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Powell argued that the 
stability of the capitalist system was under siege and, therefore, “the time has come—
indeed, it is long overdue—for the wisdom, ingenuity and resources of American 
business to be marshaled against those who would destroy it” (The Apathy and 
Default of Business section). Such a mobilization of resources could work through 
universities, schools, the media, publishing, and the courts in order to change how 
individuals thought about the corporation, the law, culture, and the individual. 
 The answer to this challenge of the American enterprise system was a 
philosophy that worked to legitimate capital accumulation as a national priority. Neo-
liberalism, a theory of political economy, filled this role. Harvey (2007) described the 
theory: “Human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized 
by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade” (p. 2). The role of the 
group was to create and preserve an institutional framework that could accumulate 
capital at the top so investors could fund entrepreneurial enterprises. The individual’s 
role was to pursue self-interest and in doing so be the engine of the market. The 
market would become the sole means of distribution because, it was postulated, “the 
state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals 
(prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state 
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interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit” (Harvey, 2007, p. 
2). 
 Neo-liberalism had been slowly developed by Austrian philosopher Friedrich 
von Hayek and a group called the Mont Pelerin Society (n.d.). The group first met in 
1947 at the Spa at Mont Pelerin and developed a purpose statement. In this statement 
they argued that the use of political coalitions to encourage redistribution had hurt 
“Western Society.” The Mont Pelerin Society wrote that in communist countries 
human dignity and freedom were obliterated and in other countries such as the United 
States and the UK these ideals were under “constant menace from the development of 
current tendencies of policy” (¶ 2). According to the group, the biggest threat to these 
ideals was from minority groups who had wrested power through political means. 
The Mont Pelerin Society wrote, 
Even that most precious possession of Western Man, freedom of thought and 
expression, is threatened by the spread of creeds which, claiming the privilege 
of tolerance when in the position of a minority, seek only to establish a 
position of power in which they can suppress and obliterate all views but their 
own. (¶ 2)  
Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, economists such as Milton Friedman and 
government officials such as William Simon also expressed this form of 
individualism and its push towards stability through capital accumulation through 
their academic and policy work.  
 According to neo-liberal theories, individuals should take advantage of their 
opportunities in order to pursue their own goals in the marketplace. According to this 
theory, the invisible hand of the market provides the fairest distribution of rewards for 
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individuals. The only responsibility that the individual has to the group is to get 
involved in the market. The state’s responsibility is the securing of the competitive 
market. Policies that focus on the well-being of people are reframed in terms of 
human capital development. For example, in education policy the goal is no longer to 
be a capable citizen but part of a well-educated population of workers. This leads to a 
more competitive labor market and thus a sorting up of the best of the best. This 
reconstruction of the individual as essentially an economic animal resonated well 
with those who sought stability through a focus on the self. All that was required for 
communion with a stabilizing force, the invisible hand, was an aggressive pursuit of 
one’s economic interests.  
 The neo-liberal practice. In the 1970s the neo-liberal bundling of the 
economic individual and the stabilization of the capitalist state became an important 
force in the practice of politics. This can be seen in the rhetoric of Margaret Thatcher 
in the UK. It also can be seen in the economic crisis in New York City in the late 
1970s. 
 In 1978 in the UK Margaret Thatcher laid out neo-liberal arguments as her 
country dealt with growing unemployment and rising inflation. Thatcher endorsed a 
strong move to free up capital by reducing the influence of groups. Harvey (2007) 
wrote,  
This entailed confronting trade union power, attacking all forms of social 
solidarity that hindered competitive flexibility (such as those expressed 
through municipal governance and including the power of many professionals 
and their associations), dismantling or rolling back the commitments of the 
welfare state... reducing taxes, encouraging entrepreneurial initiative. (p. 23)  
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Doing so advocated for the removal of the groups that had once helped define the 
individual. By eliminating the group, Thatcher attempted to liberate a new 
construction of the individual. There was, according to Thatcher, “no such thing as 
society, only individual men and women” (as quoted in D. Harris, 2007, p. 23). D. 
Harris (2007) explained, “All forms of social solidarity were to be dissolved in favor 
of individualism, private property, personal responsibility, and family values” (p. 23).  
 Back across the Atlantic, this rhetoric was translated into practice in New 
York City. The runaway inflation and the growing unemployment along with 
deindustrialization had left many disoriented and struggling to make ends meet. 
During the fiscal crisis of New York City in the mid-1970s, common sense was 
reshaped along neo-liberal lines.  
 A confluence of capitalist restructuring, rapid suburbanization, growing racial 
isolation, and a shrinking job market had left cities with increasing crime and an 
eroding tax base. During the 1960s, the solution to this problem was expansion of 
federal subsidies and increased job creation through public works. However, these 
approaches failed to produce the any lasting revenue for the city. In the 1970s the 
Nixon Administration cut federal funds to cities. At the same time the recession cut 
into the tax revenue, while outlays for city services continued to grow. In New York 
City, in 1975, investment bankers refused to cover city debt, and the city had to enter 
bankruptcy. The city had to turn over budget management to a group whose charge 
was to get the bondholders their money back. Only after the money lenders were paid 
did the city fund services such as police, garbage collection and public transit. While 
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in the UK Thatcher had spoken out against unions, in New York City it became 
common sense, that for the sake of everyone, the political demands of the municipal 
unions would be ignored. Wage freezes were implemented, social services were cut, 
and user fees at the city college were implemented in order to make sure capital 
flowed back to the investors at the top. Eventually, the unions were told that union 
members had to invest their pensions in city bonds that went to payback investors 
(Harvey, 2007).  
 Stability came at a price. The New York City bailout redistributed income to 
the top and “established the principle that in the event of a conflict between the 
integrity of financial institutions and bond holders’ returns on the one hand and the 
well-being of the citizens on the other, the former was to be privileged” (Harvey, 
2007, p. 48). The democratically elected government was responsible first to the 
banks and second to the citizens. People were faced with a new common sense: Either 
save the city and work toward the health of the financial institutions or contribute to a 
destabilized city in a continued downward spiral.  
 This choice was generalized to the domestic and international money issues 
that were seen as related to the lack of capital accumulation. Economic stability was 
tied to the ability of those at the top to accumulate capital rather than, as in the past, 
group balance. This definition of stability was combined with a redeveloped idea of 
the individual as an economic animal whose purpose was the pursuit of self-interest. 
This resonated well with the growing individualism that had characterized the 1970s.  
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The Partial Construction of the Mood 
 The general malaise of the era, then, was partially constructed by a 
redevelopment of the categories of the individual and domestic stability. The focus on 
the self that had been growing throughout the decade resonated with the call for the 
economic self that could anchor the economy through the growing accumulation of 
capital. The neo-liberal bundling, with its foundational emphasis upon individual 
freedoms, had “the power to split off libertarianism, identity politics multi-
culturalism, and eventually narcissistic consumerism” from group politics that had 
developed the civil rights movement, labor, and women’s movement (Harvey, 2007, 
p. 41). Thus, there was a mixed feeling: Although the drive toward social justice was 
important, there was also a growing assumption that the group politics required for 
the movement would lead to either an obliteration of the individual or a monopoly of 
power through interest groups. People began to associate interest groups with a 
destabilized economy. The new common sense developing in the late 1970s dictated 
that to maintain domestic stability, the individual must be understood in an 
entrepreneurial sense. The national mood then was a mixture of people’s 
dissatisfaction with past constructions of the individual that had privileged 
conformity; anger that their expectations of stability could not be met; and suspicion 
that past social affiliations, such as unions, religion, or social clubs, stood in the way 
of social well-being.  
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How Was This Bundle Enacted Through Carter’s Actions? 
 President Carter did not profess neo-liberalism. However, his administration 
did attempt to redevelop the national priorities that would acknowledge people’s 
anger toward the corruption in government, bewilderment in the future of the 
economy, and lack of faith in governmental solutions. In doing so, he prioritized 
policy solutions that achieved balanced budgets through business logics, redeveloped 
inner cities through private–public partnerships, and eventually espoused fiscal 
solutions that encouraged the accumulation of capital.  
 The confusion Carter’s centrism created exemplified the degree to which the 
Keynesian approach to stability had been discounted. By 1976 the development of a 
welfare state was seen as diametrically opposed to a stable government and economy. 
For example, on July 11, 1976, the eve of the Democratic National Convention in 
New York City, Carter appeared on the NBC radio and television programs, “Meet 
the Press.” Lawrence Spivak, in his bow tie and glasses, asked, “Governor, I hope I 
quote you accurately on this. You have said you are a conservative on spending but a 
liberal on human welfare. Is that correct?” (Carter, 1978a, p. 298). Carter responded, 
“Human rights, civil rights, yes, sir” (Carter, 1978a, p. 298). Spivak followed up, 
Now I am not quite clear as to just what that means. How can you be liberal 
on human welfare, which requires the expenditure usually of a great deal of 
money, and conservative of spending? How are you going to reconcile the 
two? (as quoted in Carter, 1978a, p. 298) 
 
193 
In his answer Carter argued that he would approach the federal government much like 
he approached the state government in Georgia. He told viewers that he had used 
business approaches to drive government spending:  
We invested state funds on a competitive bid bias, and I think I ran the 
Georgia government as well as almost any corporate structure in this country 
is run, in personal management, transportation, electronic processing and so 
forth. At the same time, I think the best investment our nation can make of its 
resources is in human beings and not in buildings, not in construction. I think 
that when we spend money on better health care for our people, a better 
education for our people, that that is a legitimate and a very good investment 
for the future. (Carter, 1978a, p. 298) 
Carter went on to explain how the priorities were dependent on each other: “I don’t 
believe that you can meet human needs or root out injustice or give people a quality 
of life with out a well-managed government with the waste eliminated” (Carter, 
1978a, p. 298). In his campaign Carter articulated a domestic stability that was 
established through spending logics that were rooted in market institutions.  
 Once in office, the goal of bringing economic stability became the prime 
objective. In August 1978, after attempts to control inflation through Keynesian 
approaches such job development, Jerry Rafshoon, Carter’s communications advisor, 
sent Carter a memo that argued, “It is impossible to overestimate the importance of 
the inflation issue to your presidency” (as quoted in Schulman, 1998, p. 58). 
Rafshoon reminded Carter that inflation “affects every American in a very palpable 
way. It causes insecurity and anxiety. ... It would be difficult to err on the side of too 
tough a program” (as quoted in Schulman, 1998, p. 59). The following summer Carter 
would appoint Paul Volcker to head the Federal Reserve. Volker believed that a 
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stable economy depended on a promise of capital accumulation. Once in office, 
Volcker “immediately prescribed bitter medicine,” and by slowing the money supply 
though the Federal Reserve banks, interest rates soared to 15%, “the dollar stabilized, 
and the economy stalled” (Schulman, 1998, p. 61).  
 Throughout his presidency, Carter had argued that the power of the 
government should be limited. In many proposals he argued for a private–public 
partnership and a reduction of government structuring of the market through 
deregulation (Carter, 1978b). Individual investment and competition in the market 
was the proper medicine for the nation’s economic woes (Schulman, 1998). The 
individual as an economic engine rather than a citizen would lead to greater general 
welfare. The naturalization of the failure of past configurations to create stability was 
fully acknowledged by 1978. In the economic report of that year, the Carter 
Administration stated, “Government cannot eliminate poverty or provide a bountiful 
economy or reduce inflation or save our cities or cure illiteracy or provide energy” (as 
quoted in Schulman, 1998, p. 66).  
 The mood of the era that was said to be so important to Carter’s success was 
partially constructed out of the social regularities that bundled individualism to 
economic stability. Carter’s attempt to acknowledge the feelings of people who 
craved stability led him to advocate for policies and approaches that would valorize 
the market and disparage interest-group politics. While Carter did not completely 
embrace neo-liberal arguments, his necessary attempts to acknowledge the mood that 




 A purpose of this study was to investigate the ways in which people explained 
the relationship between antipoverty and education policy during the Carter 
Administration. In this chapter I have explained a few of the many scattered practices 
and discourses or social regularities that allowed the performance of knowledge or 
common sense of the late 1970s. In doing so I have offered an interpretation of how 
certain explanations and practices around education and antipoverty policy became 
intelligible, valorized, or deemed as natural, while others became discounted, 
impossible, or unimaginable (Britzman, 2003). Specifically, I have argued that a 
deeper investigation of the national mood of the late 1970s can provide an important 
understanding of how people could construct their explanations at the time.  
 I have defined the national mood as combination of the practices and 
discourses through which people constructed the common sense of the age and their 
satisfaction with these dominant categories. Their emotions were engendered by their 
sense of the discrepancy between what should be and what they experienced. In the 
late 1970s this mood was partially constructed out of the enactment of the social 
regularities of race, property, individualism, and domestic stability. 
 As Carter came to office a common sense circulated that, because the property 
right that had been invested in Whiteness could not be undone, the only recourse was 
an investment in other identities. During this time, the integration ideals that had 
motivated the civil rights movements and the redistributive elements of the Great 
Society programs became suspect, as colorblindness was co-opted to hide White 
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privilege. At the same time, it also became common sense that a new definition of the 
individual was required in order to maintain domestic stability. Neo-liberal arguments 
that economic stability required capital accumulation and robust entrepreneurship 
were the keys to a stable economy took hold. This focus on the individual as an 
entrepreneur resonated with the desire of many individuals to find stability through a 
personal relationship with a larger transcendent force. Promise of stability, through 
the market’s invisible hand, was contrasted with the inflation and unemployment that 
supposedly had resulted from interest groups’ interference in the market.  
 The discrepancy between the ideals of past generations and the new growing 
common sense created a mixed bag of emotions. As described above, the national 
mood was partially constructed out of the dismay of the realization that the equal 
protection under the law did not translate into an equitable society, ambivalence 
towards the necessity or possibility of redistribution, and surety that the only recourse 
was investment in identity. At the same time, people felt dissatisfied with past 
constructions of the individual that had privileged conformity; were angered that their 
expectations of stability could not be met; and suspected that past social affiliations, 
such as unions, religion, or social clubs, stood in the way of social well-being. These 
rationalities and emotions of the time generated a sense of what was possible and 
valuable.  
 This dispersion of common sense and emotions—and, thus, the possible—
were not the result of deep cultural or economic structures; they resulted from 
historically contingent intersections of bundles of social regularities that were enacted 
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through many practices and discourses throughout the 1970s. The historical treatment 
of these bundles showed that at every moment in history the categories that enact our 
common sense can be “repeated, known, forgotten, transformed, utterly erased or 
hidden” (Foucault, 1972, p. 25). 
 In this chapter I also illustrated that these constructions of the possible are not 
the result of a single consciousness. The identity or personhood of the people of the 
late 1970s was produced in interactions with their coworkers, schoolmates, families, 
lovers, lawyers, spouses, caseworkers, politicians, and bankers. In these interactions, 
people as “historical actors are also narrators, and vice versa” (Trouillot, 1995, p. 23). 
I have avoided describing people only as structural agents and local actors who are 
part of material social processes. At the same time, I have avoided conflating the 
historical process and historical narrative, assuming that myth is all we have. Instead, 
I have embraced the ambiguity of the personhood and recognized that while people 
enact agenthoods, actorhoods, and subjecthoods, these are coconstructions with the 
context of the historical moment.  
 Thus, in looking at the late 1970s, I have tried to grasp the ways in which the 
social regularities of the time irrupted and appeared and so arranged the dominant 
way of defining social problems (i.e., group politics as an unnecessary way of life), 
and revealed a target that was in need of a solution (i.e., the divesting of interest-
group power). The intersections and bundles of social regularities thus constituted the 
epistemological and ontological of the moment; they constituted both who the 
problem group was and how the group was seen or known as the problem (Scheurich, 
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1997). Carter’s attempt to resonate with the common sense of the time brought into 
relief the irruptions of these reconfigurations the dominant social regularities. 
 In 1976, Carter claimed that more than any other candidate he was in touch 
with this changing mood. He claimed only he could offer a new discourse that would 
acknowledge and address the feelings of dismay, dissatisfaction, anger, and suspicion. 
He also would put forward new national goals that would animate the certitudes that 
were crystallizing around the power of the individual and their power over their own 
identity. In doing so, he was validating a common sense that was developing within a 
growing coalition of voters who claimed that they were focused not on group interests 
but on the interests of the individual. This group had a vested interest in the 
maintenance of the power structures.  
 Historians have noted that Carter defined the common man in a different way 
than past Democrats (Gillon, 1992; Luechtenburg, 1998). To Carter the common man 
was “rural, Protestant, politically independent, financially secure, and fiscally 
conservative,” whereas other Democrats such as Mondale had pictured the common 
man as a “struggling, urban, blue collar, union member concerned about a secure job, 
decent wages, and education for his children” (Leuchtenburg, 1998, p. 16). Carter’s 
attempt to build a coalition may have stemmed from a desire to enact social 
regularities that resonated with his understanding of the common man.  
 Specifically, it appears Carter wanted to build a coalition of people who were 
interested in the ideals of human rights yet were suspicious of interest-group 
demands. He wanted to animate people who were committed to the development of 
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the individual yet shunned past policy approaches that relied on redistribution. The 
explanations of the relationships between education and antipoverty policy would be 
made on a frequency that resonated with the common sense of these people. In doing 
so, Great Society priorities and domestic policy configurations would be replaced 
with a set of priorities that focused on the development of the individual and the 
devaluing of group solidarities. Now that I have situated the Carter era among the 
social regularities of the time, the next chapter specifically addresses how the 
administration enacted these regularities to explain the relationship between 
education and antipoverty policy.  
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CHAPTER 6: HOW PEOPLE EXPLAINED THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN EDUCATION AND ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 
 
 The purpose of this study was to investigate the ways in which people 
explained the relationship between antipoverty and education policy during the Carter 
Administration. This study offers a critical interpretation of how some policy 
approaches became valorized while others were dropped or erased in the late 20th 
century. Specifically, I highlight the ways in which the Great Society priorities and 
domestic policy configurations, which linked poverty and education, were let go, 
superseded, or forgotten. This allows me to historicize our current policy debates 
around the connections between education and antipoverty policy.  
 In this project, I have asserted that the exercise of power is productive; it is 
not simply negative political responses to the welfare policy or federal interventions 
that led to the demise of the Great Society policy approach (Berry et al., 1996; 
Foucault, 1980). It was also the multiple reconstructions of human needs and national 
priorities that occurred during the Carter Administration that contributed to the 
erasure of a domestic program that explicitly linked education and antipoverty policy 
(Fraser, 1989). These redefinitions reflected shifts in the enactment of the social 
regularities around race, property, individualism, and domestic stability.  
 For the sake of clarity, I briefly review what I mean when I say that education 
and antipoverty policy were explicitly linked. During the 1960s, the federal role in 
education expanded most notably in the passage of the ESEA (1965) and the Higher 
Education Act. These policies and others were passed as part of domestic policy 
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aimed at improving social welfare. The rhetoric in the War on Poverty and the Great 
Society agendas offered national leadership in a fight against poverty and its effects. 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the drive for improved social welfare was carried out 
through “programs with four overlapping purposes: to promote opportunities, 
stimulate community action, introduce new services, and expand transfer payments” 
(Katz, 1996, p. 266, emphasis in original).  
 Education programs, such as Title I funding, Operation Head Start, and 
Upward Bound were just some of many policy levers that were legislated to meet 
these four purposes. Congress passed these education policies in concert with other 
programs, such as increases in Aid to Families and Dependent Children, 
unemployment and job training services, and health care programs such as Medicaid 
and Medicare. Community action programs were also developed and administered by 
the Office of Economic Opportunity, in theory, to form “a broad, inclusive, 
multipurpose agency to coordinate” the social welfare activity (Katz, 1996, p. 268).  
 Although the education policies during this time represented a large expansion 
of the federal government’s involvement in education, their inclusion in the Great 
Society followed the traditional federal pattern. E. Ginzberg and Solow (1974) 
pointed out, “Over the years, the federal government had made funds available to 
accomplish high priority national education objectives. Hence it was a logical next 
step for it to help raise the education achievement of children from low-income 
families” (p. 219). This national priority in education was linked directly with the 
national priority of eliminating abject poverty in the wealthiest country that had ever 
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existed on the face of the earth. The Great Society policy configuration posited 
education policy as an equal partner with other welfare and health programs in the 
fight against poverty.  
 I believe it is important here to point out that the possibilities for coordination 
mainly existed in the rhetoric of the national leadership (E. Emerson, personal 
communication, October 31, 2007). That is, the legislation, administration, and 
implementation of the policies provided less attention to the coordination of 
programs. The committees that passed the legislation held each program accountable. 
In the administration, the audit culture that was developing led to the fracturing of 
tasks across bureaucracies. Moreover, implementation at the local level was subject to 
the fiefdom politics of the local city, school district, and state districts. Thus, the 
community action programs that were supposed to coordinate these programs at the 
local level often had neither the clout nor the will to integrate into the local power 
structures, whose leaders perceived the programs as a threat (B. C. Jordan & Rostow, 
1986).  
 At the time, despite these difficulties in coordination, many believed that a 
multifront War on Poverty was still an important priority. Although they could not 
point to changes in the poverty rate, because most of the programs attacked poverty 
with in-kind assistance (food stamps, health care, and education benefits), supporters 
argued that overall the project was worthy. In 1974, E. Ginzberg and Solow argued 
that despite the mixed immediate results, they could not “argue that poverty [was] not 
a subject worthy of national concern and federal intervention; that many components 
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of the specific legislation ... were sensible first efforts” (p. 219). E. Ginzberg and 
Solow also showed that between 1964 and 1974, “the Black population made striking 
gains in occupational status and in income, in political participation and as office 
holders” (p. 220). E. Ginzberg and Solow asserted that what was important was that 
the country stick with goals of coordinating programs to actively remove barriers to 
opportunity and learn to approach the problem in a smarter way.  
 My study centers on how the Great Society goals and priorities were devalued 
and how other approaches replaced it. A focus on the Carter era can help us grasp 
how the wisdom of the past approach started to become suspect. As shown in chapter 
5, in the late 1970s it started to become common sense that Great Society programs 
should be judged a failure. Many on the left and right pointed to the ways in which 
the promises of the Johnson era were grandiose and impossible to keep, as evidenced 
by the lack of change in the poverty rate. In addition to this lack of change, federal 
involvement in local affairs increased. An editorial in the Providence Journal-
Bulletin on March 30, 1978, commented, 
The lavishing of tens of billions of federal dollars under earlier Great Society 
programs did not cure the cities’ ills but worsened them. Washington was too 
far removed to maintain control over urban renewal efforts; runaway 
programs destroyed more than they built. And massive corruption followed 
massive waste. (“Urban Policy for all Americans,” p. A8)  
Many of the arguments against the programs focused on inefficiency and promises 
that were impossible to keep through government action. 
 Throughout the 1970s, the Carter team paid careful attention to these 
criticisms and evaluations and attempted to chart a new, central course that would 
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lead to a more positive understanding of the efficacy of government. From Carter’s 
perspective, the right course would be charted through the goals of having a 
government that was ethical and efficient (Carter, 1976). Throughout the campaign, 
Carter touted his reorganization of Georgia’s government. For example, at Johns 
Hopkins University on April 2, 1975, he told the crowd, “We had 300 departments 
and agencies in our Georgia government. We abolished 278 of them, and we did that 
over the opposition of entrenched selfish interest groups who thrived on confusion” 
(as cited in Carter, 1976, p. 42). He argued that if the nation could streamline the 
federal government in a similar fashion, we could address the fact that there was “no 
long-range planning techniques as an integral part of our society” (Carter, 1976, p. 
45). Instead of confusion, he wanted comprehensive policy solutions that were 
rational and could be related to our long-range plans.  
 Once in office, he struggled to practice this approach. However, his focus on 
the rational planning and comprehensive policy approaches often outweighed his 
development of national long-range goals. In an editorial in the Washington Post, 
March 28, 1978, a commentator reacted to Carter’s approach to governing: 
There is something vaguely mosaic about the delivery of these Carter 
administration policies: energy, welfare, economic, and (now) urban. Tablets 
are what we get, produced at long last and borne down the mountainside by 
the leader, who has been consulting in the misty reaches of some other realm 
... while the waiting multitude wonder what was going on. Mr. Carter likes to 
get ideas and intentions and imperatives put in writing. He likes to gather the 
relevant policies in one place. He likes to see the thing whole 
(“comprehensive”)—or to try to, anyway. (“What’s in an Urban Policy,” 
1978, p. A16) 
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This emphasis on the rational delivery of appropriate services through the isolation of 
an issue had a large effect on how Carter rearticulated the goals and policy 
configurations of the Great Society. His recasting of the government and the domestic 
policy was a productive force that would valorize new discourses and sedate past 
approaches; in doing so, Carter would encourage the erasure of the links between 
education and social policy. 
Purpose of Chapter 
 In order to understand the way the Carter Administration policy and politics 
produced a new order in greater detail and to help us understand today’s policy 
debates, I have asked the question: How did people during the Carter Administration 
explain the relationship between education and antipoverty policy? The people I have 
looked to for these explanations were primarily the policy elites during Carter’s 
administration and commentators from the press. In answering this question, I was 
not seeking a single explanatory statement uttered by these people. Instead, I was 
looking for the ways in which the policies were presented during two policy events: 
the creation of the Department of Education and the creation of the President’s 
comprehensive urban policy. As these events unfolded, I looked for the ways in 
which they were ranked as national priorities, the ways in which they were separated, 
the ways in which one was made dependent of the other, or the ways in which they 




 I begin by tracing the legislative struggle to create the Department of 
Education. This policy event included new descriptions of the purpose of education 
policy and the importance of its administration through a separate department. There 
also was an argument about what should count as education policy. My analysis of 
these discussions revealed three findings: (a) During the Carter Administration, there 
was a push to symbolically separate education policy from its previous links to 
antipoverty goals and priorities; (b) the national priority for education policy no 
longer focused on the provision of categorical aid to serve other national interests, 
and instead the focus became the improvement of education in general; and (c) this 
shift in educational policy was constituted by and appealed to a significantly different 
voting coalition. All of these factors worked in concert and made each other possible. 
They were partially constructed by an intersection of bundles of dominant social 
regularities; and thus they were infused with common-sense logic.  
 The second place I observed an explanation of the relationship between 
education and antipoverty policies was in the framing of Carter administration’s 
urban policy. Thus, in the second section of this chapter I investigate how the Carter 
Administration dealt with many of the issues that the Great Society programs were 
designed to address. My analysis of this event shows that the administration worked 
hard to distance their ideas from Great Society programs. In this new approach 
schools were only superficially addressed; thus, the link between education and 
antipoverty policy was further weakened.  
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The Creation of the Department of Education: A New Symbol 
 Many authors have claimed that the creation of the Department of Education 
was immediately inconsequential or lacked substance as a policy shift (C. Cross, 
2004; G. Davies, 2007; Manna, 2006); I disagree. Although I agree with most authors 
that it was a symbolic and thus a political move, I believe that such a move was 
crucial in the reterritorialization of education policy, specifically in its reference to 
antipoverty policy.  
 In this section, I discuss how the choices of symbols and the ways the political 
moves in the drive to create the Department of Education offered a new articulation 
of the relationship between education and antipoverty policy. First, I contend that in 
the arguments for the Department of Education we find an emphasis on the ways in 
which the new department could elevate the general improvement of education as a 
national priority. As we will see, it was argued that if education could be elevated as a 
national priority, the federal government would be positioned to assist in the 
improvement of the quality of basic education in general. Subsequently, it was argued 
that linkages to health and welfare often circumvented the federal government’s 
abilities to provide this leadership and therefore education policy must be distanced 
from welfare and health policy.  
 Second, I argue that the political moves needed to create the Department of 
Education aligned the Carter Administration with coalitions that were enacting the 
dominant social regularities of the time. This coalition building around the dominant 
discourses and practices of the time offer us insight into the ways in which the Carter 
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Administration explained the relationship between the policies. The courting of the 
National Education Association (NEA) and other organizations was an attempt to 
cobble together a new coalition of voters, voters who were not necessarily supportive 
of past New Deal or Great Society initiatives. In the struggle for electoral survival, 
the Carter Administration, through choice of issues and theory of governance, enacted 
discourses that focused on self-development and the building of human capital. 
 I explore how the administration was rearticulating the relationship between 
education and antipoverty policy by tracing the development of the drive to create the 
Department of Education, from the campaign in 1976 through the eventual passage of 
the legislation in the fall of 1979. This narrative is not an exhaustive description of 
the legislative battle; instead, I point to important areas in this legislative initiative 
through which we can grasp the ways the administration discussed the relationship.  
1976–1977: Needs Definition  
 One of the most consistent issues in Carter’s campaign was the importance of 
improving education. Many emphasize the importance of the promises he made to 
teachers, specifically the NEA, in his win of the Democratic nomination and later the 
general election (C. Cross, 2004; Davies, 2007; Hargrove, 1988). The courting of this 
constituency and a commitment to the issue continued into the 1st year. An 
examination of these early years shows important shifts in relationship between 
education and antipoverty policy. These shifts were due in large part to the continued 
emphasis on making the improvement of education a national priority in and of itself. 
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Carter’s continued focus on education as an end of itself resulted in education policy 
no longer being dependent on antipoverty priorities.  
Remove the Red Tape and Improve Education in General 
  Once he was president elect, Carter asked that that a compilation of campaign 
promises be prepared. A copy was issued in the White House on February 17, 1977 
(White House Staff, 1977). Under the education subheading were multiple promises: 
Carter promised to increase the federal funding level to 10% of the total local budget; 
he also promised that poorest districts would receive an increase in federal monies. 
However, the bulk of his promises in education focused on his goal to establish a 
comprehensive education program. This is a departure from the previous categorical 
approach.  
 For example, under the subheading, “Administration,” there were promises to 
focus on the improvement of federal education policy in order to release schools from 
being inundated with paperwork (White House Staff, 1977). These promises mostly 
come from an NEA interview that took place on June 19, 1976. In that interview, 
Carter promised work to reduce “drastically the number of categorical aid programs, 
in order to reduce administrative work” (White House Staff, 1977, p. 259). He argued 
that that the “only category that [he] would like to maintain is to insure that the 
federal monies that are spent for the kinds of children who need help most” (Carter, 
1978a, p. 259).  
 In addition, Carter asserted that education, in and of itself, should become a 
national priority. Carter stated, “I think the public is ready for a clear expression from 
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the national viewpoint about what we should do for education in this country. It’s 
something that’s been relegated to a secondary position in the past” (Carter, 1978a, p. 
260).  
 Once in office, the Carter Administration continued to construct the education 
issue as one of general support rather than of strategic categorical aid, especially 
when arguing for the creation of the Department of Education. On July 5, 1977, Vice 
President Mondale spoke to the NEA during the annual convention in his home state 
of Minnesota. Noting the importance of the creation of the Department of Education, 
Mondale (1977) told the audience, 
We’re committed to broad reform of our federal education effort, and we’re 
hard at work on that now. Right now 120 separate programs under the office 
of Education exist in that department alone. And that just doesn’t make sense. 
It’s estimated that more than a million and a quarter hours are spent every year 
just completing forms for the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. That 
can’t be right. Red tape and paperwork never educated a single child. We 
don’t reform just to make neater boxes on an organizational chart. We want to 
help you do your job. (p. 6)  
The duplication of forms and processes required by the categorical programs was 
definitely notorious at the time, and Mondale was committing to reducing it. 
However, he was also reframing federal education policy, one that would focus on the 
improvement of education in general. 
 In the same speech, Mondale (1977) noted that the NEA’s political power was 
on the rise. He stated that more than 80% of the candidates the NEA endorsed for 
Congress the previous year had been elected. Mondale added that the Carter 
Administration was committed to a “major new outreach effort to involve teachers in 
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our decisions in education policy” (p. 2). He asked the crowd for help on other issues, 
such as the Panama Canal, energy policy, fiscal conservativeness, election day 
registration, consumer protection, heath care costs, worldwide human rights, Social 
Security reform, and honest government. The administration was also engaged in an 
attempt to develop a new urban policy and in reforming welfare; however, neither of 
these agenda items was noted to the group.  
Education Issue Becomes Generalized in the Press 
 Besides the campaign speeches of 1976 and the coalition building of the early 
administration, there were other areas in which the issue of education was generalized 
and separated from antipoverty issues. In August 1977 a high-profile report was 
released by the Educational Testing Service. The report described the conclusions of 
a 2-year study headed by former Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz (who served 
during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations), in which researchers tried to 
explain a steady, 14-year drop in average scores on the SAT (Peterson, 1977). Major 
newspapers picked up the report.  
 On August 24, 1977,  Peterson described the Educational Testing Service 
report in the Washington Post. On that summer day readers found out that three 
fourths of the decline in SAT scores between 1963 and 1970 was the result of a 
greater number of test takers, many of whom were not given the same educational 
advantages. Peterson explained, “Since 1970, however, the composition has remained 
stable, and the continuing decline into 1977 results from a change in social attitudes, 
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relaxed learning standards, television, high divorce rates, and unprecedented 
turbulence in the nation’s affairs” (p. A1).  
 This report and the newspaper articles that accompanied it in 1977 helped 
generalize the education issue. There was a growing discourse that the schools could 
not be trusted to guarantee the suitable education of any of the students, 
disadvantaged or not. According to Peterson (1976), the report had indicated that “An 
‘A’ or ‘B’ means a good deal less that it used to. Promotion from one grade to another 
has become almost automatic. Homework has apparently been cut about in half” (p. 
A1). In an editorial the following day in the Washington Post (“The Test Scores,” 
1976), the commentator also speculated that increasing amounts of elective courses, 
such as Science Fiction and Radio/Television/Film, were replacing Basic English 
classes. He concluded his discussion with his own assessment:  
The purpose of education is not merely to pass tests. But this particular set of 
tests is a broad and accurate gauge of students’ academic competence. That 
competence is a substantial part of the national wealth, and a persistent drop 
from year to year is not a thing to be tolerated. (“The Test Scores,” 1976)  
In this commentary we see the broadening of the issue to a national scale. Here the 
commentator has related education policy to fiscal policy and economic stability. 
General education quality was becoming an important national issue.  
Generalizing the Educational Issue in the Argument for the Department of Education 
 The “need” of bail-out education in general began to irrupt in 1977. It became 
the bedrock for the argument to create the Department of Education. In October 1977, 
the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee conducted hearings on the possible 
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creation of the Department of Education. In his opening statement, Senator Abe 
Ribicoff, a long time supporter of the creation of the Department of Education, noted 
that this concern with national leadership in education was a bipartisan effort and thus 
a national priority. Mostly he was correct; some important Republicans, such as Alan 
Quie, were interested in elevating the importance of national education policy (C. 
Cross, personal communication, October 8, 2007).  
  Ribicoff (1977) argued that the schools in the late 1970s were caught in a 
financial crunch of declining enrollments and rising school costs. He observed that 
this coincided with the general decline in our confidence in schools. Ribicoff stated 
the nation was “deluged with newspaper articles on declining competence at all levels 
of education—from the elementary classroom student to the college professor” (p. 1). 
Ribicoff then posited the question, “Is quality education and educational opportunity 
for all still a national priority?” He answered, “If so, and I strongly feel it is, a 
Department of Education is needed” (p. 2). Through this rhetoric we see the 
expansion of the education issue to include not only the opportunity aspect, but also 
the need for quality education in all schools. The national priority was no longer 
linked only to the fight on poverty but instead to the reclamation of a past lost, a 
confidence lost.  
 Ribicoff (1977) went on to argue that the creation of the Department of 
Education was necessary because the office of education was unprepared to engage 
its new role of leadership. Ribicoff stated that the new role “includes the setting of 
standards, issuance of regulations, monitoring and evaluating programs” (p. 3). 
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Ribicoff claimed this leadership was crucial to all of the “parents of 50 million 
children, their grandparents and all those interested in our coming generation” (p. 4). 
Ribicoff’s arguments are indicative of the changing role of education policy in the 
national rhetoric. Of particular interest is his opening statement, where education 
policy seems to be detached for the antipoverty policy discussions, its categorical 
dimension; in doing so, federal education policy was also attracting a broader set of 
constituents.  
How Was the Relationship Reconstructed in 1976–1977? 
  The relationship between education and antipoverty policy was reconfigured 
during the early years of the Carter Administration. Education policy at the federal 
level in the past had been used strategically to achieve other national priorities, 
employment, defense, and welfare; the approach was categorical. By the 1960s 
education policy was being created at the federal level to help in the drive to end 
poverty. However, as Carter came to office he began to question this strategic 
investment approach. Instead, he hoped to make general improvement in education a 
priority. He sought to show that there was a new need, not supplemental to education 
but basic. Carter’s discourse resonated with the worries of others as they began to 
lose confidence in schools. In the production of this new need, the policy community 
was bringing into question the rankings of its national priorities as well as the 
assumption of education’s strategic links to antipoverty goals. Federal education 
policy was still a way to increase opportunity and fight poverty; however, it was not 
dependent on that national priority. At the same time, this approach was developing a 
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group of constituents, such as the teachers in the NEA, who were not necessarily 
invested in the goal to fight poverty.  
1978: Drawing the Lines Around Education Policy 
 The struggle to create the Department of Education was mostly fought during 
1978. Although the legislation eventually died, it was the lessons learned in this year 
that made the creation of the Department of Education possible in 1979 (A. Wise, 
personal communication, October 26, 2007). The decisions, arguments, and 
compromises of 1978 offer us another place from which to interpret the ways in 
which the policy elites explained the relationship between education and antipoverty 
policy. Specifically, I look at the ways in which the education issue was framed early 
in 1978. Then, I look at the ways in which the administration developed their vision 
of the new department. Finally, I recount the various arguments about the purpose of 
a new Department of Education that can be found in the committee hearings of 1978 
and the ways in which these policy debates politically separated education policy 
from antipoverty policy. 
Framing of the Education Issue in 1978 
The education issue was framed in two important ways in the early months of 
1978. First, it was argued that the creation of the Department of Education would 
allow education to crawl out from under the weight of the health and welfare issues. 
Second, the announcement of the administration’s ESEA renewal emphasized the 
improvement of education in general through a back-to-basics rhetoric.  
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 Pitting education against health and welfare. In an editorial in the Washington 
Post January 28, 1978, Braden (1978) argued that the office of education should be 
moved to cabinet status to signal the importance of education in general to the future 
of the nation. Braden wrote, “It is arguable that, as a function of government, 
education is more important than some other functions that now rate Cabinet status. 
Our future and our hopes for high achievement rest on education” (p. A2). He 
supported this by noting the creation of the Department of Education might require a 
larger investment, and that this might help realign U.S. priorities in spending. Braden 
rhetorically asked, “What better objective than excellence in education can we spend 
money on?” (p. A2). He contrasted this objective with the spending on other health 
and welfare priorities. Braden argued that the Department of Education was needed 
because the expenditures on health and welfare were 
based almost entirely on the numbers of aged or infirm who have a draft on 
the government. So there is little room for thinking in terms of spending 
innovatively. HEW Secretary Joseph Califano and his assistants can’t do 
much planning because their main task is to keep up with the bills. (p. A2)  
Braden’s arguments represent ways in which the social policy was pitted against 
education policy. Interestingly, he recast the federal role in education policy as a 
more general leadership for all students, while social policy was presented as an 
interest-group issue. Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and Aid to Families With 
Dependent Children were characterized as mounting accounting problems instead of 
worthy objectives. Education policy, in this argument, was almost held back by its 
unnecessary connection to antipoverty programs.  
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 A similar argument was made by Carter in the early months of 1978. On 
February 10, 1978, the White House hosted a reception for the board of directors of 
the NEA and their guests. In Carter’s remarks that afternoon, he laid out an agenda 
that was focused on the improvement of education in general. Carter (1978a) told the 
crowd of about 185 people that the administration’s education policy for the year 
would focus on “basic educational quality” (p. 1). He went on to explain that he had 
been disappointed by the fact that the subject of education rarely came up in Cabinet 
meetings. Carter (1978a) observed, “The only time it does arise is when there is a 
legal question involving civil rights or the allocation of funds” (p. 3). He then 
asserted, “As long as the educational function is buried within a large department 
with welfare and health, I don’t think that education will ever get the visibility that it 
deserves” (Carter, 1978a, p. 3). Again, here we see education posited as a separate 
issue from that of health and welfare, through a desire to separate it and elevate it. 
Carter (1978a) explained that the past connections to other social programs buried 
education and made national leadership in improving basic educational quality 
difficult. In the new agenda, the improvement of education was not linked to 
antipoverty efforts; instead it was argued that education should take a detached 
position from other policy streams and stand on its own as a national priority. 
 In this same speech, Carter (1978a) emphasized the ways in which the NEA 
could help him cobble together a new coalition. He urged educators to stay involved 
with politics and not to restrict their opinions solely to educational matters, “because 
the thrust of our Nation, what it stands for, what it is, what it can be, is your 
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responsibility, not only as a private citizen, but also I think as one who helps to mold 
opinion” (Carter, 1978a, p. 2). Like Mondale, Carter asked for support in his Panama 
Canal treaties and his push for human rights across the world. However, he did not 
address the attempt to reform welfare or the administration’s ongoing development of 
urban policy.  
 Later in the month, an editorial in the Boston Globe argued similarly that the 
education policy was important over and above its links to antipoverty policy. The 
commentator argued, “When HEW was established in 1954, it was hoped that the 
unified department would lead to the tight coordination of federal health, education, 
and welfare policies. But it just has not worked that way” (“Take the ‘E’ out of 
HEW,” 1978, p. A8). The writer believed that this possibility for coordination is less 
of a priority than the visibility of national leadership in education. The editorial read, 
“Clearly in our media-dominated society, power and influence accompany visibility 
and recognition” (“Take the ‘E’ out of HEW,” 1978, p. A8).  
 Not all people took this stance. There was plenty of opposition to the creation 
of the Department of Education, from all sides of the political spectrum. On the far 
right people worried about losing local control and further disrupting the power 
structures. Opponents from the left worried that the break up of HEW would lead to a 
break up of political coalitions that had developed during the civil rights era. This 
opposition from the left was surprising to many observers (L. Francis, personal 
communication, January 29, 2008).  
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 The opponents on the left felt the move would signal a clear shift in the 
coalitions. For example, Albert Shanker, the president of the American Federation of 
Teachers and a vice president of the AFL-CIO, argued that creating the Department 
of Education not only would remove the possibility of coordination, but also could 
also lead to defunding of HEW because constituents could not lobby as a block. On 
March 6, 1978, the Christian Science Monitor out of Boston ran a commentary and 
opinions piece regarding whether there should be a separate Department of 
Education. Shanker (1978) penned the “No” response, writing, “America’s schools 
and colleges have a significant part to play in major social programs under taken by 
the federal government” (p. 31). Shanker cited the importance of the schools role in 
job training, increased access to child-care services, and “important public health 
programs, such as the current initiative in disease immunization and adolescent 
pregnancy prevention” (p. 31). Shanker also argued,  
Federal aid-to-education programs survived the Nixon-Ford years because 
they commanded the support of a coalition of education, labor and civil rights 
groups, not because they had a department to shelter them. That coalition still 
exists in the form of the Committee for Full Funding of Education programs, a 
force to be reckoned with on Capitol Hill thanks to the AFL-CIO’s 
participation. (p. 31)  
 Ryor (1978), president of the NEA, disagreed with Shanker and wrote the 
“Yes” section of the article. In his response he was obviously not worried about the 
dissolution of the political coalitions that were connected to HEW. Ryor insinuated 
that supporters of a separate department had differing interests from the Committee 
for Full Funding of Education programs:  
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We wish to make it clear that our focus is on the individual student and how 
this nation can best provide equal educational opportunities for all its citizens. 
We are not interested in turf protection or convenience for Washington 
organizations or Washington bureaucrats. (p. 30)  
In 1978, in this exchange, many readers would have seen Shanker’s position as 
protecting the status quo, rather than a politically astute pursuit of the national goal of 
fighting poverty. For many, Ryor’s response would have been seen as advocating for 
a departure from the past. The desire for this departure was constructed by an 
increasing lack of confidence in U.S. schools in general. The stemming of this erosion 
of confidence in the educational institutions was becoming a central educational 
issue, and in its shadow the eradication of poverty began to fade as a national priority.  
 Basic skills and new audience for the ESEA. In his remarks to the press while 
introducing the ESEA proposals on February 28, 1978, Vice President Mondale 
warned that education should be at the center of the nation’s domestic policy. 
Specifically, Mondale (1978) linked education to the successful perpetuation of the 
United States as a superpower when he explained, “It is the centerpiece of our hopes 
for continued world leadership” (p. 1). Second, Mondale (1978) linked education to 
ideas of opportunity: “It is crucial to the aspirations of all Americans for freedom and 
justice and full opportunity for all of our children” (p. 1). In his conclusion Mondale 
(1978) offered a ranking for education among federal priorities: “I believe the 
Congress and the Administration are clearly united in this common goal, making 
1978 the year in which we together bring education to the forefront of our Nation’s 
domestic priorities” (p. 2).  
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 In a press release on the same day, President Carter (1978a) also asserted that 
education was a priority onto itself. He claimed that creation of the Department of 
Education would allow the education policy to free itself from the budget constraints 
of its previous position within HEW. Such an approach would “let us channel Federal 
funds more efficiently and effectively” (Carter, 1978a, p. 1). Carter (1978a) summed 
up the legislative proposals by stating that they would  
focus our Nation’s resources on helping our children master the basic skills—
reading, writing, and arithmetic—which remain critical to their ability to 
function in a complex society. We must do a better job of teaching these basic 
skills to all our children. (p. 1)  
Carter (1978a) ended his remarks by emphasizing that through this approach to 
education “all Americans will benefit” (p. 2). The federal government role was 
reframed from categorical help to a drive to help the general population learn basic 
skills.  
 Some have stated that this iteration of ESEA was not a significant departure in 
education policy (C. Cross, 2004). Cited are the ways in which, despite the rhetoric of 
a move to general support, the bill created and reauthorized over 20 categorical 
programs, including Environmental Education, Safe Schools programs, and Gifted 
and Talented programs. However, I would argue that an important shift occurred. The 
shift in the rhetoric signaled a break with the past and its coalitions. The education 
policy was pitched to a new group that was not worried about losing links to the New 
Deal and Great Society coalitions. Some of the new categorical programs, such as 
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gifted and talented education and educational proficiency standards, were advocated 
by this new audience.  
How Does This Help us Understand the Relationship? 
 In early 1978, in the press and through announcements of the administration, 
federal education policy was further disconnected from existing antipoverty 
initiatives. Education policy in the announcement of the legislative objectives and in 
editorials no longer served as a policy lever used to achieve other goals, such as 
redistribution and increased of opportunity. Instead, it became a priority and an end in 
itself. Past connections to health and welfare policy were seen as unnecessary 
connections that made it impossible for national leadership in education. The policy 
groups were pitted against each other.  
 As education became a separate issue, the voting coalitions began to crack. 
The potential loss was acknowledged by some such as Shanker (1978). However, the 
new coalition that was forming around the new education issue brushed it to the side 
and asserted that their interests were focused on individual development. This was 
contrasted with the group politics or special-interest politics that were represented by 
the labor and civil rights groups.  
The Administration’s Vision of a New Department 
The shape of the relationship between education and antipoverty policy could 
also be ferreted out in the ways in which the administration sought to construct the 
new department. In the same February 28, press briefing in which they announced the 
new ESEA proposals, the administration listed four reasons for the creation of the 
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Department of Education (Mondale, 1978): The new department would (a) let the 
administration focus on federal education policy, at the highest levels of government; 
(b) permit closer coordination of federal education programs and other related 
activities; (c) reduce federal regulations and reporting requirements and cut 
duplication; and (d) assist school districts, teachers, and parents to make better use of 
local resources. Linking an agenda of basic skills to the proposed creation of the 
Department of Education was meant to emphasize the administration’s support for the 
improvement of education in general. The rhetoric was meant to grab the ear of an 
audience concerned with efficiency and with general improvement rather than 
strategic work on categorical reasons, such as poverty priorities. This emphasis was 
woven through the struggles regarding how the department should be developed. 
 Three options. As Thanksgiving of 1977 approached, President Carter had a 
decision to make. The Presidential Reorganization Project (PRP) study on the 
creation of the Department of Education had developed three options. Each option 
represented different mixtures of political constraints and rational policy development 
on what should be in the Department of Education.  
 1. The first option requested the development of a Department of Education 
and Human Development.  
2. The second option was favored by Joseph Califano, the secretary of HEW, 
who was opposed to the creation of the Department of Education. This plan proposed 
a department would be based on the “defense type model, with undersecretaries for 
each of HEW’s three core functions” (G. Davies, 2007, p. 232).  
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3. The final option was the creation of a narrow department that basically 
would represent taking the E out of HEW.  
Carter’s decision would signal what could be categorized as education policy 
and what could not. Each of the options was “evaluated against three standards: its 
ability to improve the federal government’s capacity to develop and implement 
effective education policies; consistency with overall reorganization of government; 
and assessment of political feasibility and responsiveness to campaign positions” 
(Radin & Hawley, 1988, p. 71).  
 The PRP group strongly favored the first option. They had come to the 
conclusion that the department should be broad and should focus on helping with the 
delivery of human development services, such as Head Start, Child Nutrition, Science 
Education, and Indian Education, at the local level. They hoped that this might help 
maximize the potential for coordination of services. However, they were clear that 
they wanted to exclude the large cash transfer programs in the social welfare and 
health care areas. Politically, they believed this would sufficiently “introduce a 
diverse array of actors into the policy environment of the department who would 
bring different and needed perspectives on the problems of education” (Radin & 
Hawley, 1988, p. 71). The least attractive option was the narrow department. This 
option the PRP group felt would do little to develop “comprehensive approaches to 
the challenges associated with education” (Radin & Hawley, 1988, p. 71). The final 
approach that advocated for the restructuring of HEW in general with a development 
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of an undersecretary of education did not represent responsiveness to the campaign 
positions as outlined in the criteria.  
 On November 28, 1977, President Carter, Vice President Mondale, Secretary 
Califano, members of the Domestic Policy staff and the Office of Management and 
Budget, and PRP officials met in the cabinet room. In the meeting the Domestic 
Policy staff advocated for the narrow department; they believed it would pass the 
easiest because it would not impinge on any bureaucratic “turf.” The PRP launched 
into a presentation and the case for a broad department. Toward the end the PRP 
group also argued for an option to study the issue further. Califano advocated for 
further study. Given that he had originally been publicly against the creation of a new 
department, the others in the room suspected that he was attempting to stall the 
project, hoping it would not come to fruition (Radin & Hawley, 1988).  
 Unfortunately, the president’s decision that day was not clear. As Radin and 
Hawley (1988) recounted, after about 90 minutes of discussion, the president abruptly 
announced that he was late for a meeting of the National Security Council and that he 
wanted “the broadest possible Department of Education we can get” (p. 74). Carter 
and Mondale then left the room but did not adjourn the meeting. Adding to the 
confusion, after Carter left the room, “Domestic Policy Chief Stuart Eizenstat stood 
up and said ‘what the President said was that he wants the broadest department 
possible. What he means is ...’ And then Eizenstat went on to describe a narrow 
department” (Radin & Hawley, 1988, p. 75). This meant that the PRP, responsible for 
developing the details of the administration’s position, needed to keep searching for 
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signals on what the president actually had meant. The only thing that was clear from 
the meeting was that “the establishment of a new department would be viewed as 
evidence of Carter’s commitment to making education a high priority” (Radin & 
Hawley, 1988, p. 74).  
 Testing the waters. In early January 1978 the decision on what should be in 
the department and what should not was still not clear. The president was committed 
to providing general support to the project but was not willing to offer specifics. The 
PRP looking for some signals listened to the president’s second State of the Union 
address. In the address, Carter made it public that it was still his intention to pursue a 
separate department. On the evening of January 19 Carter stated,  
We’ve made a good start on turning the gobbledegook of federal regulation 
into plain English that people can understand. But we know that we still have 
a long way to go. We’ve brought together parts of 11 different government 
agencies to create a new Department of Energy. And now it’s time to take 
another major step by creating a new Department of Education. (as quoted in 
Radin & Hawley, 1988, p. 86)  
This statement was general and did not focus on what should be included or what 
should not. 
 In order to test the waters and get a sense of the political feasibility of the 
different possible configurations of the department, PRP staff met with various 
legislators on implicated committees. The responses were often general and expressed 
worries about the creation of a narrow department that would support the special 
interest of the NEA. In a meeting with the president’s reorganization team February 
22, 1978, Congressman John Brademas argued that he did not want to see a narrow 
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department that focused solely on the concerns of kindergarten through Grade 12 (K–
12) teachers; instead, he wanted to see a department whose focus was on the 
“comprehensive needs of children” and should include day care and Head Start” 
(Gwaltney, 1978b, p. 1).  
 On February 16, 1978, Wellford and Gwaltney met with Congressman 
Jeffords, the ranking minority member on the Select Committee on Education. 
Jeffords said that, while he had recently decided to support the creation of the 
department, he felt that other Republicans would be concerned that a department 
would “represent centralization of education at the Federal level” (as cited in 
Gwaltney, 1978b, p. 2). 
 The same group met with Senator Pell, a long-time supporter of the idea of a 
Department of Education, on February 21, 1978. Pell also wanted a department that 
was broader; however, instead of focusing on the welfare of children, he supported a 
department that would be titled Education and Culture (Gwaltney, 1978b, p.3). This 
variation would link education to the development of the arts and humanities. 
However, he also pointed out that many of his arts and humanities constituents would 
not support such an approach. Senator Ribicoff already had proposed legislation that 
would create a broad department and wanted to insure that the administration 
supported the same approach.  
  A broad department meant the possible transfer of programs out of their 
historical bureaucratic slots. Rumors of possible transfers lead to multiple appeals to 
the administration by many groups who desired to stay in their current locations in the 
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federal government. On March 22, 1978, the National Urban League sent a telegram 
to the Patricia Gwaltney, stating, “We strongly urge you to reject the inclusion of 
Head Start in the current reorganization proposal for a separate department of 
education” (p. 1). The telegram was signed by 11 individuals, including Berkeley 
Burrell, president of the National Business League; Richard G. Hatcher, mayor of 
Gary, Indiana; Jesse Jackson; Vernon E. Jordan; and Coretta Scott King.  
 The American Indian spokesmen also protested the transfer of their schools 
into the new department. Commenting on the relationship with the Department of the 
Interior, the Indian spokesman said, “They may be bastards, but they’re our bastards” 
(as cited in Radin & Hawley, 1988, p. 66). The arts community voiced strong 
opposition to being included in the department and worried they would lose their 
ability to advocate for the support of the arts. The Department of Agriculture put 
together a Save School Lunch campaign. Groups including the Amalgamated Meat 
Cutters and Butcher Workmen, National Milk Producers, United Egg Producers, and 
the American Academy of Pediatrics argued that school lunch quality was imperative 
and that only the Department of Agriculture had the expertise to regulate and research 
food quality (“Save School Lunch,” 1978). Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall (1978) 
also lobbied to make sure that the youth training and employment programs were not 
transferred out of his department. At the beginning of the memo, he summarized his 
position: 
Our employment and training programs, for youth and adults, have the 
primary purpose of providing jobs, whether through job creation, job training 
or the matching of workers and jobs. In contrast, education programs have the 
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goals of teaching basic competency and some analytical skills. There are 
certain important interrelationships between these two types of programs. 
However these missions are separate and should remain so. (R. Marshall, 
1978, p. 1) 
 Rather than propose a new bill, the administration planned to testify on the 
Ribicoff Senate Bill 991 that seemed to have large support, given its 58 cosponsors. 
The hearings were on the bill was scheduled for April 14. The PRP group prepared 
for testimony and waited for a clear decision from the president on what should be 
included.  
 A vision of a new department. It was not until the morning of the hearings that 
the PRP group received the decision. McIntyre and Gwaltney hurriedly rendered the 
decision memo into a testimony. To their surprise, given the pressures from various 
interest groups, the president had supported the broadest conception of the department 
of education (Heffernan 2001). Everything except the Labor Department youth 
services programs was advocated for transfer. Included for transfer were the National 
Science Foundation, the U.S. Department of Agriculture nutrition education program, 
the Office of Civil Rights, Continuing Education Programs for Indians, Project Head 
Start, the Department of Defense dependents’ schools, and the National Foundation 
on the Arts and Humanities (McIntyre & Eizenstat, 1978b).  
 The administration team was a half hour late and did not have enough copies 
of their testimony to distribute to all of the members of the committee but promised 
the copies would arrive shortly. Besides the members of the Senate committee, the 
room was packed with representatives from the various interest groups (Heffernan, 
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2001). Many in the room were anxious to hear the testimony, because although the 
PRP had consulted a great many interest groups, President Carter had not been clear 
on the details of his positions. After the testimony, Ribicoff was pleased and stated, “I 
want to take this opportunity to commend the President for the creation of a strong 
Department. I must confess that during the pulling and hauling I had considered doubt 
about the follow through, but it becomes apparent the President has opted for a strong 
Department of Education” (as quoted in Radin & Hawley, 1988, p. 109). However, 
the Indian groups, the Head Start groups, Science and Arts supporters, and civil rights 
activists were disappointed and shocked (Radin & Hawley, 1988).  
 The administration’s testimony represented a push for a Department of 
Education that was broad and could bring together multiple programs. Looking at the 
rationale behind the transfer of the various controversial programs, two main reasons 
were cited by the Carter Administration: (a) expansion of the concept of education to 
include things outside of the K–12 public school settings and (b) the coordination of 
more efficient delivery of services. For example, the decision memo noted that an 
advantage of transferring the National Foundation of the Arts and Humanities would 
“provide a bridge to expand the learning process beyond formal schooling through the 
support of non-academic institutions, e.g., libraries and museums” (McIntyre & 
Eizenstat, 1978b, p. 24). This expansion of the education issue was also noted in the 
rationale for the transfer of Head Start; the memo stated that the inclusion of Head 
Start would “broaden significantly the scope of the department” (McIntyre & 
Eizenstat, 1978b, p. 22).  
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How Does This Help us Understand the Relationship? 
 The vision of the new Department of Education advocated by the Carter 
Administration in the spring of 1978 represented an attempt to expand the use of 
cultural and human development as a policy lever for change. In almost every case 
the inclusion of a controversial program was meant to expand the definition of 
education outside the normal K–12 ideas. However, this expansion of education 
policy went in the direction of human development rather than an inclusion of other 
more redistributive polices such as health and welfare policy. This is evident from the 
out-of-hand rejection of the broadest configuration that created a domestic policy 
department, as advocated by Califano. The new department from the administration’s 
perspective was supposed to signal a break with past approaches. It was meant to plug 
into new interests and coalitions that were being constructed around the policy levers 
that were part of the education project. The human development priority in education 
policy began to supersede the redistribution priorities. Education policy was cast as 
part of a new policy approach, while antipoverty measures were connected to 
discredited past approaches. The shift was clear to the department’s supporters and 
just as clear to those opposed to the creation of the department. A recounting of the 
legislative fight over the transfer of Head Start brings this alignment and the 
discourses that structured them into sharp relief.  
The Transfer of Head Start: Battle Lines Are Drawn 
 One of the strongest examples of the ways in which the fight for the 
Department of Education drew lines around what was education policy and what was 
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not can be found in the 1978 battle over the possible inclusion of Head Start into the 
new department. The argument turned on the assertion that the goals of the education 
community differed in such a distinct way from Head Start goals that its inclusion 
would kill the program. Here is a very clear recognition that the links between 
education and antipoverty policy were severed. Moreover, the social interactions 
around this issue reveal the momentary registering of the intersection of dominant 
social regularities. It is Head Start’s hybridity that brings these logics into relief. It 
was partly educational and partly redistributive and therefore fit only partly with the 
new common sense that although White privilege could not be disturbed, other 
groups could invest in their identities. Also, since Head Start also functioned as an 
employment policy, in that it hired local community members as staff, it did not fit 
with neo-liberal logics. The fight over its placement represented the ways in which 
these new social regularities reconfigured the lines of domination 
 On Thursday April 27, 1978, Senator Heinz presided over a hearing of the 
Committee on Governmental Affairs in which they considered the details of Senate 
Bill 991. The first person to testify that day was Senator Edward Brooke. In his 
testimony, Brooke provided a clear explanation of the ways in which people were 
drawing lines around what was education policy and what was not. Although Senator 
Brooke was a long-time supporter of the creation of the Department of Education, he 
was deeply concerned about the inclusion of Head Start in the department. Brooke 
explained, “Head Start is not just, or even primarily, an education program. It is, as 
was intended by Congress, a comprehensive program of development and welfare 
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services for our poorest and most vulnerable children” (Heinz, 1978, p. 268). Brooke 
went on to offer a clear explanation of the ways in which the creation of the 
department would draw lines around what was education policy and what was not: 
If we ignore the many services which Head Start provides, completely distinct 
from its education programs, and classify Head Start primarily as an education 
program, which will be the result if we transfer it to the Department of 
Education, the inevitable dynamics will lead to Head Start increasingly being 
regarded primarily as just an early childhood education program. And these 
other equally needed services will be downgraded, if not in the end virtually 
discontinued, for placing Head Start in a Department of Education could well 
result in Head Start being absorbed into the established education system. This 
is not a premature or idle speculation, for important segments of the education 
system are already on record as desiring and rationalizing the absorption of 
early childhood programs such as Head Start. ... Yet at the same time 
education representatives seek to incorporate early childhood programs into 
the education system, many educators increasingly feel most strongly that the 
duty of the educational system is to teach and not to provide at school all the 
services necessary to make up for society’s or for a family’s neglect of 
children. (Heinz, 1978, p. 269)  
He then listed the successes of Head Start due its approach. Brooke noted that Head 
Start had “provided not only education, but also health, nutrition, social and mental 
health services” (Heinz, 1978, p. 270). He also attributed the success of the 
coordination of this approach to the fact that the parent involvement requirement 
creates a sense of ownership. Brooke also pointed out that this parent involvement 
element was “regarded dubiously, at times with outright opposition by segments of 
the education system” (Heinz, 1978, p. 270).  
 Brooke’s testimony provided a strong sense that the creation of the 
Department of Education would privilege a certain set of interests and priorities. He 
asserted that Head Start was not in line with these interests; instead, its interests were 
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aligned with another policy domain. It was clear to him that the interests of the 
proposed Department of Education often would be in opposition to the priorities 
implied by Head Start’s structure.  
 Representative Chisholm from New York also testified (Heinz, 1978). She 
had been a day care director, educational consultant, public school teacher, and Head 
Start director. In her testimony, she focused on the ways in which she believed the 
inclusion of Head Start would disempower its constituents. Chisholm explained, 
Head Start is a very special program to minority groups. For about a decade 
many poor, black and minority communities have relied on this program for 
comprehensive quality services to needy children at reasonable costs. ... [In 
addition], Head Start has been a means of leadership development in many 
communities where poverty, racism and sexism have kept valuable human 
resources from being identified and nourished. (Heinz, 1978, p. 279) 
Chisholm theorized,  
Perhaps it is this demonstrated potential for grass-roots community 
development that has made Head Start controversial in some circles and even 
threatening. But I say without hesitation that this potential is perhaps its most 
innovative asset. We cannot afford to undermine the program by subjecting it 
to the policy perspectives of those who have a vested interest in controlling 
the program through their own structures. (Heinz, 1978, p. 279).  
When pressed by Senator Heinz to explain why a move to the Department of 
Education would bring about domination by the education groups, Chisholm 
responded,  
The powerless and the helpless do not have the clout and the political ability 
sometimes to make their needs really known and to be able to collect the kind 
of resources that are necessary when the battle lines are drawn. ... Since this 
Head Start program involves a multiplicity of different kinds of disciplines 
and caters primarily to the unique and very specific needs of those youngsters 
who come from the most helpless and the most powerless communities ... it is 
only to be ascertained on the basis of the politics of legislation that these 
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groups will not be able to get the same kind of support as the very powerful 
educational groups in this Nation. (Heinz, 1978, pp. 281–282)  
 Chisholm testified that from the perspective of those who sought to protect 
Head Start, a hallmark of Great Society policy configurations and priorities, the 
creation of the Department of Education represented a shift in interests, priorities, and 
power. Both Brooke and Chisholm asserted that the Head Start approach would not 
survive if it were located in the new Department. They feared the institutional setting 
that was structured along discourses prevalent in the education community would 
work to assimilate Head Start and therefore change its priorities and focus on the 
interests of the poor.  
 The administration claimed, however, as evidenced by the decision memo, 
that the inclusion of Head Start would be a counterbalance to the education 
community, one that could expand the definition of education (McIntyre & Eizenstat 
1978b). Later that day, when James Parham, the Assistant Secretary for Human 
Development Services, testified on behalf of the administration (Heinz, 1978), he 
mainly gave an overview of Head Start and did not explain the advantages or 
disadvantages to the transfer. Following the testimony, Senator Heinz asked directly, 
“Do you favor or oppose transferring this very important program to the Department 
of Education?” (p. 306). Given that he was the HEW administrator in charge of the 
program, Parham responded, “It sort of reminds me how I felt when a young man told 
me he wanted to marry my youngest daughter, take her away to another city” (Heinz, 
1978, p. 306). Parham then added that the president would make “provisional 
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safeguards which will maintain and strengthen those characteristics of Head Start that 
are uniquely effective, we think, that we value” (Heinz, 1978, p. 306). Senator Heinz 
responded,  
Mr. Parham, I hope you won’t think it amiss if I characterize what you have 
just said as about the most lukewarm, half-hearted statement in support of the 
administration proposal I have ever heard from someone who is part of 
administration. (p. 307)  
Mr. Parham eventually did enumerate a few reasons for Head Start’s inclusion, 
visibility, and increased access to students through connections to the public school 
systems.  
 It appeared from Parham’s testimony that the administration itself recognized 
the ways in which the Department of Education worked to produce new national 
priorities and that these new priorities were separate from the interests of those who 
desired to protect Head Start. The administration was embarrassed by the lackluster 
testimony and asked for an explanation. Gwaltney (1978a), in a memo to the 
congressional liaison Les Francis, listed out the chain of events that led to the 
testimony and then added that Paraham claimed that he was not aware that he was to 
testify on the advantages of the transfer. Despite this lack of preparation, the 
metaphor used by Paraham was powerful: Head Start’s genealogy, its family, was 
rooted in HEW. A new department represented moving to a new town where, as 
many were doing in the late 1970s, one would go and reinvent or lose one’s self.  
 Later that day, Ms. Marian Wright Edelman, founder of the Children’s 
defense fund testified and responded to the claim that Head Start could act as a 
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change agent within the education community if it were placed in the department. In 
her testimony (Heinz, 1978) she laid out not only the lines of battle, but also the 
resources on each side of the fight. Edelman explained to the committee, 
The administration says that it views Head Start as a model for the kind of 
comprehensive, family-centered, and community-oriented education that it 
wishes to encourage. This assumes that a $600 million program will create the 
bureaucratic leverage to reform a $17 billion department supporting a $90 
billion public education system. (Heinz, 1978, p. 322) 
She then employed a powerful metaphor and argued that Head Start changing the 
education community would be the equivalent of the tail wagging the dog. It appeared 
evident to her that a program the size of Head Start would have a hard time changing 
all of public education; instead, Head Start most likely would be homogenized by the 
larger public education forces in the Department of Education.  
How Does This Help us Understand the Relationship? 
 The fight over the inclusion of Head Start into the Department of Education 
provides a clear picture of the ways in which the creation of the Department of 
Education represented a reconfiguration of national priorities. This new configuration 
interrupted and slowly replaced the past Great Society priorities. The fact that the 
supporters of Head Start fought so vigorously to keep it separate from education and 
the nonchalance with which the Carter Administration approached the transfer both 
give us insight into the ways in which the administration valued the redistributive 
aspects of Head Start. Education policy no longer needed antipoverty policy, and 
antipoverty legislation was in danger of losing its redistributive aspects if it was 
connected to education programs. The dominant social regularities of the time (e.g., 
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the protection of Whiteness as property, the stabilization of the economy through a 
reconstruction of the individual) made education policy appear to be a logical 
priority, whereas antipoverty policy appeared fragile.  
 The fight over Head Start plus other transfers such as Indian education and 
child nutrition would weigh down the legislation in 1978. C. Cross (2004) offered a 
succinct description of the bill’s demise in 1978: 
With the clock ticking and Congress faced with many more bills than they 
could handle before adjournment, the bill was scuttled. Carter did not list it as 
a high priority, and because Erlenborn and other opponents had filed more 
than 100 amendments, the leadership knew they that they could not afford the 
time the bill would take on the floor. (p. 62)  
In 1979, with the battle lines clearly drawn, the administration again would launch a 
proposal to create the Department of Education. However, this time the vision would 
be narrowed and the administration would seek support only from those in the 
education community who were detached from the other forms of social policy.  
1979: A Narrow Department  
 The bill that established the Department of Education was passed in 1979. 
While the previous year the administration had sought the broadest department, by 
early 1979 the administration had agreed with the domestic policy advisers that the 
key to creating the department centered on proposing a narrow department (A. Wise, 
personal communication, October 26, 2007). In addition, the administration’s 
argument for the department also narrowed in scope. The passage of the bill 
establishing the new department crystallized the relationship between education and 
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antipoverty programs that had been developing over the previous 3 years. The result 
was a drive to create a narrow department that would appeal to a new coalition of 
voters who were not necessarily caught up in the Great Society policy configurations.  
Narrowed Focus 
 As the Carter Administration began the legislative fight for the Department of 
Education, members were committed to a legislative victory. The passage of the bill 
“was of utmost importance. No further substantive analysis would take place. All 
resources would be devoted to negotiating and compromising” (Radin & Hawley, 
1988, p. 129). The result was a narrow approach that would not incite any further 
“turf battles.” G. Davies (2007) wrote,  
[The] Education Department that [Carter] was now prepared to endorse 
consisted of little more than the current Education Division. It looked, in other 
words, very much like the proposal that OMB [Office of Management and 
Budget] had criticized as the least desirable approach to reorganization. (p. 
39)  
 The rationale also narrowed. On July 27, 1979, Abramowitz sent a memo to 
Eizenstat and Carp. Attached was the requested briefing paper that listed past federal 
education policy approaches and also enumerated Carter Administration priorities. 
The number one rationale for the creation of the department was that “education 
should be represented at the cabinet level.” This was followed by a list of problems 
with the size of HEW and then the remedies of these problems: “The Department of 
Education will (a) reduce administrative cost, (b) reduce time spent in generating 
policies and regulations, (c) reduce unnecessary staff functions, and (d) simplify the 
operation of federal education programs” (Abramowitz, 1979, p. 4).  
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 As compared to the rationales presented in 1977 and 1978, this explanation is 
narrow. Although the focus on efficiency remains, missing are the arguments 
regarding the importance of improving education in general. Also missing is a desire 
to expand the conceptualization of education outside of schooling. The goal by this 
point was the establishment of a symbol (A. Wise, personal communication, October 
26, 2007). However, in that memo, almost as an aside, Abramowitz (1979) noted, 
“President Carter has often stated that he would like every child leaving the third 
grade to be able to read and write at grade level” (p. 3). This appeared just prior to the 
rationale for the new department and foreshadowed the ways in which the department 
would be poised to change education policy.  
A Narrow Coalition With More Depth  
 The coalition began to formalize in 1979. As G. Davies (2007) pointed out, 
besides the administration’s newfound attention, the other “new ingredient in the 
1979 [Department of Education] battle was the work of the 100-member coalition of 
lobby groups, headed by Allan Cohen” (p. 240). These lobbyists represented groups 
that included Chief State School Officers, the National Parent–Teacher Association, 
the National School Boards Association, the Secondary School Principals, the 
Council for Exceptional Children, and the American Educational Research 
Association. Mostly, these groups were able to mobilize their members. During the 
important phases of the legislative process, according to G. Davies (2007), “members 
encountered hundreds of educators wearing red, white, and blue buttons that bore the 
slogan: “A DEPRARTMENT OF EDUCATION/YES!” (p. 240). 
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 As the vote approached the coalition organized their efforts. G. Davies (2007) 
recollected, 
Anyone at the White House who had any contact with the Hill was required to 
make calls. Meetings were scheduled for the president with members of 
Congress. Commitments were exchanged. Tickets to see the Pope or to ride on 
Air Force I were given away. When asked what they had had to promise 
certain members to get their votes, the White House lobbyist replied: “Don’t 
ask because you really don’t want to know!” (p. 243)  
The coalition was devoted to the passage of the bill and recognized it was an 
important part of shifting the domestic policy. 
A Symbol of a Break With the Past 
 On September 27, 1979, the bill passed by a narrow margin. Commenting on 
the legislative victory, Carter said that it was “a significant milestone in my effort to 
make federal government more effective. We will now have a single cabinet 
department which can provide the coherence and sense of direction needed for federal 
education programs” (as cited in Houston, 1979, p. B1). The administration claimed 
that the new department would save the taxpayers $100 million in the 1st year due its 
removal of the bureaucratic underbrush within HEW. On October 17, 1979, the White 
House hosted a celebration the signing of Senate Bill 210. In the inside of the 
invitation to the celebration was a quote from the day the bill signed. In the quote 
Carter recalled,  
When I came to Washington, I was convinced that the Federal Government 
had failed to deliver adequately on its limited, but important, role in American 
education. Billions of dollars were being spent, but education programs 
continued to be denied the full-time attention from a Cabinet Secretary that 
would make these programs perform effectively.  
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The creation of the department was symbolic. It might have been a symbol of a 
commitment to improving education, but more importantly it was a symbolic break 
with past approaches to education.  
Shape of the Relationship as Judged From the Creation of the Department of 
Education 
 The drive to create the Department of Education offered new articulation of 
the relationship between education and antipoverty policy. Over the course of 3 years 
the administration repeatedly emphasized the ways in which a new department could 
elevate the general improvement of education as a national priority. In the quest for 
the elevation of education policy other national priorities, such as the War on Poverty, 
needed to be downgraded. Past linkages to health and welfare policy were seen as 
unnecessary connections that made national leadership in education difficult.  
 In addition to the shift in national priorities, there was a change in coalitions at 
the federal level. The courting of the NEA and others was an attempt to cobble 
together a new coalition of voters who were not necessarily supportive of past New 
Deal or Great Society policy configurations. In the struggle for electoral survival, the 
Carter Administration, through the choice of issues and theory of governance, enacted 
discourses that focused on self-development and the building of human capital. As 
the discourses associated with this new coalition were given center stage, past policy 
approaches were pushed to the wings.  
 The disunity of the education and antipoverty policies was the product of 
knowledge-production procedures of the time. Common sense of the time dictated 
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that the stability of economy was dependent on the accumulation of capital at the top. 
If groups were allowed to press for redistributive measures through a welfare state, 
inflation and unemployment would result. Therefore, the common conclusion was 
ceasing to invest in the development of groups such as union power. Instead, the 
focus should be on developing the individual’s ability to compete in the market. 
White privilege was protected, and minorities were told that their only recourse to 
equality was through the investment in their own identities and their ability to 
compete in the market. The dire need for the creation of the Department of Education 
as a symbol appeared to represent a need to sanctify this new common sense where 
human capital development was the goal. It was a signal that government was 
reorganizing to fit these new dominant social regularities.  
 It could be argued that the creation of the Department of Education, by 
definition, would appear to sever the links between education and antipoverty 
projects. The arguments for reorganization necessarily should show attempts pit the 
policy streams against each other, and the arguments and divisions should be 
exaggerated by the natural turf battles that are part of the bureaucracy. However, in 
this case, the separation of antipoverty and education policy was also evident in other 
policy events.  
Urban Policy: Schools Left Out of the new Partnership 
 Another important place to look for the ways in which education policy was 
reterritorialized in the late 1970s is in the Carter Administration’s development of a 
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“comprehensive” urban policy (Carter, 1978a, p. 120). The development of the urban 
policy framework reveals the administration’s estimation of the relationship between 
education and antipoverty policy by exposing the degree to which education was 
central to the antipoverty efforts. Tracing the creation of urban policy also offers a 
place from which to observe actors of the late 1970s attempting to rearticulate the 
issues that were claimed as an impetus for the Great Society.  
 Many of the issues that had prompted the War on Poverty were still present in 
cities in the late 1970s and often were worse. However, during the 1970s, poverty did 
not need to be rediscovered; the city centers were growing centers of concentrated 
poverty. According to one newspaper reporter in Philadelphia (Guthman, 1978), 
despite President Nixon’s declaration in 1973 that cities were “past the crisis 
moment,” by 1975, “New York City was teetering on the brink of bankruptcy while 
other cities, including Philadelphia, were finding it increasingly difficult to deal with 
the complex problems of poverty, joblessness, bad housing, fleeing industry, 
declining tax base” (p. A8).  
 During Carter’s campaign, he began to describe new approaches to these 
problems. On April 1, 1976, Carter delivered a speech in New York, where he 
addressed the issues of the city. In the speech he promised a break with the past in the 
form of a “comprehensive” urban policy. On the campaign trail in what is known as 
his “Great Cities speech,” Carter stated,  
Our country has no urban policy or defined urban goals, and so we have 
floundered from one ineffective and uncoordinated program to another. Hopes 
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have been raised only to be dashed on the rocks of despair when promise after 
promise has been forgotten. (Carter, 1978a, p. 120)  
A comprehensive policy would deal with problems such as “urban decay, declining 
tax base, crime, unemployment, lack of urban parks and open spaces” (Carter, 1978a, 
p. 120). His promise was to deal with the human problems rather taking than the 
brick-and-mortar approaches that had been pursued in the past, and he was dedicated 
to “the provision of a job for each person capable of holding gainful employment” 
(Carter, 1978a, p. 121). However, he would achieve this full employment through a 
partnership with private industry rather than spending on public works as in the New 
Deal era. Carter (1978a) promised to assist “local governments with urban economic 
planning and development to help them encourage private industry to invest in their 
cities” (p. 127).  
 Carter was attempting to distance himself from past approaches of dealing 
with urban issues. According to Sugrue (1998),  
Carter never wholly repudiated liberalism, as many of his detractors charged, 
but by directing attention to what he viewed as the deficiencies of federal 
urban policy, Carter served as a bridge between expansive liberalism of the 
1960s and the anti-statism of the 1980s. (p. 140)  
In this section, I assert that in the construction of this bridge a new articulation of the 
relationship between education and antipoverty education was formed. My analysis 
demonstrates that education policy was basically ignored in the development of 
Carter’s “comprehensive” urban policy. The sidelining of education policy 
contributed to the development of federal education policy as detached from the 
pursuit of antipoverty goals.  
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 I begin my discussion of Carter’s urban policy with an examination of the 
general goals of the project as it developed in 1977. I then explain the possibilities of 
education’s possible roles in the development of the proposals. Finally, I explain the 
final policy package that was presented in March 1978 and show the small role that 
was attributed to education.  
 This section is notably shorter than the previous one that dealt with the 
Department of Education. One reason is that all of my interviews, except for two, 
were with people who specialized in education policy at the time. Les Francis and 
Patricia Gwaltney were involved in the wider governmental projects (P. Gwaltney 
McGinnis, personal communication, December 11, 2007); all others were focused 
solely on education and could not speak to the urban policy initiative. Their focus on 
education is also indicative of the separation. 
Urban Policy Goals 
  According to Sugrue (1998), the thrust of Carter’s domestic policy included 
interlocking goals:  
To reduce the size and complexity of the federal government; to eliminate 
costly federal programs, particularly those that existed solely for the benefit of 
special interests; and to take power from the federal government and redirect 
it toward states and localities. (p. 141)  
These goals shaped the administration’s approach to urban policy. According to 
Carter, past attempts at urban policy failed because the urban issues had fallen under 
the purview of a number of federal agencies with “jurisdictional uncertainty, 
duplication of effort and lack of coordination” (as cited in Sugrue, 1998, p. 141).  
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 A week after Carter was elected, the mayors of the major cities met to discuss 
their potential problems and list their grievances. In response to these grievances in 
March 1977, the president created the Urban Policy Research Group (UPRG). The 
UPRG brought together a wide range of actors from multiple departments and 
different disciplines. The groups worked slowly as they orientated themselves to each 
other’s perspectives. However, by July 1977 Carter attended the National Urban 
League convention, where Vernon E. Jordan accused him of ignoring Black America. 
Stung by this criticism, Carter came back to the UPRG, set a December deadline, and 
encouraged the group to increase their outreach (Sugrue, 1998). 
  The UPRG’s focus was addressing job and population loss and physical 
deterioration as well as political fragmentation. Using the language from UPRG 
memos, Sugrue (1998) showed that within the UPRG was a strong argument that 
“neighborhood and voluntary associations” and “indigenous neighborhoods 
redevelopment programs” should be at the center of urban reform, for they alone 
could “alleviate the alienating effects of big government, big industry and big 
institutions” (pp. 143-144). However, UPRG members were quick to point out their 
approach was different from the community action programs created during the 
1960s. They criticized the community action programs because they felt that these 
programs focused on the poor and the minorities and thus resulted in a White 
backlash. Instead, the UPRG argued for a framework that was “inclusive” of White 
middle class and not “exclusive” (as cited in Sugrue, 1998, p. 144). Carter agreed and 
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believed that self-help was the answer to the blight that the federal money in the 
1960s had not stemmed.  
 Although they were not named as a central goal of urban policy, the education 
groups worked to become part of the conversation. One group, the Council of Great 
City Schools, scheduled a meeting with Bertram Carp, who was member of the 
UPRG and on Carter’s Domestic Policy staff. However, Carp could not make the 
meeting, and the Council of Great City Schools representatives met with Elizabeth 
Abramowitz. Following the meeting, to insure that they reiterated their message, the 
council sent Carp a letter on September 28, 1977, that stated their ideas on urban 
policy. Larry Harris of the Minneapolis School District laid out the importance of 
considering schools as part of the urban policy. He reminded the Carp the role the 
educator plays in the community: 
Urban educators are not the traditional American educators. They have had to 
become urban generalists. Desegregation, chemical dependency, urban 
renewal, unemployment, mobility, model cities, truancy, special education, 
refugees and other factors have forced the urban educator to become painfully 
aware of the range of negative factors at work in the inner city. (L. Harris, 
1977, p. 1)  
L. Harris (1977) then urged the UPRG to involve urban educators as “active and 
ongoing partners—in planning, in implementation and in ongoing modification of 
programs” (p. 1).  
 Besides wanting to be a part of the policy discussions, the Council of Great 
City Schools also had policy suggestions ready. At the implementation level, L. 
Harris (1977) argued there must also be involvement of the schools. To insure 
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coordination at the local level, he proposed that the UPRG consider an “Urban Action 
Agreement, which would link the county, the city and the city school system together 
as a team to implement policy” (L. Harris, 1977, p. 1) 
 L. Harris (1977) also suggested an Urban Impact Aid program. This program 
would address the growing concentration of the poor in urban centers by increasing 
funding to these areas. He pointed out that this type of aid could help address the 
issues that were related to White flight that the federal government had supported 
through out the 1960s and 1970s  
 L. Harris (1977) went on to note that the growing discourses around the 
teaching of the fundamentals did not provide much help in the complex environment 
of urban education. He wrote, “One must recognize that the old days of simply 
teaching reading, writing and arithmetic have passed” (L. Harris, 1977, p. 2). He then 
listed the multiple things that the urban school did: 
We now feed many inner city children two meals a day, we are involved with 
student health needs, we have added staff to get students to school and staff to 
keep negative elements in the community out of the school, to protect students 
and staff, we are teaching parenting and providing services to the young 
woman who is a parent and a student, we are attacking the problem of 
chemical dependency, we do face the basic and costly burden of desegregation 
which is a result of housing patterns of long standing, we are providing work 
training and support through work education programs for youth and adults, 
and we have implemented Community Education programs, including 
evening and weekend opportunities for children and adults alike. (L. Harris, 
1977, p. 1)  
L. Harris (1977) asserted that the education proposals that were good for the rest of 
the country might not help the urban schools succeed. Instead, they needed an 
approach that could address the many factors that resulted from being in the city. He 
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then reiterated the implications of the work urban schools do for the UPRG: “As 
federal government looks at urban renewal and attempts to make the inner city more 
livable, school personnel must be involved from the beginning. ... We stand ready to 
come to Washington” (L. Harris, 1977, p. 2). 
What Shape Did the Policy Eventually Take? 
 Despite this offer to help and a request to become part of the center of the 
discussion of urban issues, the education group was not included. The UPRG’s goal 
was to articulate an urban policy that was different than the Great Society programs. 
The thrust for difference is evident in an early 1978 memo that addressed the politics 
of the urban policy.  
 On January 5, 1978, Les Francis wrote a memo to the Domestic Policy staff. 
In it he outlined the political strategy for the urban policy. He maintained that the best 
approach to urban policy from a political point of view was to frame it as an urban 
investment strategy. He pointed out that how the administration dealt with the urban 
issue generally would be one of the key ways in which voters would judge the 
administration at the midterm elections.  
 Francis (1978) stated that the administration would be judged not only by the 
amount of programs they pushed through Congress, but also by the kinds of programs 
they pushed. Francis reminded the Domestic Policy staff, 
We cannot afford to forget that which was essential part of Jimmy Carter’s 
campaign of the Presidency—especially the pre-nomination phase of that 
campaign—namely the “no more programs, no more fast fix-it solutions, no 
more all wisdom resides in Washington” appeal. To a great extent, candidate 
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Jimmy Carter won the Democratic nomination and the Presidency precisely 
because he was not a traditional Democrat, he was not an advocate of past 
programs and was not an apologist for past failures. (p. 2)  
Using this argument as the general backdrop, Francis advocated for framing the urban 
policy as an “investment strategy” (p. 2). This approach would leave much of the 
responsibility for change to those who were working and volunteering at the local 
level. Francis cited a Gallup survey that described that most urban residents by 1978 
did not want to move out of the city and were “personally enlisting in the battle 
against urban decline” (p. 2).  
 Francis (1978) also argued that ultimately the President’s goal in urban policy 
should not be a greater amount of financial assistance but instead a greater 
partnership with local government. Francis abstracted from a memo from Senator 
Muskie’s subcommittee staff, “Any new federal urban policy must ... seek ... to 
restore cities to a position of greater control over their own fiscal and economic well-
being” (p. 3). This approach was contrasted with the December URPG report that, 
according to Francis, “relied solely on the old ideas which have not brought us 
results” (p. 3).  
 President Carter had read the Muskie memo and made comments off to the 
side. Next to a statement that read, “The federal government currently spends at least 
$70 billion annually on the state and local sector. We ought to be able to construct a 
reasonable and effective urban policy without adding significantly to that amount,” 
Carter wrote, “I agree” (as cited in Francis, 1978, p. 3). Francis noted that such a 
strong endorsement of local control would be considered by those in the Democratic 
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Party as too “radical.” Specifically, Francis noted that if the new approach does not 
include new money some in the “urban lobby” identify the investment strategy as a 
“cover-up for neglect, a cop-out” (p. 5). Despite these possible negatives, he 
maintained the reinvestment approach fit better with the president’s style and the 
electoral politics.  
 The focus of Francis’s (1978) memo was on the politics of the situation; 
however, there was an implied policy argument. Francis claimed that the focus should 
not be on spending more money; instead, money already spent should be invested 
more wisely. It seems evident that the goal was no longer about redistributing money 
from the wealthy suburbs to the impoverished city center; instead, it was framed as a 
wise investment.  
The Final Decision  
 A decision memo presented to Carter on March 21, 1978 (McIntyre & 
Eizenstat, 1978a), determined the final shape of the policy. It seems that Carter took 
to heart that urban policy should not represent any new spending. In the decision 
memo, McIntyre and Eizenstat (1978a) suggested a theme for the urban policy that is 
similar to the one Francis had been advocating for in his January memo. They 
suggested the theme “A New Partnership to Conserve America’s Communities.” 
McIntyre and Eizenstat (1978a) argued, 
This theme dramatizes the real commitments of the administration to urban 
conservation, but also recognizes that successful policy must be a 
partnership—involving all levels of government, the private sector and 
neighborhood and voluntary groups. It is the same theme which you stressed 
in your urban policy speeches during the campaign. (p. 13)  
 
253 
 Education issues are dealt with in Part IV of the decision memo in a section 
titled Community and Human development. One of the stated goals of this section 
was to “maintain a decent standard of living and adequate health and education 
services in existing communities” (McIntyre & Eizenstat, 1978a, p. 141). However, 
the only two education programs listed were the Cities in Schools program and Title I 
funding. 
 The Cities in Schools program was designed to assist families and students to 
achieve more productive lives and to assist troubled schools to better serve their 
students and act as a catalyst for integration of human services in local communities 
(McIntyre & Eizenstat, 1978a, p. 143). In 1978 the program was only in three cities. 
According to the decision memo the President agreed to expand the program to four 
additional cities. This is one of the few times that the president approved additional 
funds throughout the entire memo (McIntyre & Eizenstat, 1978a); however, this was 
most likely because the program was so small. Its budget was only 1.5 million in 
1970, and the proposal was to expand it to 3 million in 1979. While this was a nod to 
the importance of the connections between the schools and the communities, it was a 
small program that impacted only a few places.  
 The other proposal for the inclusion of the education community in urban 
policy was through Title I. “The policy staff recommends that due to the increase in 
funding found in the reenactment of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
that no additional funding for education be provided in the urban policy” (McIntyre & 
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Eizenstat, 1978a, p. 149). The memo also offered no ideas on the use of that money 
for the coordination of human services at the local level.  
 These two pieces represent the whole of the involvement of education in the 
development of urban policy. This is a far cry from the desires voiced in the letter 
from Minneapolis (L. Harris, 1977). Despite, the recognition by urban educators that 
their job consisted of a great deal more than the focus on the fundamentals, the 
administration saw their expansion of the “Basic Skills Programs” as a rational for 
not providing additional funds and support structures (McIntyre & Eizenstat, 1978a, 
p. 149).  
The Public Announcement 
 Education issues were not central to the formal remarks that accompanied the 
proposal to Congress. In his statement to Congress on March 29, 1978, President 
Carter outlined his comprehensive urban policy. In general the policy would “involve 
all levels of government, the private sector, and neighborhood and voluntary 
organizations in a major effort to make America’s cities more attractive places in 
which to live and more viable place in which to do business” (Carter, 1978a, p. 1). He 
then listed out the seven goals that the major proposals would achieve. In these goals 
education was not mentioned. In the first goal, the overall focus was not the 
improvement of bureaucracy, but to “improve the effectiveness of existing Federal 
programs by coordinating these programs, simplifying planning requirements, 
reorienting resources, reducing paperwork, and making Federal actions more 
supportive of the urban policy effort” (Carter, 1978a, p. 1).  
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 Carter (1978a) concluded his list of major goals with the need to “improve the 
physical environment and cultural facilities in urban areas by providing additional 
assistance for housing rehabilitation, mass transit, that arts and recreation facilities” 
(p. 2). In this goal, one would expect to find a mention of education; however, there 
was none.  
 The response to the urban policy was mixed. Most noted that it was 
reconfiguration; however, they also noted that that the plan, overall, was modest. In 
the Chicago Tribune, Neikirk (1978) summarized the urban policy in these few 
words: “He took existing programs, infused a little more money into them, and aimed 
then at the cities” (p. 1-8). According to Neikirk, the plan deserved a “temperate and 
conditional approval, and best wishes that the plan will do more good than harm” (p. 
1-8).  
 Most newspaper editors approved of the step to recognize the ways in which 
all federal policy affected cities. The Washington Post noted that the most valuable 
part of the urban policy was the “painstaking government wide review of all the 
programs anyone could think of that may have an effect on the nation’s cities and 
subsequent decision to change many of those programs that have been working to the 
detriment of urban social and economic health” ((“What’s in an Urban Policy,” 1978, 
p. A16).  
 Only in the editorial of the Akron Beacon Journal (Fitzpatrick, 1978) was 
there mention of the lack of education proposals in the urban policy. Fitzpatrick 
commented that the urban policy was not completely comprehensive:  
 
256 
For example, two of the chief concerns of those who have fled the cities for 
suburbs and rural communities in recent years have been crime and the 
decline of public schools. ... Yet those topics draw almost no mention in the 
proposed urban policy. (p. A6) 
How Was the Relationship Reconstructed Through Urban Policy?  
 The development of Carter’s urban policy reflected the administration’s desire 
to break with past policy approaches. They attempted to resonate with common sense 
of the age that devalued redistribution and favored capital accumulation. Also, it 
might be inferred that the refusal to include the education groups in the discussion 
was an assertion that the education project should be thought of as a general issue 
rather than as a categorical issue.  
 Repeatedly, the administration went out of their ways to argue that their 
approach to urban policy was separate from Great Society approaches. The new goals 
in urban policy argued for a greater involvement of city government, a reduction in 
categorical help, and a reduction in spending. In this environment, education was 
included only through the small Cities in Schools program and the acknowledgement 
that a significant amount of Title I funding went to the schools. The urban schools 
coalition’s arguments were mostly ignored.  
 The president’s urban policy approach seems to have been an enactment of the 
social regularities of the day. In the assertion that the policy approach must be 
inclusive of White interests while investing in the needs of the cities reflects an 
assumption that White expectation of privilege could not be disturbed. At the same 
time, the social regularities made the economic solvency of the city the most visible 
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problem. The common sense of the age also asserted that the solution to this problem 
was to free up the market forces. The urban policy supported enacted this by 
authorizing the federal government to play a major role in the encouragement of 
private investment.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I answered the following question: How did people during the 
Carter Administration explain the relationship between education and antipoverty 
policy? I doing so I provided insight into the ways in which the Great Society 
priorities and domestic policy configurations, ones that linked poverty and education, 
were let go, superseded, or forgotten. Specifically, I showed how during the policy 
events of the creation of the Department of Education and the creation of urban 
policy, education policy was distanced from its previous links to antipoverty goals 
and priorities. As a result, the issue of education became a national priority unto 
itself. The change in the relationship between education and antipoverty policies 
allowed for the development of new coalition of voters who were animated by 
interests in the development of the individual.  
 In the battle to create the Department of Education, the administration and the 
press continually pitted antipoverty and education priorities against each other and 
argued for an elevation of education issues as national priorities. In the past, federal 
education policy had been dependent on the pursuit of antipoverty goals. By the late 
1970s, in the quest for the elevation of education policy, antipoverty programs were 
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continually characterized as drags on the system. Past linkages to health and welfare 
policy were seen as unnecessary connections that made national leadership in 
education difficult.  
 In addition to this reconfiguration of policy priorities, there was a change in 
the political coalitions at the federal level that supported education policy. The 
courting of the NEA and others was an attempt to cobble together a new coalition of 
voters who were not necessarily supportive of past New Deal or Great Society policy 
configurations. In the struggle for electoral survival, the Carter Administration, 
through the choice to create the Department of Education, enacted discourses that 
focused on self-development and the building of human capital. As the Carter 
Administration enacted these discourses, past policy approaches became less 
appropriate or viable.  
 The administration’s attempt to create comprehensive urban policy also 
signaled that the relationship between education and antipoverty policy had changed. 
For the most part, education policy was minimized from Carter’s urban policy. The 
rationale provided at the time was that the administration was dealing with urban 
education through a specific education policy focus in the creation of the Department 
of Education. But this logic contributed to the separation of antipoverty and education 
policy. The reconfiguration of education policy would take place in separate policy 
discussions from one of the main targets of antipoverty policy, the urban center. At 
the same time, education policy was independently being generalized, and its 
categorical aspects were being challenged. Carter’s desire to separate policy streams 
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and to develop rational, comprehensive policy approaches allowed for the 
realignment of national priorities.  
 The redevelopment of the relationship between education and antipoverty 
policy took place at a historical moment in which people across the United States 
were attempting to construct new ways of living. These changes engendered an 
uneasy mood that was a combination of a shifting common sense and people’s ability 
to make sense of their world. This mood helped construct what was considered 
possible in American social policy.  
 As people became dismayed by the persistence of equality issues, despite 
equal protection under the law, they looked for other ways to work toward equality. 
The elevation of education as a national priority became a visible strategy at the time 
because it did not require a necessary redistribution of privilege and it would allow a 
concomitant strategy to invest in other identities. At the same time, as people 
searched for greater personal freedom through education, it became clear that this 
strategy had to be disconnected from the antipoverty policies that were supported by 
suspect interest groups, whose demands for conformity were seen as standing in the 
way of social well-being.  
 Thus, in the late 1970s we see the separation of education and antipoverty 
policy at the federal level, not only bureaucratically, but also in the rhetoric of 
national priorities. As a result, education policy became more greatly aligned with 
human capital development and further detached from more redistributive policy 
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frameworks. The rearticulation in the social regularities regarding race, property, 
individualism, and domestic stability remade the possible in domestic social policy.  
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CHAPTER 7: THE POLICY DEBATE TODAY 
 
 In chapter 1, I reviewed research that showed that segregation along racial and 
socioeconomic lines has been a hallmark of U.S. life, especially in the urban centers 
in the second half of the 20th century. Currently, children who live in poverty, when 
compared to wealthier children, suffer more illness with less access to health care, 
live in lower quality and less stable housing, and walk through more dangerous and 
less hopeful neighborhoods (Berliner, 2005). These differences in income, health 
care, housing, and communities greatly contribute to the success students enjoy at 
school. Schools serving privileged students are 89 times more likely than 
nonprivileged schools to be consistently high performing (D. Harris, 2007). The 
quality of the schools these students attend has a powerful influence; however, the 
out-of-school factors associated with poverty also play a limiting role (Berliner, 
2005).  
 This is true for a large number of students. Researchers have estimated that 
20% of American children live in poverty (Blank, 1997; Iceland, 2003). The United 
States has the second highest percentage of children in poverty among the 26 
wealthiest countries (Berliner, 2005). In the southern United States, over half of the 
students in public schools come from poor families (Viadero, 2007).  
 Despite the growing number of students who experience these impediments, 
many claim that equality of educational opportunity is not dependent on other social 
conditions (S. Carter, 2000; Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 2003). They claim that any 
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attempt to recognize the powerful influence of poverty is just a strategy for making 
excuses for schools. This framework has become a powerful discourse that limits how 
we think about education policy.  
 It has become common sense that the achievement gap is the fault of the 
failing schools. At the same time, people believe that the dominant way in which we 
define our problems in education (e.g., poor teaching, low standards) as well as the 
policy levers that are posed as solutions (e.g., standardization, mass testing, and 
aggregate accountability measures) are rooted in a response to human nature and are 
therefore are indispensable. There is a sense that the naturalness of the current policy 
regime is predicated on proof that past policy levers, such as those that linked 
education and antipoverty policy, failed.  
 When I was teaching in high-poverty schools I was disturbed by the 
dissonance between this common sense and my own experiences. This research 
represents my attempt to come to grips with that dissonance. I was prompted to this 
work by the question, “What counts as education policy?” (Anyon 2005b). I was 
struck by this question because it asks us to reconsider the possibilities for improving 
the well-being of children. In this study, I historicize the common sense that limits 
our understandings of the possibilities for ensuring that kids have healthy 
neighborhoods and healthy schools. In doing so, I tried to shake this false self-
evidence of our current common sense and point to the historical contingency of our 
policy approaches.  
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Purpose of Chapter 
 In this chapter my goal is to offer an answer to the question: What lessons can 
be taken from a historical deconstructive analysis of this policy issue for 
contemporary educational policy? In doing so, I assert that denaturalizing our current 
understandings of education policy opens up our future possibilities for critical 
engagement. Specifically, I argue that historical deconstruction presented in the 
previous chapters offers insight into and prompts us to ask questions about two 
elements of the current policy debate around what counts as education policy. First, 
the historical narrative presented in this study helps us understand the ways in which 
the social regularities of the day, from which we construct our possibilities, are in 
flux. I assert then that to understand the current policy debate, we must look at how 
the social regularities we enact construct our view of the possibilities. Second, this 
study has shown that the development of policy frameworks through an enactment of 
these dominant social regularities also produces valorization of some interests and 
discrediting of others. Therefore, we must work continually to insure that we create 
process structures that bring as many people into the policy discussion as possible. 
 I begin by first explaining how my theoretical and methodological approach 
has helped bring the importance of these two elements into focus. I then review how 
my approach helped me historicize the present common sense. Finally, I tentatively 




The Helpfulness of Critical Policy Analysis 
 In order to understand what we can learn from the historical narrative in 
chapters 4, 5, and 6, we first must be clear about what my methodology makes visible 
and how this information can help us in policy discussions. In this study I have 
heeded the advice that policy research should not be understood solely as an attempt 
to find answers to some research questions on a policy issue or social problem. 
Instead, it should be considered “interpretational forays into the dynamic 
complexities of high modern society” (Ball, 2005, p. 1). In doing so, I have directed 
my attention to the ways in which social problems are socially and historically 
contingent at the ontological and epistemological level (Scheurich, 1997). This 
liquidity of problem and solution definition thus forced me to understand the policy 
documents as open, awkward, incomplete, and unstable texts that may be read an 
infinite number of ways (Ball, 2005). 
 Thus, given that the meanings of policies are always being made and remade, 
the critical policy analyst must become attuned to the “theoretical constitution of 
facticity” (Fischer, 2003, p. 14). In other words, the goal of the analyst no longer 
becomes the triangulation of truth in order to make the best policy decision. Instead, 
the best decision is reached through a deliberative dialogue. The analyst facilitates the 
dialogue through descriptions of how different actors in the policy discussions 
construct their arguments (Fischer, 2003). 
 This theoretical orientation has some practical implications. The deliberation 
must be more than an intellectual exercise; it must help us make a decision about how 
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we will allocate resources. In order to facilitate this decision, Fraser (1989) pointed 
out, “In late capitalist welfare state societies, talk about people’s needs is an 
important species of political discourse” (p. 161). In this assertion Fraser pointed to 
the ways in which people make political claims based on an argument of “exactly 
what various groups of people really do need and who should have the last word in 
such matters” (p. 161). She asked us to pay attention to the ways in which needs are 
socially constructed and what kinds of “needs talk” are more powerful than others. In 
doing so, a critical policy analysis can reveal the power relations that make one 
definition of a problem more likely than others.  
 Given that this approach recognizes no real fundamental categories from 
which we can make a final appeal, these problem definitions or needs claims must be 
judged in two pragmatic ways. First, in order to judge which interpretation of 
people’s needs is better than another, we must pay attention to the differences in how 
one interpretation comes to the forefront over another. In other words, we should look 
at the ways in which the social construction of knowledge is tied to the exercise of 
power. at how common sense replicates the power structure. Second, we must look at 
who took part in this needs definition. As Fraser (1989) pointed out, “In general, 
procedural considerations dictate that, all other things being equal, the best need 
interpretations are those reached by means of communicative processes that most 
closely approximate ideals of democracy, equality and fairness” (p. 182). Thus, we 
should look first at how people at the table construct their knowledge and second at 
who is at the table. 
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 The historical narrative presented in this study helps on both counts. 
Specifically, it contributes to our understanding of how, in the late 1970s, a common 
sense was constructed that separated education and antipoverty policies. Second, this 
narrative helps show the ways in which this time defined who got a seat at the table as 
the government attempted to define educational needs.  
Lessons From my Historical Analysis 
 A goal of this study was to paint a large enough picture to show not only what 
people in the late 1970s identified as the policy issues and policy solutions, but also 
what problems and solutions became unthinkable or discredited (Scheurich, 1997). I 
assert that my portrayal of the time in chapters 4, 5, and 6 helps us first by offering an 
interpretation of some of the ways in which it became common sense to separate 
education and antipoverty policy at the federal level. Second, I argue that the 
narrative gives us insight into some of the ways in which we decide who should be at 
the table in our current education policy discussions.  
Lessons About Common-Sense Production 
 The move to separate education and antipoverty policy coincided with a 
complex set of changes that occurred throughout U.S. society. This move was 
partially the result of the development of a common sense and a mood that was 
attached to the ways in which people regularized interactions around race, property, 
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individuals, and domestic stability. Seeing these policies as separate was part of a 
redevelopment of national priorities in the federal government.  
Common Sense is a Coconstruction of the Context 
 In chapter 4, I described the social and historical context in which the Carter 
Administration attempted to rearticulate new national priorities. Carter’s choice of 
symbols was strikingly different from those employed by the Johnson Administration. 
However, placed amongst the multiple and complex changes that were unfolding over 
the course of the 1970s, it is clear that with his speech, Carter was trying to resonate 
with these changing modes of life.  
 Over the course of a little over a decade there were changes in what people 
expected from the economy, their home life, their gender roles, the shape and location 
of their communities, and the ways in which they entertained themselves. The 
expectation that the economy would continue to grow at a record pace was soon 
replaced by a sense that the economy could not be counted on to deliver. At the same 
time, gender roles were being reorganized. Women and men sought to try new 
identities and argued for the validity of these identities. These identities were often 
modeled on images from mass media that were becoming more prominent in the lives 
of people; however, due to technological changes, most people were beginning to 
experience these media privately and along slimmer demographic lines. Many people 
who had grown up in the Northeast found themselves moving away from their 
extended family and to the Sunbelt. Many people moved to suburban homes that were 
built around the use of the automobile. In addition, the political coalitions that had 
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been developed throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s began to dissolve, and many 
southern Democrats began to change their party affiliation to Republican.  
 When situated amongst these changing expectations, the rhetoric of the Great 
Society claiming that we should use our growing wealth to invest in a stronger public 
seemed defunct. Carter, therefore, tried to push for a new set of priorities that would 
focus on rational and efficient government. However, in his push for a rational 
approach he privileged a certain rationality.  
Common Sense Represents an Intersection of Bundles of Social Regularities 
 This rationality is actually better understood as a mood. In chapter 5 I defined 
this mood as a combination of the common sense and emotions that fomented in the 
reconstruction of daily life in the 1970s. In the chapter I explained a few of the many 
scattered practices and discourses, or social regularities, that allowed the performance 
of knowledge or common sense of the late 1970s. In doing so I have offered an 
interpretation of how certain explanations and practices around education and 
antipoverty policy became intelligible, valorized, or deemed as natural, while others 
became discounted, impossible, or unimaginable (Britzman, 2003, p. 244). 
 Specifically, I explained that the common sense that developed partially 
represented an intersection of the bundles of social regularities around Whiteness and 
property with the bundles of social regularities around individualism and domestic 
stability. In the late 1970s it became common sense that the property right that had 
been invested in Whiteness could not be undone. Thus, many felt the only recourse 
was an investment in other identities. When color blindness was coopted to hide 
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White privilege, the integration ideals and the redistributive elements of the Great 
Society programs became suspect. At the same time, it also became common sense 
that a new definition of the individual was required in order to maintain domestic 
stability. Neo-liberal arguments offered a domestic stability that was built on 
economic stability. According to these logics, economic stability was the result of 
capital accumulation (including human capital) and robust entrepreneurship. It 
became common sense that past more communitarian constructions of the individual 
should be shed for a new construction that focused on entrepreneurship. This 
resonated with the desire of many individuals to find stability through a focus on the 
self. Looking inward, it was felt, would allow people to transcend the trappings of the 
daily grind and promote a communion with a transcendent force. It was common 
sense, therefore, to focus on one’s personal interests in the name of the invisible hand 
that would ensure increased stability.  
 This common sense validated feelings of dismay, dissatisfaction, anger, and 
suspicion. The combination of these represented the general malaise of the era. It also 
prompted a reconfiguration of policy priorities. As seen in chapter 6, the elevation of 
education as a national priority resonated with the mood. The desires for policy goals 
that would focus on the individual and allow for the investment in identities found 
validation in the mood of the time. At the same time, antipoverty policies that pushed 
for redistribution became suspect. The solidarity that was required to push for 
redistribution did not fit with the growing investment in individualism. 
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 This study helps us understand that the possibilities in our fight to improve the 
well-being of children are structured by the enactment of social regularities of the 
day. A careful investigation of these social regularities can be offered as a resource 
from which people in the policy discussions judge the politics and philosophy of 
others as well as their own—an important activity in our continuing community 
struggle for betterment and fairness. 
 It is important to remember that these social regularities operate together and 
are coconstructed by each other. At the same time, they are not perpetually 
interlocked; if I have shown anything, I hope it is that social conditions are always in 
flux and thus open for critique. Therefore, we should resist the temptation to see such 
research as a diagnosis of the social order as a whole. We also should resist the 
temptation to isolate one social regularity, such as individualism, and make it the 
target of attack. Instead, we should work on multiple fronts and recognize, as much as 
possible, the relationships between our practices and discourses.  
Lessons About who is Sitting at the Table 
 If there is no final truth for us to base our allocation decisions on, then it is 
imperative that we work toward getting as many voices as possible into the 
discussion. Striving for this ideal is difficult work in the complicated and specialized 
world that is federal governance. Carter desired this as one of his key goals of his 
administration. However, ultimately, his desire for comprehensive, rational plans that 
were focused on one issue at a time limited who was at different policy discussions. 
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These limits were evident in both the fight to create the Department of Education and 
the creation of the president’s urban policy. 
The Creation of Policy Communities in the Creation of the Department of Education 
 In the creation of the Department of Education the administration sought to 
compartmentalize and symbolically elevate education policy at the national level. In 
doing so, past coalitions between labor, antipoverty groups, health care lobbies, and 
education interests were broken apart. This can be seen in the both the fight to keep 
the Head Start program out of the new Department of Education and the disregard for 
arguments such as those made by Shanker (1978), the president of the American 
Federation of Teachers. Shanker argued that the new department would remove the 
possibility of coordination and lead to a defunding of HEW. He believed this would 
result if the past coalitions could not lobby as a block. However, those who favored 
the creation of the department did not seem to fear this, because they believed that 
their interests were not necessarily related to those of labor, health care, or 
antipoverty groups. Instead, their focus would be the improvement of schools to 
insure each individual student could learn. As they claimed independence from other 
interests, they narrowed the scope of education policy discussions to focus on the 
child as a student only. This approach reshaped who was included in the education 
policy community.  
 A mirror of this dynamic can be seen in the Head Start fight related in chapter 
6. During this policy struggle, it became clear that those whose interests were not in 
line with the dominant education community did not want to be included in the 
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Department of Education. They feared that inclusion of Head Start into a department 
that was focused on the development of the student, rather than on the community, 
would lead to a refashioning of the program. Due to this fear of homogenization, 
Head Start supporters asserted that they were not part of the education community as 
the department would define it. Both of these examples show the ways in which the 
education policy community was narrowed during the late 1970s.  
The Creation of Policy Communities in the Creation of Urban Policy 
 The creation of the urban policy was involved a sorting of policy 
communities. The lack of inclusion of urban school groups into the discussions of the 
development of urban policy in effect disinvited them from future policy discussions. 
Their overture for inclusion was denied, mainly based on the assumption that 
education was being dealt with elsewhere, which signaled that schools operated 
separately from their communities. This meant that the issues of the urban schools 
would need to be addressed in the education community rather than by the policy 
communities that dealt with urban development. This sorting of policy communities 
in the late 1970s partially contributed to the ways in which the linking of the policy 
discussions today is almost unthinkable.  
A Tentative Application of the Emerging Issues 
 Cavanaugh (2007) reported, 
Not only did many industrialized countries outperform the United States in 
science on a recent international exam, but American students' academic 
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achievement was also more likely to be affected by their wealth or poverty 
and family background than was their peers' in higher-scoring nations. (p. 1) 
The report that was issued on the results of the test concluded, “Socioeconomic 
factors appeared to be less of a factor in higher-scoring nations is no accident” 
(Cavanaugh, 2007, p. 1). The Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, who administered the tests, concluded, “Quality and equity need 
not be considered as competing policy objectives” (as quoted in Cavanaugh, 2007, p. 
1).  
 In this study I have historicized the Paris group’s conclusion. I have shown 
how in the United States these policy objectives came to be competitively pitted 
against each other rather than reciprocally connected. I also have shown that if we are 
to think carefully about how we can develop an approach that recognizes the 
connections between education and poverty, we must engage in a deliberative policy 
discussion that brings as many groups to the table as possible. In the policy 
discussions, studies like this one must serve to facilitate a better understanding of how 
we construct our common sense, so that we may judge the ways in which we are 
defining the needs of people. Also, we must look at the ways our common-sense 
notions and our bureaucratic structures, existing or proposed, narrow or expand our 
policy communities.  
 Briefly, I offer a few remarks about these two issues in today’s discussion of 
poverty and education. First, I discuss the construction of common sense in today’s 
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context. Second, I discuss the ways in which policy communities are being 
developed.  
Today’s Common Sense 
 As I mentioned above, if I have shown anything, I hope I have shown that our 
social regularities are open and in flux. They are continually reshaped through our 
interactions with our context and each other. They intersect and are bundled in 
multiple ways across multiple places. The longevity of their replication is variable 
and dependent on an almost infinite number of possibilities. For example, some of the 
elements of the commonsense that developed in the late 1970s persist, whereas others 
have faded or been recombined. 
 In particular, ideas around neo-liberalism and capital accumulation are still 
prevalent in our policy discussions (Duggan, 2003; Harvey, 2007) During George W. 
Bush’s presidency the rich have received multiple tax cuts in the name of economic 
security for all. The idea of the individual as the entrepreneur and as human capital 
still pervades many U.S. policy discussions (L. Davies, 2002; Spring, 1997) At the 
same time, critical theorists still point to the protection of the property right in 
Whiteness as a major logic in affirmative action and integration cases (Delgado & 
Stefancic, 2000).  
 However, people who are beginning to feel a dissonance between this 
common sense and their own experiences are pragmatically questioning the 
individualist suspicions of redistribution efforts. Some in education are questioning 
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the reliance solely on education to achieve a fairer society. For example, a teacher 
named Juliet Luther in a letter to the editor of Education Week concisely conveyed 
the power of the current common sense and her desire to resist it. Luther (2007) 
wrote, 
It was gratifying to read William A. Proefriedt's Commentary “Outsider in the 
Locker Room” (Dec 6, 2006) after so many years of suppression of the 
opinions, views, and, indeed, even the research findings of all those educators 
who attempt to discuss socioeconomic-status factors in student achievement, 
only to be ruthlessly shouted down. Teachers who are willing to speak of 
these issues are told in a variety of ways that they are not confident in the 
abilities of students who have historically done poorly in school, or have left 
without graduating. Worse, it might be implied that these teachers are racists 
who hold negative views about the children of ethnic minorities. All to 
support the notion that simply upholding standards, planning lessons 
“aligned” with standards, and measuring outcomes according to the standards 
is enough. Mention children who lack sufficient food, sleep, or a place to call 
home, who have no books or access to books, or suffer the effects of poverty 
in other ways, and you may find yourself accused of espousing a deficit view 
of them. I concur with others who believe that the nation's children would be 
far better served by investment in initiatives to address poverty than in more 
standards programs or standardized testing in schools. (p. 29) 
Luther’s assessment calls for a reassessment of the grid of social regularities that link 
race, individualism, and redistribution.  
 At the same time, the symbols of the past are continually recombined and thus 
blur the arguments that established the commonsense of the late 1970s. For example, 
although Carter’s goal of creating a Department of Education was an attempt to set 
himself apart from past Great Society approaches, recently the Department of 
Education building was named for Lyndon B. Johnson (Hoff, 2007). Representative 
Green, who spoke to support the bill, noted that the naming of the building set federal 
priorities on a new course: “Before, educational opportunity in America was not a 
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national priority, as it continues to be today for both our parties, including current 
President George W. Bush” (as quoted in Hoff, 2007, p. 24). Depending on the ways 
in which this new symbol is accepted or rejected, it has the power to hide from view 
or remind people of Johnson’s approach to social issues. It can either hide from us or 
remind us of the ways in which education and antipoverty priorities shifted places 
during this time span. 
 Therefore, as we engage in education and antipoverty policy discussions 
today, we must be aware of the ways in which priorities have changed over time. We 
must strive to be aware that our new priorities will be built out of a common sense 
that is emerging and is the product of experiences and memories. We ourselves are 
trying to resonate with the feelings of rejection, pride, and distrust that past politics 
and common sense have come together to produce.  
Today’s Policy Communities 
 In the current policy debates around the relationship between education and 
antipoverty policy we suffer from a silo effect that was partially constructed during 
the Carter era. These silos are consistent through the policy-making community, the 
universities, and the bureaucratic structures. Our attempts to consider education and 
poverty issues in tandem require that we reach across buildings, disciplines, and 
organizations. Doing so will take a conscious effort that can transcend budgets and 
scarce allocations.  
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 For example, in August 2007, federal officials announced that they planned to 
save HHS $3.6 billion by cutting reimbursement to public schools for identifying and 
treating students through Medicaid (Samuels, 2007). The schools long have been the 
place where students who were eligible for aid have been identified. The elimination 
of this funding would remove this responsibility from the school. The funds are 
mostly used to pay for school nurses and school psychologists. These employees are 
often required to provide handicapped students with needed services that the schools 
are required by federal law to provide. The HHS officials noted, “Medicaid is an 
extremely costly program, and we have to make dollars stretch as far as possible” (as 
quoted in Samuels, 2007, p. 17). In response, the school officials claimed, according 
to Samuels, that “Medicaid is shifting its responsibility to pay for poor students onto 
cash-strapped school districts” (p. 17). Here the issue is not priorities but money. 
Given that the schools and HHS are competing for the same shrinking domestic 
funds, their ability to work together to help the neediest students is reduced to finger 
pointing. 
 However, these divisions are not insurmountable, especially at the local level. 
For example, in Portland, Oregon, the city and the school system teamed up to launch 
a program to “help families with housing costs so they can afford to rent or buy 
homes and—city officials hope—send their children to city schools” (Gewertz, 2007, 
p. 8). August 1, 2007, the city council passed a measure that would set aside $1.6 
million to keep families with children in inner Portland and to boost school 
enrollment. Specifically, the measure  
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sets aside $950,000 for grants to school or community groups to promote 
neighborhood schools. It also establishes a $450,000 pot of rental-assistance 
money for families whose children attend some of the city's most 
underenrolled schools, and a $200,000 cash reserve to provide about 40 
below-market-rate supplementary mortgages to help families buy homes. 
(Gewertz, 2007, p. 8)  
A 20% drop in enrollment in the school district over the past decade spurred 
the collaboration between the schools and the cities. This drop in enrollment 
also resulted in a “loss of more than $58 million in state funding” (Gewertz, 
2007, p. 8). School and city officials recognized that if housing costs could not 
be controlled, school funding would continue to drop.  
 In this example we see a way in which funding issues brought people 
together to address connected issues. In addition to the immediate need to 
stem the loss of state funding, there is a sense that school quality can be 
improved only by improvements in neighborhoods. For example, Portland has 
developed the Rosa Parks Elementary School, opened in 2006 and part of a 
“new development that replaced a school and a housing project with homes 
for a mix of low- and middle-income families” (Gewertz, 2007, p. 8). City 
money, school district money, and nonprofit money was used to develop a 
community campus, which includes space that is shared by the Boys and Girls 
Clubs and the school. A Portland official said, “It makes so much sense not to 
have these be separate silos. We want to end the attitude that says, ‘There is 




  There is nothing stable or inevitable about the alliances that have 
worked to isolate education and antipoverty policy communities. The barriers 
between these disciplines and departments were the products of the concerns 
and the times in which they formed. Our times and coalitions are constantly 
being reformed.  
Conclusion 
 In this study I have shown that in the late 1970s, as people explained the 
relationship between education and antipoverty policy, they claimed that the two 
needed to be separated in order to elevate education policy to a national priority. A 
review of the context and the mood of the time showed this change in the relationship 
coincided with a shift in modes of living and peoples’ common-sense explanations of 
race, entitlement, individualism, and domestic stability. This historical treatment of 
the relationship between education and antipoverty policy reveals that in our efforts to 
better our society and live up to our ideals of fairness, we should pay careful attention 




APPENDIX: DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Actor: the capacity generated by social regularities in our interactions that 
allows people to speak as a member and carrier of a role in a specific time and place. 
For example, the social regularities that establish a person’s student role in a specific 
family generate the person’s ability to act as a student in that institution.  
Agent: the capacity generated by social regularities in our interactions that 
allows people to speak as a member and carrier of a social stratum. For example, the 
social regularities that establish a person’s class generate the person’s ability to act as 
a member of that class. (This is the more stable part of personhood and is 
contradictory to the common idea of the agency.) 
Antipoverty policy: This is a general term that refers to federal policies aimed 
at relieving the conditions of poverty. At the federal level, these include housing 
policies, the past Aid to Families With Dependent Children (now Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families), and other in-kind programs such as Food Stamps. 
Each of these programs has its own details and troubles, which is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Other general terms, such as welfare or social policy, are equally 
acceptable.  
Education policy: This is a general term that refers to the range of federal 
policies that support education. While the main focus in on the ESEA (1965) and its 
iterations, I am also interested in prekindergarten and higher education programs and 
their relationship to antipoverty programs.  
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High-poverty neighborhoods: Neighborhoods in which >40% of residents fall 
below the poverty line.  
Historical figure: This term is meant to represent a person in the past. This 
word encapsulates all aspects of personhood: agent, actor, and subject. 
Historicize: the process by which we make the contingency of social life 
apparent.  
Poststructural: A set of theoretical concepts that recognize that all meaning is 
generated through social interaction. The meaning of concepts or objects only exists 
in relationship to other meanings. This implies that there is no foundational place 
from which to judge “truth.” Thus, all life is social and historically contingent. This 
has large implications about the stability of our knowledge as well as our ability to 
represent our knowledge.  
Social regularities: According to Scheurich (1997), social regularities can be 
understood in the following way: In any moment in history, multiple historical 
processes (such as the fiscal policies; accountability regimes; or discourses on the 
individual, race, opportunity, and equity, among others) become the emergent rules 
by which social interactions are made regular.  
Subject: the capacity generated by social regularities in our interactions that 
allows people to speak as a narrator of their own experience. This capacity is a voice 
that is aware of its own vocality. While not all configurations of social regularities 
allow for the constitution of this capacity in historical figures, it is nevertheless 
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